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ABSTRACT 
Globalisation is one of the defining phenomena of today’s economy, albeit one that is 
loosely defined and prone to exaggeration. For many, globalisation is an opportunity, 
affording scope on the supply side for increased specialisation, enhanced diffusion of 
technology, and a competitive spur to innovation and productivity growth. Yet for 
others, globalisation is perceived to be a threat to the values, institutions and policies 
that have underpinned post-war Europe’s success and way of life, in short to social 
Europe. This study examines the social impact of globalisation for the EU economies 
and the policy challenges that arise. It starts by looking at the conceptual background, 
then provides an extensive empirical analysis of the different facets of globalisation 
and its social dimension, and moves on to discuss policy issues. The study’s key 
message is that the EU as a whole will gain from globalisation, but that these gains will 
not be uniformly distributed across individuals, regions and countries. Nor will they 
accrue automatically, but will instead depend on successful adaptation and well-
judged policy responses. In particular, the EU has to balance its efforts to boost 
competitiveness and to transform its economy by adopting and implementing policies 
that smooth the adjustment process and offer sufficient protection to those vulnerable 
to the changes and uncertainties that globalisation will bring. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Key messages 
1.  There can be little doubt that globalisation is having, and will continue to have, a 
pervasive influence on 21st century economic and societal developments. 
International flows of goods, services and capital have all increased substantially 
relative to output, especially over the last two decades. Yet, much of the increase 
in exposure to international competition confronting EU member states is, in fact, 
the result of European economic integration. 
2.  An important aspect of globalisation is that the world’s two most populous 
countries – China and India – have reintegrated into the world economy after 
decades of comparative isolation. Together with the reintegration of former 
communist countries in Europe, this has meant that the supply of labour available 
at the global level has greatly expanded, as has the number of global consumers 
and hence the size and diversity of the potential market for EU exporters. 
3.  Globalisation has to be seen in perspective, however. As a proportion of GDP, 
world trade reached a peak before the start of the First World War and it is only in 
the last decades that it has returned to these levels. As a proportion of the 
population, international migration is still less extensive than it was a hundred 
years ago.  
4.  A distinctive feature of the present wave of globalisation is the intensity of (mostly 
two-way) capital flows, including foreign direct investment (FDI). Although for 
most OECD countries FDI still accounts for a relatively small proportion of overall 
investment, it is a key source of capital and know-how for a number of 
developing countries and has been significant for some EU member states such as 
Ireland. Asian investment in the richer countries also deserves to be highlighted. 
5.  At a deeper level, globalisation can be attributed to underlying drivers of 
economic, political and social change. These include the long march towards 
market liberalisation that has characterised the period since the 1950s, the collapse 
of communism, demographic developments and technological change. Advances 
in information and communication technologies have had a very pronounced 
effect on the organisation of economic activity, as have the falling costs of 
transport, and technologies now flow across borders more readily and more 
rapidly. To illustrate the point, total freight costs for trade between developed 
countries are relatively trivial at 4% of the value of trade: two examples are that 
transport charges represent only 2% of the cost of a television shipped from Asia 
to Europe and 1.2% of the cost of a kilo of coffee. Similarly, at today’s prices, a 
three-minute telephone call between New York and London would have cost $293 
in 1931, $1 in 2001, and is now just a few cents – for a hugely better connection. 
6.  These trends have been associated with growing prosperity in aggregate, but it is 
evident that there are losers as well as winners. In particular, rapid advances in 
technology, coupled with adjustments in some global markets have exerted 
pressures on the returns to unskilled labour in Europe, with the falling relative 
wages of unskilled workers contributing to a widening of income inequalities. ii | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Against this backdrop, there have been growing fears that the European social 
model, rightly seen as a defining feature of the EU and its member states, can no 
longer be sustained and that it will have to be reined back or even dismantled. 
7.  A clear conclusion of this report is, however, that these fears are largely 
unfounded and that there is no compelling evidence that globalisation is leading 
inexorably to a ‘race to the bottom’ in social policy or in the capacity of European 
society to maintain its commitments to solidarity and equality. 
8.  The contemporary economic environment nevertheless calls for more rapid 
adaptation to shifting economic currents and fresh thinking about the role of 
social policy in meeting the challenges of adjustment to new sources of 
competition – whether owing to technological change or to the different 
manifestations of globalisation. Social policy has several roles to play in 
responding to this challenge, notably in facilitating adjustment in labour markets. 
Education is at the heart of adaptation, but solidarity cannot be neglected. 
9.  Some of the directions for policy development, such as placing greater weight on 
flexibility in labour markets and making social protection systems more 
responsive, are already receiving considerable attention. Others, such as dealing 
with the consequences of an ageing population are recognised as key issues, but 
there is less evidence of coherence in policy responses. How to accommodate 
increased immigration has been less prominent on the policy agenda and has not 
always been viewed as the most urgent issue in many member states, although it 
is rapidly becoming so. Consequently, the development of new policy ideas can 
benefit from the exchange of experience and learning from those member states 
that have led the way in policy development and innovation. 
10.  We argue, furthermore, that within the debate on ‘flexicurity’, it is especially 
important to look beyond the labour market emphasis of much of the discourse to 
embrace those wider aspects of the concept that bear most on the economically 
inactive and the excluded, and not to lose sight of the solidarity function of social 
protection. 
Definitions and overview of the study 
11.  This study is concerned with the social impact of globalisation in the EU context. 
Thus, it does not attempt to investigate the wider issues raised in work by, for 
example, the International Labour Organisation about the costs and benefits for 
richer and poorer nations and social groups, nor those for governance as raised by 
Joseph Stiglitz and others with respect to sharing out prosperity at the global 
level. Instead, the study concentrates on the implications for social policies at the 
EU and member state levels. The study takes as a given that globalisation has a 
positive overall economic effect, but also that it has distributive consequences that 
mean there will be losers as well as winners. It is also acknowledged that the 
benefits of globalisation do not necessarily accrue automatically to all member 
states, but need to be nurtured by appropriate policy choices. 
12.  Globalisation is not an easy concept to pin down, as it has many facets and 
encompasses a wide range of different processes associated with increased 
interconnectedness across national borders. A credible definition encompasses the 
following aspects: the growth in international flows of goods, services and capital; IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | iii 
 
an increased propensity towards international migration; the spread of 
technologies and of the multinational companies that play a major role in 
diffusing them; and the intensification of communication exemplified by the 
expansion of Internet use. Geographically more dispersed subcontracting, 
sourcing and division of labour in production processes are also associated with 
globalisation. 
13.  The study is in three main parts that draw upon the more detailed work produced 
by the research team responsible for the study. The first looks at the background, 
the facts and the figures about globalisation, with the objective of presenting a 
clear picture of what globalisation is and is not. In the second part, the focus is on 
the social dimension, including extensive documentation of EU social conditions, 
together with more specific work on migration (and the regulatory developments 
affecting it) and trends in inequality. The third part of the study then concentrates 
on the policy challenges, starting with a discussion of policy issues, what these 
imply for social policy and the social agenda in the EU, and continuing with a 
scenario exercise that speculates on the likely evolution of globalisation. A 
summary and recommendations complete the study. 
Main findings on globalisation and its consequences 
14.  Many contributors to the literature have sought to develop and refine definitions 
of globalisation, in theoretical and empirical terms. Although the intensity of trade 
is often used as a proxy for the globalisation process, most authors dealing with 
the contemporary global economy argue that globalisation should be viewed as a 
multidimensional phenomenon. Capital and currency flows are just as important 
as trade in providing quantifiable indicators of globalisation. Certain structural 
factors, for example the rise of intra-industry trade and the growing salience of 
multinational enterprises, should be added to the picture. 
15.  The defining features of the current phase of globalisation include the fact that the 
global market has expanded to an unprecedented scale, along with the weakening 
of the traditional core–periphery effects. The volume of world trade quadrupled 
between 1980 and 2005, while output rose by 250%. In the past, the core provided 
manufactured goods to the periphery in exchange for raw materials. Today, by 
contrast, the emerging markets account for a large and growing share of world 
manufacturing capacity. Even more strikingly, the flow of capital has become bi-
directional. While in the 19th century Britain exported financial capital to the 
periphery, the largest economy of today, the United States, runs a current account 
deficit substantially financed by emerging-economy nations.  
16.  In terms of addressing the behaviour of economies in the globalising world, 
traditional economic theories of trade based on comparative advantage struggle to 
explain actual developments in the world, particularly the rise of Asian 
economies, which have created rather than relied on existing, comparative 
advantages. China doubled its share of world trade in goods to 9% in the decade 
to 2005, not just by relying on cheap labour; still, the EU has maintained its share, 
unlike the US and Japan. 
17.  While globalisation is an uncontested worldwide phenomenon, the rise in the 
degree of openness to trade in goods and services of the EU member states has iv | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
been much less pronounced than frequently argued in the media and in public 
discourse. The pace of openness to trade has not shown a striking acceleration, 
with the exception of Germany, the Benelux countries and most of the recently 
acceded member states, where openness to trade in goods has increased. In the 
latter case, however, the increase is mainly an effect of elimination of trade 
barriers within the enlarged internal market. 
18.  Moreover, the current geographical fragmentation of production processes also 
has no precedent in history and in today’s world countries progressively trade in 
tasks rather than products. It is also salient that capital markets are much more 
mature today than at any time during the previous expansions of trade and 
capital flows. Gross flows of capital are much larger than in the past and they take 
many more forms. In particular, the flows of FDI are much larger relative to 
output than at any time before.  
19.  During the last two decades, financial integration has been by far the most rapidly 
expanding field of globalisation. Both portfolio and direct investment have 
increased by a greater order of magnitude relative to GDP. For the ‘old’ EU 
member states, volume indicators of international financial integration show a 
tenfold increase in the 35 years between 1970 and 2004. The stock of external 
assets and liabilities for the EU as a whole as a proportion of GDP grew from 59% 
of GDP in 1970, to over 550% in 2004, with strong expansion after 1995. Because of 
more intense financial integration, the foreign influence on business has grown, 
including a substantial increase in control by foreign owners through majority-
owned foreign affiliates. Although there has been a rise in both outward and 
inward FDI, there is no indication of an overall increase in foreign (non-EU) 
ownership of EU business.  
20.  There has been a considerable relocation of productive activities, in both goods 
and services. This has resulted in a rapid expansion in two-way trade flows 
between developed and developing economies. The EU has been among the 
winners, in particular in the field of business services, notwithstanding a 
substantial increase in the market share of India. 
21.  An analysis of the effect of the relocation of activities supports the thesis that the 
outsourcing of activities during the last 15 years has tended to lead to relative 
wage losses for unskilled workers and for branches employing a large share of 
unskilled workers. Yet, other studies reviewed underline sharply that rules and 
regulations concerning the functioning of the labour market and wage formation 
exert a strong impact on the degree of outsourcing. There are large disparities 
between countries with respect to skill levels, which have the arithmetic effect that 
those countries with low average levels of skills are the most vulnerable. The 
effects of global competition manifest themselves either in stagnating real wages 
or (in the case of rigidities with respect to wage formation) in rising 
unemployment. 
22.  The ‘insourcing’ of activities, that is, the expansion (notably of the export of 
business services and other high value-added service activities) in the world 
market for service industries have, as could be expected, mainly favoured the 
branches of activity relying on top-level, highly skilled human resources and has, 
unavoidably, contributed to the rise in the wedge between highly skilled and low-IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | v 
 
skilled labour. At the same time, there is an offsetting trend for certain 
professional activities to be outsourced to countries like India, with lower cost, but 
well-educated workers. 
23.  Despite these various forms of relocation of economic activity, there is little sign 
that tax yields in EU countries are coming under pressure. Among the old 
member states (EU-15) only Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands saw a 
substantial shrinkage of the relative size of their total tax revenues between the 
periods 1991–95 and 2001–05, comparable periods in the economic cycles. These 
developments seem to be the results of conscious structural reforms, however, 
rather than directly reflecting pressures from more mobile tax bases. Most of the 
EU-15 member states have either maintained the relative size of their tax revenues 
or even managed to increase them. In addition, several countries have chosen to 
alter their tax structures to change incentives for business, for reasons beyond just 
the threat of losing their tax base. 
24.  Net migration into the EU has been on the increase, rising threefold between the 
mid-1990s and 2003 to reach some 2 million (although a sizeable share of this is 
regularisation of illegal immigrants, notably in Spain). The main migratory 
movement is still (and is likely to remain) immigration into the EU from 
neighbouring countries, Africa and, increasingly, South America (into Spain). The 
analysis undertaken within the framework of this study emphasises in particular 
that, judging from the increasing flow of remittances, links between the migrants 
and their families in the country of origin are probably more important than often 
assumed in the conceptual analysis. This conclusion would suggest that the share 
of migrants coming to work for a certain period in an EU country is increasing 
and that issues raised by this potential change of the pattern of migration should 
be studied carefully in addition to issue of social integration. 
25.  There is convincing evidence that income inequalities have been increasing 
somewhat in many countries: Gini coefficients have risen over the two decades 
since the mid-1980s from levels of around 20 (indicating low inequality) in 
Sweden and Finland to closer to 25, and have grown from already fairly high 
levels in Italy and Greece. That being said, there is no (or only weak) evidence that 
this rise in income inequalities is attributable to globalisation. In fact, recent 
studies and additional examination of available data suggest that the rise in 
income inequalities is a phenomenon intimately associated with the emergence of 
the ‘knowledge society’, which has resulted in an increase in the return on human 
capital. At the same time, as indicated above, the knowledge society has brought 
about a widening of the gap between those with a high and those with only a 
b a s i c  e n d o w me n t  o f  k n o w l e d g e  a n d  s k i l l s .  I t  i s  a l s o  n o t e w o r t h y  t h a t  o v e r  t h e  
same period, there was a significant fall to around 30 in the Gini coefficients for 
Ireland and Spain, showing that the movement is not all one way. 
26.  The inference to draw is that where there is rising inequality, it is attributable to 
either explicit political choices or inappropriate responses to the operation of more 
fundamental socio-economic drivers, such as, notably, the emergence of the 
knowledge society, increases in educational inequalities or the failure of systems 
of education to ensure equal opportunities to all. But this process has not followed 
the same pattern in all countries. In the endeavour to adapt their society and to vi | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
find new responses, certain countries have been more successful than others have 
in adjusting labour and product markets, and especially in actively investing in 
human capital, including at the lower end of the range of endowment. 
27.  Examination and assessment of the evidence on the development of the level and 
structure of social spending suggest that social policy in general has shown a high 
degree of resilience in the face of globalisation and the rise in inequalities. Social 
protection expenditure has broadly been stable as a proportion of GDP in the EU 
since the early 1990s at around 27-28%, contrary to the expectation that it would 
be squeezed in the interests of bolstering competitiveness. Indeed, its growth over 
the period 1992–2003 exceeded growth in GDP for the EU-15, with the implication 
that the European welfare state has become more, not less generous. Moreover, 
the evidence suggests that globalisation did not even affect the composition of 
social spending in OECD countries. 
28.  It is an open question whether an extensive social protection system should be 
seen as a necessary complement to a more competitive global market or an 
impediment to successful participation in globalisation. Both arguments are (often 
too glibly) advanced in crude terms that are at odds with the subtlety of the 
underlying logic. Some social protection systems, despite being costly in terms of 
outlays as a proportion of GDP, manifestly manage to strike a successful balance. 
Others are characterised by problems of inappropriate incentives or burgeoning 
costs (or both) that appear to be unsustainable.  
29.  Migration poses a test for the welfare state, not least because of popular 
perceptions that migrants take advantage of it and give little in return. There is a 
high risk in this context of setting in motion a vicious circle in which unskilled 
migration inflames public opinion, resulting in calls for unrealistic restrictions on 
migration, leading to more illegal and unskilled migration, further inflaming 
public opinion against migrants and forcing governments to adopt even stricter 
(and unenforceable) migration restrictions.  
30.  Overall, however, there is no evidence that migrants are abusing the (politically 
most sensitive) non-contributory parts of the welfare system, despite survey 
findings suggesting that 50% of EU citizens believe they do. Furthermore, 
migration can also contribute towards filling gaps that may emerge for 
demographic reasons in the capacity of EU member states to fund their social 
protection systems. This assertion implies that migrants are of working age and 
a r e  s u p p o r t e d  s u f f i c i e n t l y  i n  t h e  l a b o u r  m a r k e t  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e y  h a v e  h i g h  
e n o u g h  e m p l o y m e n t  r a t e s .  I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  m i g r a n t s  h a v e  t o  b e  s e e n  n o t  a s  
competitors for jobs, undercutting indigenous workers, but as complements: the 
game is not zero-sum. 
31.  Globalisation is not – indeed by far – the only factor influencing the socio-
economic and cultural fabric and it is often wrongly credited with, or blamed for, 
much that is happening in EU member states (and elsewhere). Longevity is 
increasing and the predictability of the life cycle in the sense of a stable career 
path is reduced for a large number of citizens. There are increasing returns on 
intellectual capital, that is, on investment in education and knowledge. At the 
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apparent income disparities and – at least in some socio-economic contexts – a 
change in the patterns and strength of the inclusive forces in society.  
Policy issues 
32.  The core policy issue emanating from the different elements of globalisation is to 
enable the EU and individual member states to take advantage of the undoubted 
benefits without undue social costs that might arise from ‘winners’ being expected 
to compensate ‘losers’. In this regard, the default position is that globalisation is 
much more an opportunity for added growth than a social menace. 
33.  In response to the question, Is a social Europe fit for globalisation?, the answer of 
this report is an emphatic ‘yes’. But the benefits of globalisation cannot just be 
assumed to happen and, with an increased pace of change, it is inevitable that 
there will be losers as well as winners, with marked social consequences. The 
E u r o p e a n  s o c i a l  m o d e l  i s  n o t  d o o m e d  a n d  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  o n l y  f r e e  m a r k e t  
approaches are consistent with sustained prosperity is clearly wrong. Indeed, the 
success of the smaller open economies testifies to the scope for prospering, even 
with extensive and generous welfare states. 
34.  The principal benefits of globalisation arise from the scope it affords on the supply 
side for increased specialisation, enhanced diffusion of technology, and a 
competitive spur to innovation and productivity growth. Consumers gain from 
lower prices and wider choice, while an often-overlooked benefit on the demand 
side is that emerging markets offer rapidly growing sales opportunities for 
European companies.  
35.  It has also to be repeated that globalisation is not a zero-sum game. Nevertheless, 
in assessing the benefits of globalisation and the social impact, three issues need to 
be taken into account. First, the gains are not uniformly distributed across 
individuals, regions and countries. Second, the costs of globalisation are more 
likely to be concentrated in the short run, while the benefits will take longer to 
materialise. Third, the gains will not accrue automatically, but will depend instead 
on success in undertaking adequate competitive, regulatory and social reforms. 
36.  Critics of globalisation identify a broad range of actual or potential threats from 
unfettered globalisation. These encompass distributive impacts, such as adverse 
consequences for specific groups in society, issues of cultural hegemony, concerns 
about environmental damage and geopolitical disruption (especially now from 
terrorism). Threats also arise to the stability of public finances and from social 
tensions associated with migration. 
37.  Yet it is also important to stress offsetting effects. First, there is a boost to real 
incomes from the lower prices of imports. Second, the job losses resulting from 
international competitive effects are small in scale compared with normal ‘creative 
destruction’ in product and labour markets. In the same vein, the pressures on 
social protection budgets from demographic change are much more extensive. 
Third, the loss of low-value jobs may be less damaging than it sounds: if 
o f f s h o r i n g  m e a n s  r e t a i n i n g  o n l y  h i g h - v a l u e  j o b s ,  i t  c o u l d  b e  s e e n  a s  a  l o g i c a l  
answer to a declining labour force.  viii | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
38.  The policy issues surrounding globalisation can be grouped under three main 
headings. The first is equipping the economy to compete in the globalised age. 
Second, there are many demands on policy-makers to smooth adjustment. Third, 
there are issues of governance. One school of thought is that the EU simply has to 
b e c o m e  m o r e  l i k e  t h e  U S  o r  o t h e r  p a r t s  o f  t h e  w o r l d .  T h i s  s t a n d p o i n t  c a n  b e  
summarised as ‘work harder, innovate more and expect less’. The Lisbon strategy 
is in many ways a response to globalisation, insofar as its primary aims are to 
reposition the EU in the global economy, but it is important to recall that the 
strategy also has as key goals creating employment and assuring social cohesion. 
As such, it is not about emulating the US model. 
39.  A central policy challenge is to achieve economic flexibility with better social 
protection in order to create an environment capable of making the best use of the 
opportunities offered by globalisation. In this context, social policy has a vital role 
to play, not least in endowing people with capabilities, with a premium on active 
policies that intervene early rather than passive, reactive policies.  
40.  Adjusting to globalisation implies policy developments that will, in turn, have 
social impacts and create uncertainties that need to be managed as social risks. 
Labour turnover can be expected to grow, putting a premium on the 
transferability and adaptability of skills, but also on suitable forms of flexibility in 
the workplace as well as for activating individuals. Active labour market policies 
are seen as part of the answer, but they are not a panacea and need to be 
complemented by other policies. Moreover, they are often costly and are prone to 
inappropriate incentives. An implication is that policy learning and 
experimentation are needed to find solutions that are effective, as well as attuned 
to conditions in the different member states.  
41.  There is an important time dimension to consider, because costs such as higher 
unemployment and increased income inequality tend to be concentrated in the 
short term, whereas benefits in the form of lower prices, higher productivity and 
income will only occur later. Similarly, many reforms will improve the 
benefits/costs ratio of globalisation in the long term, yet will have a short-term 
impact – often negative – on social cohesion, which makes them politically 
awkward to implement. Still, in this context it is important that whatever 
measures are envisaged to counter negative social repercussions, these should 
favour, not hamper, the adjustment to changing conditions. Nevertheless, leading 
commentators (such as Tony Atkinson) have stressed the vital role of social 
support in smoothing transitions. This stance supports the interpretation of social 
protection systems as productive factors.  
42.  It is important to recognise that in the globalised environment, migration is likely 
to be a permanent feature and thus migration policies have to take a long-term 
approach. Particular issues include whether to try to stem the increase in low-
skilled migration in favour of skills tests or to impose some form of green card (as 
in the US) or points system to attract specific categories of immigrants.  
43.  In a long-term perspective, investments in human capital should be expected to 
deliver not only a higher rate of growth of income and output but also a higher 
degree of income equality and added labour market flexibility. This view is in line 
with, notably, the recent argumentation of Gøsta Esping-Andersen in favour of IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | ix 
 
shifting the emphasis in social and welfare policy towards giving higher priority 
to childcare and education of the younger generations.  
44.  To the extent that it is the lower skilled who are most vulnerable to the effects of 
globalisation, there are grounds for labour market policies aimed specifically at 
these groups. It has also to be recognised, however, that globalisation does not 
stand still. The most probable scenario for globalisation is that the main trends 
will broadly continue over the next 15 years. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect 
further increases in trade intensity, financial market integration and the spread of 
technology. Even if the growth of emerging markets slows, it will remain above 
that of the EU and of most member states, such that the share of global output of 
the likes of China and India will expand, an implication of which is that 
globalisation will – as the CIA puts it – acquire a more ‘Asian’ face.  
45.  A significant qualitative change in globalisation can nevertheless be expected, as 
companies rethink their value chains and seek to reduce costs by ‘unbundling’ 
tasks, rather than shifting the entire production of products. The much enhanced 
scope for coordination of production afforded by information and 
communications technology means that companies can more easily outsource or 
offshore segments of the production process that were kept in-house in the past. 
Such unbundling will make it more probable that groups of workers who have 
hitherto been insulated from globalisation will face new competition, but will 
equally give increased opportunities to the most qualified and adaptable workers 
in the EU.  
Recommendations 
46.  A  s t r o n g  c o n c l u s i o n  f r o m  t h i s  s t u d y  i s  t h a t  m a n y  o f  t h e  f e a r s  s u r r o u n d i n g  
globalisation are greatly exaggerated and, even where justified, they tend to rest 
on an incomplete analysis of the process. Above all, there is no empirical support 
for the proposition that globalisation is leading to a race to the bottom in social 
policy. It follows that to view globalisation as an inexorable force is simply 
unwarranted. Countries can, and do, adjust and there is no great mystery about 
what is needed. This message has to be repeatedly articulated and ‘sold’ to 
citizens. 
47.  Globalisation reinforces tendencies to diminish ‘local solidarity’, to pit one welfare 
system against another and to expose the individual to a higher degree of 
unpredictability and risk. Yet these processes are not inevitable, especially if a 
coherent, EU-wide response is put in place. Much can be achieved by using the 
tools and methodology of the open method of coordination to enable member 
states to learn from one another and to improve their own policy performance, 
but it is also important for the social dimension of policy to be fully incorporated 
in wider policy processes, such as the Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs.  
48.  Responding to globalisation is only one rationale for ‘reinventing the welfare 
state’ and would miss a trick if it meant no more than ‘compensating’ those who 
suffer most from more intense international competition. Policy mechanisms and 
institutions have to be adapted to the changing economic environment, 
recognising that the ensuing social effects are not always directly attributable to 
globalisation, but result from the reactions of employment and wage formation. x | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
49.  The core of a social policy response is in the following main policy domains: 
education and training, immigration policy, labour market reforms and the 
reshaping of social protection. There is, in addition, an international governance 
dimension to consider, especially in the light of the EU’s commitment to 
international obligations as part of its sustainable development strategy. 
50.  W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t r a i n i n g  a n d  s k i l l s ,  t h e s e  c a n  a n d  s h o u l d  b e  e n h a n c e d  b y  d u e  
attention to the level of education of vulnerable target groups. It is especially 
important to extend adult training and learning beyond those who already have a 
high level of educational attainment. 
51.  In relation to migration, there is an evident need for new, more comprehensive 
policies to promote the social integration of different types of migrants into the 
economy and society of the host country. An active approach to the inclusion of 
immigrants should therefore be part of solidarity. In addition, national migration 
policies are bound to have externalities for other member states, so establishing 
common principles and approaches is a pressing matter.  
52.  The challenge facing welfare reform is not about defending or opposing levels of 
social expenditure or casting doubt on specific benefits or rules. Successful 
welfare states respond to new paradigms and associated risks not by cutting back, 
but by reconfiguring in ways consistent with values such as those espoused by the 
European social model. Our fond hope is that the discourse on globalisation can 
be altered to reflect this analysis.  
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BACKGROUND, KEY CONCEPTS, 
FACTS AND FIGURES 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
lobalisation evokes strong passions among its supporters and detractors alike. 
It is also a highly salient political issue that lies behind many of the 
contemporary debates about policy reform. Often, too, it is perceptions of the 
threat from globalisation that are to the fore, even as consumers and workers enjoy its 
benefits. In particular, the viability of the European social model is seen as being at 
risk, despite much evidence to the contrary. For example, the May 2006 Eurobarometer 
survey on the Future of Europe (European Commission, 2006d) shows that a growing 
number of European citizens perceive globalisation as a threat to employment and 
social conditions. Asked about the increasing globalisation of the economy, 47% of 
interviewees considered that globalisation was primarily a threat to employment and 
companies in their country, compared with only 37% who saw it as a good opportunity 
for firms in their country. Moreover, the latter proportion had fallen by 19 percentage 
points since October 2003, when 56% of Europeans had viewed globalisation as “a 
good opportunity”. Only 11 of the (then) 25 member states in the May 2006 survey saw 
globalisation above all as an opportunity for national companies. Danish citizens (77%) 
and Swedish citizens (54%) were the most positive in their assessment of the 
consequences of globalisation. On the other hand, the vast majority of French citizens 
(72%), Greeks (also 72%) and Belgians (64%) seemed to be among the most worried 
about globalisation. 
As a phenomenon of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, there can be little doubt 
that globalisation is something that resonates widely. Yet in some respects, it is hardly 
new: trade intensities as a proportion of national output were as high in 1910 as they 
are today and international migration was extensive. Nevertheless, the growth in 
research on different facets of globalisation has been extraordinary. Thus, a search of 
the library catalogue at the London School of Economics produced 1,761 ‘hits’, up from 
1,521 in the 15 months since this study had been launched, on the terms globalisation or 
globalization in the titles of works it holds, most of them published in the last 20 years, 
and other data confirm this proliferation in interest. It is also apparent that the salience 
of globalisation is contested and approaches to coping with it provoke heated debate.  
1.1  An interpretation of globalisation 
1.1.1  A multifaceted concept 
The term ‘globalisation’ is widely – if usually glibly – used, yet remains ill defined. It is 
one of those slippery terms that most people understand intuitively but, like the 
proverbial elephant, find it hard to define or give operational content. The website that 
accompanies the popular text by Held & McGrew (2003) observes that 
globalization – the ‘big idea’ of the late twentieth century – lacks precise definition. 
More than this, it is in danger of becoming, if it has not already become, the cliché 
of our times. Nonetheless, the term globalization captures elements of a 
widespread perception that there is a broadening, deepening and speeding up of 
world-wide interconnectedness in all aspects of life, from the cultural to the   
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criminal, the financial to the environmental. At issue appears to be ‘a global shift’; 
that is, a world being moulded, by economic and technological forces, into a 
shared economic and political arena. 
From an economic perspective, Stiglitz (2003, p. 51) gives this definition of the 
phenomenon: 
The idea of globalization is very simple. The decrease of communication costs, 
transportation costs, and artificial barriers to goods and factors of production has 
led to a closer integration of the economies of the world. Globalization implies 
mobility not only of goods and services but also of capital and knowledge – and to 
a lesser extent of people. Globalization entails not only the integration of markets, 
but also the emergence of a global civil society. 
A number of facets of globalisation can be distinguished, most of which would be 
broadly accepted by critics and supporters alike. These include the growth in 
international flows of goods, services and capital; the increased propensity towards 
international migration; the spread of technologies and of the multinational companies 
that play a major role in diffusing them; and the intensification of communication 
exemplified by the spread of Internet use. Geographically more dispersed 
subcontracting, sourcing and division of labour in production processes – sometimes 
seen in more negative terms in the French expression delocalisation – are also associated 
with globalisation. For some of these variables, the relevant indicators may not have 
changed as much as is sometimes thought and, for variables such as trade flows, it may 
be that much of what is classed as globalisation is really attributable to forms of 
regional integration, such as the European Union or the North Atlantic Free Trade 
Association. Nevertheless, the rise of Chinese exports has dramatically undercut 
established suppliers and altered supply chains in developed and developing countries 
alike. 
Equally, in areas such as financial markets, there has manifestly been a huge 
qualitative change insofar as there is instant transmission of information across the 
world that can trigger rapid flows. There is also a softer dimension to globalisation in 
the form of global values, global brands, global news and so on – as well as the 
inevitable backlashes against them. A corollary is that social models and policy 
approaches will inevitably have to be tempered by these trends. This provokes 
questions about whether the trends are leading towards an inevitable convergence or 
whether distinctive social models can be maintained. 
1.1.2  Underlying drivers 
Although globalisation is a phenomenon much in focus in the public debate and in 
research endeavours, it is not a primary driver of socio-economic developments. To the 
extent that globalisation exists as a measurable phenomenon, it is the outcome of the 
operation of, and interactions between, such basic drivers as the following: 
•  the expansion of trade and investment flows, arising partly from the functioning 
of markets and the organisational choices made by enterprises, and partly from 
policy choices regarding the liberalisation of trade; 
•  the integration of capital and money markets resulting in a vastly increased 
volume of such flows. The free circulation of capital outside government control 
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governments, to private holders of capital. Capital flows – which were formerly 
directed towards banks and controlled by governments – are now held by 
individuals, institutions or private mutual funds and can circulate freely and 
instantaneously to projects that will yield the maximum profit. Electronic, 
computerised data transmission now gives them an unprecedented mobility on 
all the financial markets on the planet;  
•  demographic developments, notably in the EU context the substantial extent of 
population ageing underway, which will accelerate over the coming decades. At 
the same time, the youth populations of many neighbouring global regions, such 
as North Africa, have been expanding rapidly and these countries may struggle 
to provide sufficient opportunities for these populations; 
•  migration. A prominent phenomenon a century ago, but which has been much 
less in evidence in recent decades, migration is linked to the aforementioned 
demographic trends. Population movements, both within the EU and from the 
rest of the world to the EU, are increasing and posing new problems of social 
integration; 
•  innovation and R&D, and their impact on the pace of technological change as 
they affect not just products and processes, but also the options open to 
enterprises in the management of their activity; 
•  climate change, energy consumption and pollution; and 
•  the growing importance of human capital, knowledge and information. 
A proper understanding of globalisation calls for an assessment of the respective 
impacts of these drivers. For example, a key problem facing governments today is how 
to attract new investment with a view to creating jobs and promoting sustained 
economic growth. To this end, nations vie with each other through variations in their 
interest rates or their rates of exchange, and through the competitiveness of their 
markets. The world has truly become capitalist, and the ever-increasing financial 
movements can reward savings and productivity, thus strengthening a country’s 
economy. Conversely, foreign capital can abandon an economy or withdraw abruptly 
if an unfavourable fiscal policy drives it away.  
1.2  The policy context 
Globalisation poses challenges at all levels of government because of the many ways in 
which it alters the economic environment, the need for interventions to ensure that 
economies and support systems adjust and the demands on the state to adapt 
governance frameworks. From an economic theory standpoint, globalisation can boost 
growth and increase social welfare through a more efficient allocation of resources. The 
realisation of the implied social benefits relies on the fulfilment of several conditions, 
however, such as sufficient flexibility of the labour and product markets, the efficiency 
of the welfare state and, in the particular case of the EU, on the ability to shift the 
economic production frontier of the EU economies by a significant level of innovation. 
Yet, while benefits in the form of lower prices, higher productivity and income will 
only materialise in the medium term, social costs such as higher unemployment and 
income inequality are likely to be encountered in the short term. As stated in the Sapir 4 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
report to the European Commission, “[t]he key policy issue for Europe is how to enjoy 
the benefits of globalisation while continuing to mitigate its costs”.1 
The challenges of globalisation inevitably bear on the design and coordination of 
national labour market and social policies, as well as on the wider question of how the 
European social model should evolve. In this regard, the new policy framework agreed 
at the EU level for both economic and social policies needs to be taken into account. On 
one side of this framework is the partnership for growth and jobs (the relaunched 
Lisbon strategy), which brings together what were previously separate coordination 
mechanisms, the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and the Employment Guidelines. 
Complementing this framework on the other side is a new approach to the ‘open’ 
coordination of social protection and social inclusion policies, agreed in 2006. Within 
this new ‘streamlined’ approach, the European Council adopted a Commission 
proposal, which states that 
[the] overarching objectives of the OMC [open method of coordination] for social 
protection and social inclusion are to promote: 
•  social cohesion, equality between men and women and equal opportunities 
for all through adequate, accessible, financially sustainable, adaptable and 
efficient social protection systems and social inclusion policies; 
•  effective and mutual interaction between the Lisbon objectives of greater 
economic growth, more and better jobs and greater social cohesion, and 
with the EU’s Sustainable Development Strategy; and 
•  good governance, transparency and the involvement of stakeholders in the 
design, implementation and monitoring of policy.2 
These aims suggest some of the contours of an EU response to globalisation. Of 
particular relevance in exploring the social impact of globalisation is the emphasis on 
the linkages between the economic and the social. These linkages are captured in the 
expressions ‘feeding-in’, meaning the reform of social protection and social inclusion 
policies to advance Lisbon objectives, and ‘feeding-out’, which refers to the effects of 
economic reforms in improving employment and other variables that help lead to 
greater social cohesion. Feeding-in can be seen as an extension of the notion of social 
protection as a productive factor, which underpins many recent initiatives to 
modernise social protection systems. In parallel, the concept of ‘active inclusion’, which 
is a central component of the EU’s social inclusion strategy, can be seen as a means of 
enhancing the EU labour force and thus as contributing to the competitiveness that the 
EU requires to confront globalisation.  
That there is considerable policy development underway at present is 
undeniable, especially around the notion of ‘flexicurity’. In relation to the labour 
market, the European Commission’s (2006e) Green Paper on Modernising Labour Law 
to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century invites public debate on how labour law can 
                                                      
1 See An Agenda for a Growing Europe: The Sapir Report, by the High-Level Study Group 
organised by the President of the European Commission, and chaired by André Sapir, initially 
published in July 2003 (Sapir et al., 2004). 
2 See the Communication on Working Together, Working Better (European Commission, 
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be rendered more flexible, so as to support the flexibility and adaptability of workers 
and enterprises alike. It highlights a concern about dual labour markets in which 
privileged ‘insiders’ prosper at the expense of ‘outsiders’. An important issue raised is 
how labour law can underpin labour market transitions from one job (or status) to 
another, rather than protect the individual currently in a job. In this context, the paper 
invites ideas about how to promote lifelong learning and how to reinforce the 
inclusiveness of employment policies. 
As part of the emerging architecture of economic and social governance in the 
EU, there is manifestly a strong political push towards defining a way forward for the 
European social model that embraces a mix of increased labour market flexibility, 
protection of the individual and wider social aims. Increasingly, this approach is being 
linked directly to the competitive challenges of globalisation and, within it, the 
flexicurity debate is crucial, as what the EU is trying to do is to achieve greater 
flexibility without unduly compromising the much-envied standards of protection that 
characterise the European social model. An important Communication published by 
the European Commission (2007b) puts forward an agreed characterisation of 
flexicurity, which is that it should comprise policies covering labour laws, active labour 
market measures, lifelong learning and social security reforms. Flexicurity covers both 
external flexicurity through the labour market and internal flexicurity within 
individual companies. As a paradigm, it has received the endorsement of the 2007 and 
2008 spring European Councils. 
1.3  Objectives of the study 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the social impact of globalisation from a 
number of perspectives. The first aim is to develop an inventory of essential features 
and issues concerning the social impact of globalisation in the EU, to bring out 
differences in the social consequences for member states and to look for patterns of 
clustering across the enlarged Union. The assessment of the character and scale of the 
social impact seeks to highlight groups especially at risk of being disadvantaged by 
globalisation and to explore whether globalisation merely reinforces existing biases 
between winners and losers in Europe or whether it also creates new and different 
divisions. The assessment thus includes the following aspects: 
•  The relocation of economic activities. Under this heading, distributional effects and 
issues of inequality are considered. How polarised are the distributional 
outcomes? To what extent do job losses mainly occur in labour-intensive, low-
skill processes located in vulnerable areas while job creation takes place in highly 
skilled sectors in the economic growth centres? How are life chances and living 
standards affected? What are the resulting patterns of social problems and social 
decline? Depending on whether they are among the winners or losers, what is 
the social impact on workers, their families and communities? 
•  The relocation of people. This aspect takes into account socio-cultural implications 
of global-scale immigration to and asylum-seeking in Europe, particularly 
–  the extent to which political conflict and economic and social misery in 
faraway places have social and political repercussions in Europe;  6 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
–  the sharing of the benefits and costs of immigration among the indigenous 
population; problems of exploitation of migrant workers and trafficking in 
people;  
–  the social ramifications of insufficient economic, social and cultural 
integration; and  
–  the implications of developments towards increasingly multicultural and 
multi-ethnic societies for social and political cohesion.  
•  Opportunities and challenges for the European social model and social protection systems 
in particular. Here the focus is first on social policy as a capacity factor: for 
anticipating and addressing social problems (e.g. sudden mass redundancies, 
social inequities calling for redistribution, the social exclusion repercussions from 
local concentrations of long-term unemployment and insufficiently integrated 
immigrants, etc.) in adequate ways by articulating the synergies between the 
different elements of the European social model. More specifically, these are 
active and preventative (employment and) social policies backed by social and 
civil dialogue. Second, this aspect looks at social policy as a cost factor: social 
protection (and labour and health & safety standards) as an element in non-wage 
labour costs. To what extent are EU social protection standards threatened by 
competition from countries for which a markedly lower level of social 
protection/labour standards constitutes a major part of their competitive 
advantage – and what are the social consequences? 
The study does not attempt to investigate the wider issues raised in work by, 
notably, the International Labour Organisation about the costs and benefits for richer 
and poorer nations and for social groups, nor for governance as raised by Joseph 
Stiglitz and others with respect to sharing out prosperity at the global level. Instead, 
the study concentrates on the implications for social policies at the EU and member 
state levels. The study takes as a given that globalisation has a positive overall 
economic effect, but also that it has distributive consequences that mean that there will 
be losers as well as winners. It explores how member states differ in their ability to 
contain and address the negative social impact of globalisation while seizing the 
opportunities to benefit. The policy mixes and governance structures that are most 
effective are highlighted. 
Finally, the study tries to assess how the abilities to seize opportunities and 
absorb the social impact can be improved and considers what can be done to improve 
Europe’s scope for anticipating and handling the dilemmas posed by globalisation in 
the social field.  
1.4  Outline of this report 
This report is in three main parts that draw upon the more detailed work produced by 
the research team responsible for the overall study. This first part, which looks at the 
phenomenon of globalisation, comprises a synthesis of findings from the extensive 
literature on the subject and a presentation of relevant empirical material on trade and 
investment flows and on outsourcing. In the second part, the focus is on the social 
dimension of globalisation and the way in which it is evolving. A conceptual   
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discussion is complemented by an extended discussion of social conditions in the EU, 
together with more specific work on migration (including regulatory developments in 
the area) and on inequality. The third part of the study then concentrates on the policy 
issues, drawing out the implications for the social agenda in the EU and continuing 
with a scenario exercise that speculates on the likely evolution of globalisation. 
Concluding comments and recommendations complete the study.  
8 | 
2.  THE STUDY OF GLOBALISATION: INSIGHTS 
FROM THE LITERATURE 
he body of literature dealing with globalisation is vast and growing 
exponentially. Specialised databases and studies tell us something about the 
changing flows of goods and finance. Yet it is the conceptual issues relating to 
understanding these global changes that provide the most useful background for a 
study dealing with the impacts of globalisation. Therefore, much of the literature 
reviewed here not only deals with statistical issues, but also tries to answer some wider 
questions, most importantly: What is globalisation? How do standard economic and 
political theories help us to understand it? And what are the potential social impacts of 
globalisation-related changes?  
The term ‘globalisation’ has caught the attention of the media and academics 
alike. The sense of profound change in the organisation of the world is often initiated 
by casual observation. In many shops, most of the products on display have been made 
or grown in faraway corners of the world. The apples in the shopping trolleys come 
from South Africa. The shrimps on the plate in the local restaurant were swimming a 
few days ago in the sea somewhere off the coast of Vietnam. This sense of change is 
accentuated by some striking statistics. The textile and clothing industry is the most 
globalised segment of manufacturing. Today, three-fifths of all clothing buttons used in 
the world are actually produced in one region of China,3 exemplifying the division of 
labour on a global scale. It is no wonder that globalisation has become such a popular 
term, nor that it has come to be used as shorthand for a wide range of economic 
challenges, seen as an opportunity for some and a threat for others.4  
The body of literature dealing with globalisation is thus understandably vast. It 
comprises, first, specialised studies that statistically monitor developments in various 
economic activities. These indicators demonstrate that something profound is 
happening in the world and that it is something new. It is true that there was an earlier 
wave of globalisation associated with the 19th century industrial revolution that swept 
through Europe and extended to the US. At the end of the 19th century, the volume of 
                                                      
3 More specifically, they are produced in and around one town, Qiaotou (see “The tiger’s teeth”, 
Guardian, 25 May 2005). 
4 Stanley Fischer (2003, p. 2, fn. 2) describes the rise of globalisation and anti-globalisation as 
follows: 
During the 1970’s the word ‘globalisation’ was never mentioned in the pages of The New 
York Times. In the 1980’s the word cropped up less than once a week; in the first half of the 
1990’s, less than twice a week; and in the latter half of the decade, no more than three times 
a week. In 2000, there were 514 stories in the paper that made reference to ‘globalisation’; 
there were 364 stories in 2001, and 393 references in 2002. Based on stories in The New York 
Times,  the idea of being ‘anti-globalisation’ was not one that existed before about 1999. 
Turning from the newspaper to the Internet, ‘globalisation’ brings up 1.6 million links 
through the use of the Google search engine, and typing in ‘anti-globalisation’ brings up 
80,000 links. 
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global trade relative to output was roughly the same as it is today. But today, the world 
is integrating in a novel way.  
The Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke (2006) recently pointed out 
four defining features of the new developments. First, is the matter of their sheer 
volume: the global market has expanded to an unprecedented scale, with more 
countries than ever actively integrated in global markets. Second, is the observed 
weakening of the traditional core–periphery effects. In the past, the core provided 
manufactured goods to the periphery in exchange for raw materials. Today, however, 
the emerging markets account for a large and growing share of world manufacturing 
capacity and, as China’s burgeoning demand for raw materials shows, a significant 
determinant of commodity prices. Even more strikingly, the flow of capital has become 
bi-directional. Whereas in the 19th century, Britain exported financial capital to the 
periphery, the largest economy of today, the US, runs a current account deficit 
substantially financed by emerging-economy nations. Third, the current geographical 
fragmentation of production processes has no precedent. Fourth, the capital markets 
are much more developed and sophisticated today than at any time during the past 
expansions of trade and capital flows. Gross flows of capital are much larger than in 
the past, and they take many more forms. In particular, the flows of foreign direct 
investment are much larger relative to output than at any time before. 
Finance is arguably the area in which the world has been transformed into 
something very close to an idealised global market. With digitisation and the 
development of communication technologies, the transaction costs of moving money 
are practically zero. Today, a foreign-exchange dealer in a bank somewhere in Europe 
follows the movements of currencies in Asia just as closely as those in his or her own 
country, and interacts continually with counterparts across the globe. Momentous 
changes in the global organisation of finance and the deepening international division 
of labour raise questions about their societal implications. 
International organisations have responded by organising large-scale research 
projects. The OECD came up with a programme on “Empowering People to Meet the 
Challenges of Globalisation”. The International Labour Organisation established the 
World Commission on Globalisation, which gave its report in 2004. The World Bank 
published, for example, Poverty in an Age of Globalisation (2000) and more recently, 
Managing the Next Wave of Globalization (2006d). 
Apart from statistical monitoring and impact studies, another layer of literature 
explores the characteristics of globalisation. This layer is the analytical literature that 
tries to categorise the phenomena entailed in the global socio-economic processes, 
looks for drivers of changes and interprets these social and economic processes in 
terms of larger frameworks of values, preferences and desirable outcomes. It is mostly 
this body of literature that has been reviewed as a background study for this report. 
2.1  What is globalisation? 
In 1962, Marshall McLuhan first brought out the term ‘global’ as something denoting a 
tectonic shift in social relations into the public domain in his book, The Gutenberg 
Galaxy. The term was more cultural in content than anything else. The concept of a 
‘global village’ describes broadly changing patterns in human perceptions of time and 
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have created a certain global, common cultural code. Two people from different parts 
of the globe can easily discuss their favourite Hollywood movies, analyse the politics of 
some of those military conflicts that are heavily covered by news agencies or comment 
upon the contents of some globally disseminated lifestyle platform, as in the magazine 
Cosmopolitan for example.  
G l o b a l i s a t i o n  h a s  p r o g r e s s i v e l y  c o m e  t o  b e  r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  
economic challenges, however. References are often negative, as when newspaper 
headlines describe anti-globalist protesters spoiling international gatherings or the 
anti-globalisation feelings that ran against the European Constitution (Giddens, 2005, 
p. 97). Globalisation in this sense denotes the processes of pressure on labour markets 
to become more flexible and wages to adjust to the rate dictated by the global market. 
Producers compete not just with other producers in the same country or region, but 
m o r e  a n d  m o r e  w i t h  a l m o s t  a n y o n e  a c r o s s  t h e  g l o b e ,  a s  n e w  t e c h n o l o g y  m a k e s  
transportation much less of a cost and communication much easier. 
2.1.1  Trade 
The rise of globalisation is often used as shorthand for the growing prominence of 
trade in the global economy. In recent years, world trade integration outpaced other 
sources of growth (World Bank, 2006d, p. xiv). Between 1985 and 2002, trade 
integration more than tripled (Gunter & van der Hoeven, 2004, p. 3). 
But the rise in the volume of trade is not the whole story. It is the composition of 
trade that tells us more about the nature of the current phase of globalisation. Analyses 
based on a high level of commodity disaggregation confirm that trade has risen as a 
consequence of the specialisation of exchanges within the same broad sectors 
(Gerstenberger, 1990; Storper, 1992, p. 63). Around two-thirds of trade volume today is 
intra-industry trade (Gunter & van der Hoeven, 2004, p. 10). This trade is largely 
driven by the activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs). As MNEs build global 
value chains, each heavily fragmented over a number of countries, global trade 
increasingly becomes trade in tasks, not entire products or services (Grossman & Rossi-
Hansberg, 2006). Indeed, some authors point to the role of MNEs as a uniquely 
defining feature of globalisation (Strange, 1986). What is more, their role seems likely 
to grow in the future (Ostry, 1998, p. 86). 
The most striking example of globalisation in manufacturing is the textiles, 
clothing and footwear industry. Here, Asia has plainly come to dominate the global 
market. It is estimated that Asian mills account for two-thirds of the world’s spinning 
and weaving capacity (Asian Development Bank, 2006). At the same time, trade and 
production patterns are decisively shaped by distribution companies, which are based 
in Europe, North America and Japan (Hayashi, 2005). 
Outsourcing is clearly one of the drivers of changing patterns of trade. The 
European Commission recently published a report on outsourcing (Havik & 
McMorrow, 2006), which showed that EU countries fare well in trade in intermediate 
goods, producing significant surpluses. Where the EU lags is in trade in information 
and communications technologies (ICT). Here, the report called the performance 
“exceptionally poor”. Yet concerns arise over whether Europe’s relatively good 
performance in intermediate outputs is simply owing to the fact that the capital stock 
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that as other countries build up their capital stock – which is growing ever easier – 
Europe will lose its competitive edge. Another concern is that Europe is becoming 
more exposed to external price shocks as other countries come to play an important 
role on the margins of some markets, especially with respect to raw materials. 
The rise of China has become a substantial new factor behind the globalisation 
story. In 2003, China’s economy accounted for 55% of Asia’s exports. As a percentage 
of the world economy, China accounted for 7.2% of imports and 16.5% of exports 
(Reisen, Grandes & Pinaud, 2005, p. 17) and its share keeps on rising. The country is 
progressively a price-setter in commodity markets (ibid., p. 19). China is the second 
largest holder of US Treasury bills in the world ($165 billion, 6.5% of total foreign 
holdings), which makes the cheap labour giant an extremely important player in US 
and world financial stability (ibid., p. 20).  
2.1.2  Finance 
Some authors focus on financial markets as the key feature of the new economic order 
(Jessop, 2002, pp. 106–07) and indeed, the rise of various instruments of financial 
intermediation (if this can still be called ‘intermediation’) tells an even more dramatic 
story than the one presented by trade figures. “Between 1963 and 1995, the size of the 
total funds raised on international markets increased at an annual growth rate of 24.3% 
compared with 5.5% annual growth rate in world trade and 3.2% growth in global 
production” (Jessop, 2002, p. 106). These funds are seen, with growing frequency, as 
‘stateless money’, which has a dynamic at odds with the immediate post-war financial 
regime (Leyshon & Tickell, 1994). Approximately $1.5 trillion is exchanged daily on 
foreign exchange markets and only 5% of this amount is directly related to payments 
for traded goods or services (Jessop, 2002, p. 106). The deterritorialisation of money is 
being reinforced by the development of various derivative instruments. 
The Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian crisis of 1998, as well as the spectacular 
rise (and sometimes fall) of new financial actors (hedge funds), remind us of a peculiar 
dynamic of world financial architecture, whereby contagion can spread at a rapid pace 
from one part of the world to another. Indeed, the nature of such crises is noted by 
some as a particular characteristic of the present phase of globalisation. Some authors 
highlight the growing incidence of crises and their pattern – ever more frequently 
originating in the emerging markets (Pauly, 2005, pp. 183–84). 
2.1.3  Post-industrial economy 
Dealing with new structures of risks would not be complete without taking into 
consideration the whole conceptual framework that overlaps the theme of 
globalisation, namely the shift from an industrial to a post-industrial mode of 
economic growth. In short, an industrial economy is one centred on large-scale 
manufacturing operations, based on assembly-line or semi-assembly-line work 
processes. These concentrate a ‘massified’ workforce, often employed in lifetime jobs, 
and derive their profit advantage from economies of scale. 
As economies become more developed, the technical content of products 
becomes more easily variable, while growing disposable incomes allow people to make 
more and more lifestyle choices. ‘Flexibility’ becomes the key word. On the one hand, 
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and the dissemination of knowledge pick up pace with computer and communications 
technologies. On the other hand, technical and marketing variations also become easier 
as the market for manufacturing products becomes more global owing to decreases in 
transportation costs. The ratio of costs based on heavy hardware decreases – again as a 
result of the emergence of a global competitive market and the widespread 
standardisation of basic technologies. At the same time, the returns to quick adaptation 
and innovation increase. ‘Economies of scope’ and ‘economies of networks’ become the 
main sources of profit advantage in the post-industrial component of modern 
economies. All the while, the service sector grows bigger, generating new tensions and 
tough policy choices arising from the changes in relative costs in the service and 
manufacturing sectors (the ‘Baumol’ or ‘cost-disease’ effect). Yet it also has to be 
recognised that the boundary between certain forms of manufacturing and services is 
becoming more blurred and that for some services the scope for rapid productivity 
increases is considerable. 
2.1.4  Summary of the meaning of globalisation 
Thus, globalisation is a multifaceted concept. At the basic level, it refers to changing 
volumes of trade and investment flows. At the next level of analysis, it refers to a 
changing quality of these flows. Trade is progressively more intra-firm trade as well as 
trade in intermediate goods. It is driven by the expansion of MNEs, which have 
become the typical actor in globalisation processes. 
The term ‘globalisation’ implies new developmental processes emanating from 
post-industrial organisation, which may then clash in their inherent logic. Bob Jessop 
speaks of the conflict between the concept of knowledge as intellectual commons and 
knowledge as intellectual property, and more broadly of the conflict between 
implications prioritising the information economy and those stressing the need for an 
information society (Jessop, 2002, p. 110). These conflicts are in line with contradictions 
sketched out already by Bell (1973) between the economising and sociologising logics 
of the post-industrial society.  
The various dimensions of globalisation can be described as follows (Jessop, 
2002, p. 115): 
1)  the internationalisation of national economic spaces through growing penetration 
(inward flows) and extraversion (outward flows);  
2)  the formation of regional economic blocs; 
3)  the growth of more ‘local internationalisation’ and ‘virtual regions’ through the 
development of economic ties between local and regional authorities in different 
national economies; 
4)  the extension and deepening of multinationalisation through MNEs, 
transnational banks and international producer-service firms; 
5)  the widening and deepening of international regimes covering economic and 
economically relevant issues; and 
6)  the emergence of globalisation proper through the introduction of global norms 
and standards, the adoption of global benchmarking and the development of 
globally integrated markets, in which ‘deracinated’ firms with no evident 
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This list indicates that globalisation is far from producing a homogenised 
economic space. Rather, it involves a reordering of differences and complementarities 
in various geographical spaces as well as the global one, and this constant reordering is 
the basis for creating dynamic competitive advantages (ibid., p. 117).  
Depending on which facet of changes sweeping the world they want to stress, 
different authors come up with different definitions of globalisation (Box 2.1). 
 
Despite the prevalence of the economic dimension in the dominant public 
discourse on globalisation, which revolves around various indicators, it is probably 
worthwhile to keep in mind that the social reality cannot be simply compressed into a 
range of numbers. The Bureau of European Policy Advisers has recently published a 
consultation paper (Liddle & Lerais, 2007) that takes a wide view of the social realities 
and changes stemming from globalisation. This study is a response to the European 
Commission’s (2006a) Communication on a Citizens’ Agenda in which the 
Commission proposed a ‘social reality check’ ahead of preparing an agenda to promote 
access and solidarity in the EU. 
2.2  Drivers contributing to the process of globalisation 
The drivers of globalisation are in part determined by policy factors and in part by 
technological developments or underlying trends: 
•  The liberalisation of trade is largely a result of the various waves of lowering of 
trade barriers within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its 
successor the World Trade Organisation, but also of free trade agreements such 
as the European Free Trade Area and the North American Free Trade Area and a 
number of bilateral trade agreements across the world. 
Box 2.1 Globalisation – Some definitions 
Globalisation is the... 
•  “integration into the world economy” and increased interdependence “through trade, 
investment, finance, regional integration, technology, and demographic factors” 
(Richardson, 1997, p. 50). 
•  “growing integration of economies and societies around the world as a result of flows of 
goods and services, capital, people, and ideas” (Dollar, 2001, p. 2). 
•  external opening and an increased role of markets internally (Robinson, 2001, “Preface”). 
•  process in which “trade grows more rapidly than production” (Storper, 1992, p. 66). 
•  “closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been brought 
about by the enormous reductions of costs of transportation and communication, and the 
breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, 
and (to a lesser extent) of people across borders” (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 9). 
•  “reorganisation of production into global production systems, notably  global value 
chains and export processing zones” (Carr & Che, 2004, p. 1). 
•  “gradual integration of economies and societies driven by new technologies, new 
economic relationships and the national and international policies of a wide range of 
actors, including  governments, international organisations, business, labour and civil 
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•  In addition to the worldwide liberalisation of trade flows, the successive EU 
enlargements and the resulting integration have contributed significantly to the 
boosting of intra-EU trade flows and brought changes in the trade with non-EU 
countries. 
•  In recent decades, the rise in trade flows has accelerated through a remarkable 
reduction of transport costs and technological innovation, notably with the 
emergence of container handling and movements along with the associated 
increase in the role of container ships travelling around the world.  
•  Transport costs have fallen consistently, despite rising oil prices, while cross-
border telecommunication costs among the major trading nations have become 
effectively negligible. Anne Krueger cites evidence that a three-minute telephone 
call between New York and London would have cost $293 in 1931, $1 in 2001, 
and is now just a few cents for a better connection.5 Similarly, key facts cited by 
the International Shipping Federation shows that between 1980 and 1999, a 
period when the annual increase in the value of world trade was 12%, the costs of 
shipping rose by just 7% over the whole period.  
•  Total freight costs for trade between developed countries account for less than 
4% of the value of trade, with the implication that it is now other factors (such as 
regulatory restrictions, tariffs and so on) that limit trade, rather than transport 
costs. Indeed, transport costs make up only 2% of the cost of a television6 shipped 
from Asia to Europe and 1.2% of the cost of a kilo of coffee. Despite the fall in 
direct transport costs, Anderson & van Wincoop (2004) show that the costs of 
trading can still be considerable, especially for developing countries. The reasons 
lie in the costs of border formalities, information and other policy variables that 
affect distribution and margins at each stage in the chain from the producer to 
the consumer. They note that for these reasons, barriers to trade remain 
substantial. 
•  The rise in world trade has also been favoured by the liberalisation of capital 
movements, financial markets and payments. All of these developments have 
represented an imperative complement to the intensification of trade, but they 
have mainly been implemented within the OECD, by the International Monetary 
Fund, through EU enlargements or modifications in national policies. 
•  But again, the process of globalisation would probably not have taken place 
without the emergence of the Internet, ICT in general and the resulting huge 
reduction in the costs and increase in the speed of communication across the 
world.  
 
 
                                                      
5 See the lecture by A. Kruger given at the Kiel Institute symposium in honour of Herbert 
Giersch (Kruger, 2006). 
6 See the website of the Roundtable of International Shipping Associations 
(http://www.marisec.org/shippingfacts/worldtrade/costs.php). IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 15 
 
•  Rules and regulations concerning immigration and frontier control should also 
be taken into account as a potential driver of globalisation. Pertinent issues in this 
field, such as growing demands for political asylum or flows of refuges, are of 
major importance.  
•  The genuine internationalisation of many (if not most) multinational companies 
on the one hand, and the nature of international governance, either absent or in 
certain areas brought about by intergovernmental cooperation (notably within 
the OECD) on the other, has contributed to the creation of a world market that is 
largely unregulated or subject to only partial enforcements of competition rules, 
for example in transatlantic trade.  
•  Yet the process of globalisation has also been (and will in the future probably be) 
even more influenced by the speed of innovation and R&D, the progress of 
education and of intellectual capital and intangibles, the transfer of technology 
and the nature of the societal model in different countries. These important 
aspects only feature tangentially in the present report. 
The role and interplay of these and other main drivers have thus contributed to 
the process of globalisation, more specifically, 
•  huge changes in the size and direction of trade flows, with the share of 
merchandise trade in world GDP in real terms doubling since 1975 and 
quadrupling since 1950, but with trade in services only growing by half as much. 
Services are now starting to catch up, however; 
•  the outsourcing of production, initially of goods with a high content of low-
skilled labour input, but increasingly also of services with a substantial content of 
highly skilled labour input, including ICT services and certain categories of R&D. 
According to a recent study by Statistics Canada, 20% of Canadian jobs were 
exposed to outsourcing, although the study found no indication that industries 
relatively more exposed to outsourcing had slower growth of employment than 
less-exposed industries (Morisette & Johnson, 2007). Work by the McKinsey 
Global Institute has even found that for the US, outsourcing leads to net job 
creation (Farrell, 2007); 
•  a certain relocation of people, mainly nationally and associated with the 
restructuring of production units, yet also to some extent internationally as a 
complement to the outsourcing and insourcing of production; 
•  vast changes in the size and patterns of capital movements, both in the field of 
portfolio investments and in foreign direct investments. The stock of external 
assets and liabilities for the EU as a whole as a proportion of GDP rose from 59% 
of GDP in 1970, to over 550% in 2004, with a particularly strong expansion after 
1995; and 
•  the potential influence of the relocation of production on sources of government 
revenue, creating a need for reordering priorities and reforming taxation. 
In view of the very size of the changes in the flows of goods, services and capital 
movements, and of the ongoing outsourcing and insourcing, the process of 
globalisation must be expected to have social consequences: 
•  The industrial restructuring in favour of highly skilled branches can be expected 
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changes in regional employment patterns. A strengthening of employment in 
regions and branches with a high proportion of highly skilled labour can be 
anticipated, offset by a negative effect on wages or employment (or both) in low-
skilled jobs and branches. 
•  Since the effects are not symmetrical, nor do they influence the various levels of 
skill in the same direction or proportions, the process of globalisation may give 
rise to a tendency for income inequalities. Meanwhile, in countries with a low 
degree of labour market flexibility, the segmentation of the labour market risks is 
being accentuated.  
Still, the social effects of globalisation are not, as underlined elsewhere in this 
report, felt in the same way or to the same extent in all EU member states. Depending 
on the flexibility of the economy, the level of education of the working population, 
labour market rigidities and the functioning of the system of social protection, 
globalisation may appear as an opportunity or a danger. Based on the interaction 
between the economy, the social protection system and the mechanisms of social 
solidarity, the following effects can be observed: 
•  In some member states, globalisation is primarily an opportunity to accelerate the 
process of adaptation to a knowledge society and the growth of productivity, 
while in others it tends to aggravate existing segmentations and rigidities. 
•  Globalisation is absorbed with relatively little change in the overall income 
distribution in some EU countries, even if added segmentation leads to increased 
disparities of income between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. But globalisation may be 
a cause of a general shift in the functional income distribution in favour of capital 
income. 
•  Owing to the system of governance and the efficiency of tax collection in some 
member states, combined with the resilience of their economies, globalisation 
does not lead to a loss of tax revenue, but to a strengthening of public finance. 
Y e t  i n  o t h e r  m e m b e r  s t a t e s  w i t h  h i g h  t a x a ti o n  o f  l a b o u r  a n d  r i g i d i t i e s  i n  t he  
system of public revenue, globalisation leads to added pressure on public 
budgets through a vicious circle of increasing rates of taxation and social security 
contributions, adding to the direct effects of globalisation on employment. 
•  In member states with highly adaptable product and labour markets and, 
especially those with social protection schemes favouring employment and rapid 
adjustment, the social protection schemes may contribute to accelerating the 
participation of the economy in the process of globalisation, suggesting that there 
may be a positive feedback from social protection schemes to the process of 
globalisation. 
The policy recommendations in chapter 12 of this report argue that there is no 
empirical evidence of a ‘race to the bottom’, implying that globalisation is not an 
inexorable force. Even so, it is recognised that globalisation reinforces tendencies to pit 
one welfare system against another and to expose individuals to a higher degree of 
unpredictability and risks. Hence, responding to globalisation requires adapting 
policies and institutions to a changing economic environment, as discussed in section 
12.5. 
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To the extent that the policy response adopts an active stance, favouring 
adaptation and maintaining high levels of social justice and solidarity, it can be 
expected to induce a positive feedback. These not only relate to the social 
consequences, but also to the very nature of the process of globalisation and the 
capacity of the EU to exert influence on the international governance of key aspects of 
this process.  
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3.  EVIDENCE ON THE DEGREE OF OPENNESS 
he investigation of globalisation as a new phenomenon that emerged at the end 
of the 20th century is often puzzling to scholars. One of the reasons is that some 
substantive aspects of internationalisation, such as massive cross-border trade, 
foreign direct investment and migration, are not novelties in the history of world 
economy. Scholars are divided as to whether the most recent wave of 
internationalisation has demonstrated the scale of quantitative or qualitative change 
that would justify considering it a paradigm shift (see the overview in Bordo, 
Eichengreen & Irwin, 1999). Another difficulty is, as discussed in chapter 2, that public 
perceptions and discourse on globalisation comprise extremely diverse developments 
starting from various cross-border economic activities through the progress in 
technology and communication to social and cultural transformations, the interaction 
of values, etc. An exact and balanced analysis and evaluation of such diverse 
phenomena summarised under the buzzword ‘globalisation’ is therefore almost 
impossible.  
The heated debates about the causes and effects of globalisation are, however, 
with us, as is the enthusiasm for, or fear of, those who are convinced of the virtues or 
the vices of this process. To enhance the analysis of globalisation in the European 
context, in this overview we focus on ‘economic globalisation’: a basic, historically and 
theoretically circumscribed side of globalisation relative to the other aspects of the 
process. We concentrate on openness since it is intimately related to economic 
globalisation and it helps to measure the extent of the internationalisation process across 
countries and time.  
This chapter adopts the simple formulation of Brahmbhatt (1998, p. 1) that 
economic globalisation (or economic integration) is “the increasing freedom and ability 
of individuals and firms to undertake voluntary economic transactions with residents 
of other countries, a process entailing a growing contestability of national markets by 
foreign suppliers”.  
Drivers of the process have been both policy-related (such as the gradual reduction 
of official or private obstacles to exchange) and business- or technology-related (such as 
the reduction of transaction costs of exchange owing to inventions and technological 
developments in transport, information technology, communication, etc.). Some 
analysts attribute the recent wave of globalisation mostly or even solely to the 
developments in technology (Williamson, 1998; Giddens, 1999). Others, such as Sachs 
& Warner (1995), focus more on the role of public policy (trade liberalisation, the fall of 
communism and economic reforms) or even claim that one of the features 
distinguishing the current wave of globalisation from the earlier one is that current 
progress in openness relies less on technological developments and more on the 
abolition of government-erected obstacles to trade and capital flows (Bhagwati, 2004). 
Finally, some theorists accept both the role of technological developments and public 
policy, and complement these with further factors. Mussa (2000), for instance, 
considers the tastes of individuals and societies that prefer taking advantage of the 
opportunities of declining costs of transportation and communication as an equally 
important driver of globalisation as policy and technology.  
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Measures of economic openness try to gauge that part of economic integration 
that can be quantified, and thus analyse the progress (and in some periods, the 
regression) of globalisation. These measures are also useful because they make it 
possible to analyse the relationship of openness (or globalisation) with other processes, 
such as economic growth, inequality or financial volatility.  
As the definition of globalisation above reveals, the degree of economic 
integration or openness is usually related to countries that are defined by their unique 
geographical location, political system, jurisdiction, language, social history and so 
forth, or to the residents of these countries. The ease of, or freedom to, conduct 
transactions across borders refers to various aspects of business: 
a)  the cross-border trade of goods and services;  
b)  the ability to carry out financial transactions (portfolio investments as well as 
lending and borrowing);  
c)  the establishment, operation and control of business in another country through 
foreign direct investment;  
d)  the offer of labour services by residents of another country (labour migration); 
and  
e)  the exchange of information, conventions, perceptions and expectations 
necessary for the smooth and safe conduct of market exchanges.  
Based on the current structure of the EU, this chapter centres on past and recent 
patterns of progress in openness. Both time-related and cross-country comparisons are 
undertaken, with the aim of establishing which European economies are most open to 
the rest of the world and which have benefited most from the technological 
developments of transport and communication of recent decades, as reflected in their 
openness. How much was economic globalisation enhanced in Europe by the collapse 
of the communist system and the ensuing broadening of economic freedom? Have the 
former centrally planned economies caught up with the ‘old’ EU member states in 
opening up or are they still following the tracks of their more developed partners? Are 
there characteristic differences in these patterns when observing trade, portfolio or 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, the exposure to foreign ownership and control, 
and the exposure to tax competition? In the analysis, we focus on the 15 old EU 
member states, the 10 new member states that joined the Union in 2004 and the two 
new countries (Bulgaria and Romania). For cross-country comparisons, we use these 27 
countries. The chapter has only a few comparisons with other developed and less 
developed economies, partly because of brevity considerations and partly because the 
selection of comparator countries always involves some arbitrariness and would 
necessitate detailed qualifications in the subsequent analyses of data. In some analyses, 
however, we also have a look at the development of the ‘BRIC’ countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India and China), whose opening up and joining the world market in the past 
two decades are considered a major part of the current wave of globalisation.  
Openness measures provide support to the comparative analysis of openness 
across countries and time periods. These are either outcome-based (showing the actual 
realisation of openness) or policy-based (reflecting the possibility for easy exchange 
provided by policy instruments). Outcome-based measures are usually associated with 
de facto liberalisation, while policy-based measures (also called ‘rule-based’ or 20 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
‘restriction-based’ measures) are associated with de jure liberalisation. A number of 
analysts use both kinds of measures, particularly because the exclusive observation of 
either measure may be misleading.7 In this chapter, both outcome- and policy-based 
measures are used where possible.  
S o m e  s c h o l a r s  h a v e  f o u n d  t h a t  s i m p le, outcome-based measures can be 
misleading because they tend to reflect, inter alia, idiosyncratic attributes of countries 
or transitory developments in certain periods. Thus, indices that are more sophisticated 
have been proposed for comparative analysis of the level of openness. For instance, 
since the most common outcome-based index, the trade/GDP ratio, may be influenced 
by the special geographical location or the size of a given country, it has been 
suggested that instead of the actual measured level of openness, one should correct 
actual openness with the country’s potential openness (based on the potential trade), 
which is usually assessed with the help of the so-called ‘gravity’ model of trade. 
Others, such as O’Rourke & Williamson (2000), find that the growth in the trade/GDP 
ratio could reflect growth in import demand or in export supply induced by 
population growth, the colonisation of empty lands, capital accumulation or 
technological change – each different from the main drivers of globalisation (the 
reduction in transaction costs and in the protection provided by policy measures). 
Consequently, they propose the analysis of the progress in commodity price 
convergence, which would be “irrefutable evidence that globalisation is taking place” 
(ibid., p. 4).  
For the characterisation of various fields of openness, it is common to use either 
single measure indicators or multiple measures, or synthesised multiple measures. 
Most outcome-based measures take values on a continuous scale (usually with no 
maximum value), while policy-based measures are bound to be qualitative and 
therefore discrete. The popular synthesised measure of openness of Sachs & Warner 
(1995), for instance, is binary, i.e. it simply shows whether a country can be considered 
open or closed at a point in time.  
While measures of openness to trade and finance are more or less generally 
accepted,8 the openness or liberalisation of services is much more complicated to 
                                                      
7 Prasad et al. (2003) give examples of economies that show a high degree of policy-based 
openness, but achieve little openness in outcomes (remote countries in the case of trade flows 
and some African countries with respect to financial flows). They also highlight countries that 
were de jure closed to financial flows, but de facto suffered severe capital outflows (some Latin 
American countries involved in capital flight episodes of the 1970s and 1980s). In this chapter, 
examples demonstrating the different qualities of the policy-based and outcome-based 
openness indicators are given. 
8 Although in the various investigations, as many as two dozen alternative indices are used. IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 21 
 
gauge. Here, a combination of policy-based measures usually represents the move to a 
more or less open – or in other words, to a more or less liberal – regime.9  
In the next sections of this chapter, we analyse various fields in which economic 
integration is taking place with the help of policy-based and outcome-based indices of 
openness. Trade in goods and services, financial flows in the form of debt instruments, 
portfolio and direct investments are discussed, as well as the expansion of foreign 
control and the effects of the increasing international mobility of the tax bases. The 
chapter ends with a summary and conclusions. It should be noted that throughout this 
chapter a grouping of EU-14 is used to denote the ‘old’ EU: this aggregate excludes 
Luxembourg for which it is often difficult to obtain comparable and reliable data. EU-
10 refers to the countries that acceded to the EU in 2004 and EU-2 represents the 
newest member states, Bulgaria and Romania. 
3.1  Empirical analysis of economic globalisation – Trade 
3.1.1  Outcome-based measures 
The most common indicator of the evolution of openness is the trade/GDP ratio. The 
advantages of easy availability of the underlying data and the simple calculation of this 
index outweigh its conceptual problems.10 Economic historians have been able to 
reconstruct the (likely) size of trade and GDP in a number of countries for the past, 
which shows the acceleration of the opening-up process in the economies around the 
world since the last decades of the 19th century. Although the evolution has not been 
without reversals, in the most recent decades and in most of the countries of the world, 
the extent of openness has reached levels never before experienced (Table 3.1).  
Table 3.2 shows the result of the calculations for the evolution of this real 
openness in the old and new EU member states for five-year periods in the past 30 
years as well as in the BRIC countries.11 Contrary to expectations, the data do not 
reveal either spectacular or unbroken growth in openness in the individual countries 
and in the three groups of countries. Nevertheless, we can state that in the EU-14 group 
the increase of openness since 1981–85 has been sizeable, although the latest level does 
not seem to be historically high. The country groups EU-10 and EU-2 have also shown 
considerable growth in their openness since the early 1990s, albeit with large variations 
                                                      
9 In the analysis of the impact of openness on other phenomena, such as economic growth, 
employment rates, inequality or financial volatility, a general methodological consideration in 
choosing the appropriate measure of openness is that it must be exogenous to the phenomena 
on which openness is supposed to have an impact. Since in this report we analyse openness in 
itself and not in terms of its impact on other phenomena, we may neglect this – usually difficult 
– methodological problem.  
10 In addition to the problems associated with actual versus potential trade (discussed above), 
there are also the problems of inconsistency between trade (which is a gross concept) and GDP 
(a net concept), with the drawback being that the index has no maximum value. A further 
consideration is the services bias (analysed below).  
11 Owing to scarce and distorted data, Luxembourg has been left out of most of our calculations. 22 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
across the countries.12 At the end of the period covered in Table 3.2, the most open 
economies of the old EU member states are those of Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Ireland; among the new member states the economies of Malta, Estonia and Slovenia 
are most open. 
Table 3.1 Ratio of merchandise exports to GDP, 1870–1998 (in 1990 prices, %) 
  1870 1913 1929 1950 1973 1998 
Europe        
France  4.9 7.8 8.6 7.6  15.2  28.7 
Germany 9.5  16.1  12.8 6.2  23.8  38.9 
Netherlands 17.4  17.3 17.2 12.2 40.7 61.2 
UK 12.2  17.5  13.3 11.3 14.0 25.0 
Spain  3.8 8.1 5.0 3.0 5.0  23.5 
        
The Americas        
US  2.5 3.7 3.6 3.0 4.9  10.1 
Mexico 3.9  9.1  12.5  3.0  1.9  10.7 
Brazil  12.2 9.8 6.9 3.9 2.5 5.4 
        
Asia        
China  0.7 1.7 1.8 2.6 1.5 4.9 
India  2.6 4.6 3.7 2.9 2.0 2.4 
Japan  0.2 2.4 3.5 2.2 7.7  13.4 
        
World  4.6 7.9 9.0 5.5  10.5  17.2 
Source: Maddison (2003). 
By comparison with the data in Table 3.2, neither the level nor the speed of 
opening-up in the BRIC countries look as dramatic as the daily news would suggest. 
Among the four countries, China above all has shown a tendency to increase its trade 
compared to its GDP: in the most recent years, the index of openness (trade as a share 
of GDP) for China has increased by 1% each year. This progress is not staggering, 
however, even if we take into account the size of the Chinese economy. It is not a 
matter of indifference whether it is a mouse that opens its mouth or a dragon. China is 
large, but not (yet) that large that this steady opening-up itself should have far-
reaching consequences for the EU: in 2004, China’s GDP (calculated at international 
exchange rates) amounted to that of France. 
                                                      
12 Data for the former communist economies for the period before 1990 should be considered 
with caution because of valuation problems and limitations in the reliability of official data at 
that time. IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 23 
 
Table 3.2 Openness to trade in old and new EU member states since 1976 (%, countries in 
descending order of the values in the period 2001–03) 
((merchandise exports+merchandise imports) / 2) / GDP at PPP 
  1976–80 1981–85 1986–90  1991–95  1996–2000 2001–03 
Belgium –  45.7  58.1  66.8  72.3  78.5 
Netherlands 53.2  38.2  44.0  49.1  53.3  52.1 
Ireland 45.2  36.8  47.4  53.3  58.4  49.8 
Malta 47.3  33.1  40.4  46.9  39.8  37.3 
Austria 24.5  19.2  27.2  30.3  32.6  34.9 
Sweden 37.9  28.6  35.3  35.5  39.1  33.8 
Denmark 29.7  23.1  29.7  34.3  33.6  33.2 
Estonia  – – –  19.8  30.3  32.6 
Slovenia  – – –  31.8  31.3  30.7 
Finland 28.5  23.3  27.3  28.0  32.5  30.1 
Hungary 16.1  12.1  10.8  13.4  21.0  26.6 
Germany –  20.2  25.1  24.8  25.3  26.1 
Czech  Rep.  – – –  16.1  20.1  26.0 
Slovak  Rep.  – – –  16.3  19.7  24.8 
France 20.2  15.7  19.4  21.5  23.0  21.7 
UK 18.9  16.5  19.0  20.3  22.3  20.6 
Lithuania  – – –  12.2  15.8  18.9 
Portugal 10.6  9.8  15.4  18.7  19.6  18.4 
Cyprus 31.8  25.1  23.0  23.8  21.4  17.7 
Spain 8.8  8.3  11.7  14.7  16.7  17.2 
Italy 14.7  12.3  15.2  16.3  17.3  17.1 
Latvia  – – –  10.5  14.5  15.3 
Bulgaria –  36.4  28.6  9.4  10.9  13.1 
Poland  – – –  7.9  10.5  12.3 
Romania  – – –  5.6  7.9  11.3 
Greece 10.1  8.3  10.0  12.4  12.7  11.0 
            
EU-14 25.2  21.9  27.5  30.4  32.8  31.7 
EU-10  – – –  19.9  22.5  24.2 
EU-2  – – –  7.5  9.4  12.2 
Notes: The group averages are unweighted averages. Owing to scarce and distorted data, Luxembourg has 
been left out of the EU-14 calculations. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from World Bank (WDI) (2005c). 
 
When comparing the positions of the three country groups to each other, we find 
that the less developed groups (EU-10 and EU-2) that have re-established the principal 
institutions of a market economy and carried out a policy of opening-up only more 
recently (i.e. starting with the early 1990s) are still much less open than the developed 
members of the EU-14. This relative position of the less and more developed countries 
is critically influenced by the prices used to value the GDP in the denominator of the 
openness indicator. As Figure 3.1 shows, the ranking of the country groups (and, 
naturally, of the countries themselves) radically changes if we use the current exchange 24 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
rates instead of the PPPs: with the index calculated at current exchange rates the EU-10 
group becomes, on average, the most open group followed by the EU-2 and the EU-14. 
Figure 3.1 Development of openness to trade in the EU-14, EU-10 and EU-2 country groups 
(%, calculated on merchandise trade and on GDP at current exchange rates and at 
PPP) 
 
 
If we use the broader category in the numerator of the index, i.e. goods and 
services instead of merchandise goods, we find that with the new numerator the 
relative position of the countries changes only minimally (Table 3.3). A notable 
exception is Cyprus, which, being one of the EU member states most dependent on 
trade in services, has a much more prominent rank in Table 3.3 than in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.3 Openness to trade in old and new EU member states since 1976 (%, countries in 
descending order of the values in the period 2001–03) 
((exp. of goods and services+imp. of good and services)/ 2) / GDP at PPP 
  1976–80 1981–85 1986–90 1991–95  1996–2000  2001–03 
Belgium 67.8  49.5  65.5 74.9  74.8  74.0 
Ireland  51.3 41.7 54.8 64.4  76.3  72.3 
Netherlands 58.8  46.0 53.0 58.7  58.6  53.3 
Malta 66.3  47.6  58.4 64.4  54.9  50.3 
Austria 33.8  27.0  38.2 43.6  45.3  47.0 
Sweden  45.6 34.9 43.7 44.4  49.7  45.0 
Denmark 36.6  28.9  37.3 43.4  43.0  44.8 
Cyprus  41.8 35.8 39.2 42.0  39.2  – 
Slovenia –  –  –  37.3  37.0  36.1 
Estonia –  –  –  29.9  33.9  35.1 
Finland  32.7 26.8 32.3 34.4  37.7  34.4 
Germany 24.1  19.1  25.4 29.8  30.4  31.4 
Hungary 16.1  11.9  11.1 15.4  25.5  31.3 
EU-14 Curr. 
EU-10 Curr. 
EU-2 Curr. 
EU-14 PPP  EU-10 PPP 
EU-2 PPP 
0.0 
10.0 
20.0 
30.0 
40.0 
50.0 
60.0 
1976-1980  1981-1985  1986-1990  1991-1995  1996-2000  2001-2003 
Source: Own calculations based on data from World Bank (WDI) (2005c). IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 25 
 
Table 3.3 Continued 
Czech Rep.  –  –  –  20.6  25.1  30.2 
Slovak Rep.  –  –  –  21.3  23.9  28.9 
UK   23.6  20.5  23.5 25.8  29.3  28.3 
France  23.9 18.6 22.8 25.0  26.0  24.4 
Spain  11.6 11.0 15.3 19.0  22.1  23.0 
Lithuania –  –  –  17.5  18.8  22.1 
Portugal 13.8  12.4  19.1 24.0  24.4  21.6 
Italy  17.1 14.2 18.1 20.5  21.8  21.5 
Latvia –  –  –  22.1  20.7  20.6 
Greece 14.0  12.4  14.3 16.6  18.5  17.0 
Bulgaria  – 20.6 20.2 10.6  13.3  16.7 
Poland –  –  –  9.1  13.0  15.2 
Romania –  –  –  6.8  9.1  12.5 
EU-14 32.5  25.9  33.1 37.5  39.9  38.4 
EU-10 –  –  –  28.0  29.2  30.0 
EU-2 –  –  –  8.7  11.2  14.6 
Notes: The group averages are unweighted averages. Owing to scarce and distorted data, Luxembourg has 
been left out of the calculations. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from World Bank (WDI) (2005c). 
At first sight, it is surprising that in the ranking according to the utilisation of 
trade potential, the new member countries show up only in 13th place (the Czech 
Republic) and below. The most convincing explanation is that the exercise considers 
the long period of 1991–2003. Table 3.4 also indicates that there are substantial 
differences among the countries according to the three rankings of openness. On the 
one hand, there are countries that are considered very open according to the traditional 
openness index (calculated using PPP), but at the same time performing much below 
their potential according to the gravity model (Estonia, Malta and Slovenia). On the 
other hand, there are others that, when gauged by the traditional indicator, do not look 
very open but when measured against their potential trade, belong to the very open 
economies (Italy, Spain and the UK).13 The last column indicates those countries for 
which openness levels seem to be robust: they are the most open or least open by a 
consensus of all three indicators. Again, with due consideration for the long period 
covered in this calculation, it is no surprise that in the ‘consensus ranking’ all the 
economies that are most open are old EU member states, while all but one of the least 
open ones are new member states. Were there similar calculations for potential trade 
available for the most recent years, some small new EU member states would probably 
also show up in the most open economies by consensus of the three openness indices.  
                                                      
13 Since the first three countries belong to the smallest economies and the second group to the 
largest economies of the 26 EU member states shown in Table 3.4, it seems that these small 
economies showed relatively less openness and these large ones relatively more compared with 
countries of a similar size in the 61-country sample used in the model of Bussière, Fidrmuc & 
Schnatz (2005).  26 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
Table 3.4 Ranking of the countries in terms of openness to trade according to three openness 
indicators, 1991–2003 
 Trade/GDP 
at current 
exchange rates 
Trade/GDP at 
PPP rates 
Utilisation of 
trade potential 
Consensus level 
of openness 
Germany 20  11 1 M 
Netherlands 6  3  2  M 
Italy 25  19  3  – 
Belgium 2 1  4  M 
UK 22  14  5  – 
France 23  13  6  – 
Sweden 14 5  7  M 
Spain 24  21  8  – 
Denmark 16  6  9 M 
Finland 17  10  10  – 
Ireland 5  2  11  M 
Austria 13  7  12  M 
Czech Rep.  7  16  13  – 
Hungary 9 17  14  – 
Portugal 19 18  15 – 
Poland 21  25  16  L 
Greece 26  23  17  L 
Bulgaria 11  24  18  L 
Slovenia 8 8  19  – 
Rumania 15 26 20 L 
Slovak Rep.  4  15  21  – 
Cyprus 18  12  22  – 
Estonia 1  9  23  – 
Malta 3  4  24  – 
Lithuania 10  20 25  L 
Latvia 12  22  26  L 
M: Most open economies – based on the three rankings; L: Least open economies – based on the three 
rankings 
Notes: The ranking according to the utilisation of trade potential comes from the results of the gravity 
model calculation, which assesses a country’s trade potential based on its GDP, distance to its trade 
partners as well as cultural, historical and political factors affecting trade. 
Sources: Own calculations based on data from World Bank (WDI) (2005c) and Bussière, Fidrmuc & Schnatz 
(2005). 
3.1.2  Policy-based measures 
Another approach to measuring openness is based on the extent of policy-related 
obstacles to trade. This approach filters out most of the geographical determination of a 
country’s openness. Here, mainly (but not exclusively) those policy instruments of 
trade are taken into account that a country itself applies to ease or hamper trade 
transactions with the rest of the world. An often-used measure of openness belonging 
to this category is that developed by Sachs & Warner (1995). This binary indicator of IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 27 
 
p o l i c y - b a s e d  o p e n n e s s  c l a s s i f i e s  a  c o u n t r y  a s  c l o s e d  i f  a t  l e a s t  o n e  o f  f i v e  s p e c i f i c  
characteristics of a closed economy prevails in the country.14 According to this 
indicator, the cut-off dates for switching from a closed economy to an open one for an 
enduring period15 were different for the various EU member states. Ignoring 
temporary openness episodes, the first wave of opening-up happened at the end of the 
1950s: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands became open 
in 1959, while the transition in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and the UK occurred in 1960. Ireland followed suit in 1966. The next 
wave was stirred by the collapse of central planning and the start of economic 
transition in Central and Eastern Europe: Hungary and Poland started the process in 
1990, followed by Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Republics (still as Czechoslovakia), 
Slovenia (1991), Estonia and Romania (1992), and finally Latvia and Lithuania (1993).16 
Other, more sophisticated measures for the obstacles to trade are the IMF’s Trade 
Restrictiveness Index (IMF-TRI),17 and the World Bank’s series of indices: the Trade 
Restrictiveness Index (TRI), the Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI) and the 
Market Access Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (MA-OTRI). In the following 
discussion, we analyse the results of the calculation of the World Bank’s trade 
restrictiveness indices based on Kee, Nicita & Olarreaga (2006).18 The World Bank 
indices are based on the theoretical approach developed in a series of papers by James 
Anderson and Peter Neary, starting with their seminal article, Anderson & Neary 
(1992). All the three indicators attempt to summarise the effects of both tariff and non-
tariff barriers reflected in their combined impact on the affected economy. The TRI 
answers the question of what is the equivalent uniform tariff in a country that would 
keep real income (or welfare) constant. The OTRI answers the question of what is the 
equivalent uniform tariff in a country that would keep its imports at their observed 
levels. Finally, the MA-OTRI answers the question of what is the equivalent uniform 
tariff faced by exporters of a given country in the rest of the world that would keep its 
exports at their observed levels. 
In their most recent exercise, the experts of the World Bank collected and 
processed data for 91 counties, mostly for the years 2003–04 (tariffs and trade) and for 
the late 1990s (non-tariff barriers) – see Kee, Nicita & Olarreaga (2006). The 15 old EU 
member states were considered a single economy and only their extra-EU trade was 
taken into account. The new member states (not all of them present in the sample) were 
handled as separate entities (in practice, what they really were in the period before 
2004). Table 3.5 points to some interesting insights that can be drawn from the trade 
                                                      
14 These characteristics are 1) non-tariff barriers covering 40% or more of trade; 2) average tariff 
rates of 40% or more; 3) a black market exchange rate that has been depreciated by 20% or more 
relative to the official exchange rate for a considerable period of time; 4) a socialist system in 
place; and 5) a state monopoly on major exports (Sachs & Warner, 1995, pp. 22–23). 
15 More specifically, this relates to the date of switching from a closed economy to an open one 
up to 1994, i.e. the time of writing the study by the authors.  
16 Malta was not rated by the source because of insufficient data on trade policies. 
17 See IMF (2005). 
18 See also the Global Monitoring Report 2006 published by the World Bank (2006c). 28 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
restrictiveness indices. The table contains the ranking of the group of EU-15 and the 
new member states according to the different trade restrictiveness indices. For each 
category, there are three indices: a composite index, one calculated for manufacturing 
products and one for agricultural products.  
The first striking result is that the EU-15 is far from being a champion of non-
restrictive trade practices with respect to its trade partners. This result is reflected in 
the EU’s positions in the TRI and OTRI rankings. A second interesting finding is that in 
the relevant period, most of the new member countries were less restrictive vis-à-vis 
their partners than the EU-15 was vis-à-vis its partners. This is, however, an illusion 
that can be dispelled with the appropriate interpretation. In the period in question, the 
basically obstacle-free trade between the new member states and the EU-15 amounted 
to about 60-70% of the total trade of the new member states, but only about 5-15% of 
the total trade of the EU-15. This difference is more than sufficient to explain why the 
new member states may look more open than the old ones, but if we recall that intra-
EU trade, which amounts to about 60% of the total trade of the EU-15, is not taken into 
account in the TRI and OTRI indices, the whole puzzle is solved. With this 
interpretation in mind, we can assume that in a future edition of TRI and OTRI indices 
the new member countries (by that time counted as members of the EU) will slip back 
in the ranking of the countries in terms of openness based on trade restrictiveness. 
Although we do not have trade restriction indices for all the 27 countries, it is clear that 
the ranking in Table 3.5 does not match those in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. For instance, 
Slovenia, a very open economy according to Tables 3.2 and 3.3 (i.e. using outcome-
based measures) turns out to be the least open among the Central and Eastern 
European EU countries in Table 3.5 (i.e. using policy-based measures).  
So far, we have presented several measures of openness. Below we continue to 
do this with the understanding that each index approaches the problem of 
globalisation from a different angle and can be used to analyse different issues. To 
show the diverse qualities of the openness indices, here we draw attention to how 
differently these indices handle the issue of the ‘doubling of the global labour force’, a 
recently and sharply formulated line of development of the globalisation process. In 
his short pamphlet, Richard Freeman states that the fundamental reality of 
globalisation is that in the past 15 years, the global labour force has doubled.19  
Workers in China, India and the former Soviet bloc were around and active 
before the mid-1980s, but only since then have they gradually joined the global 
workforce pool – effectively doubling the size of the world’s connected workforce 
compared with this pool without them. Transformation, market liberalisation reforms 
and opening-up in China, India and the former communist countries (as well as 
progress in the liberal world trading system) have led these countries to join the 
world’s actively and freely trading community. The implications are and will be 
substantial: more intense global competition, pressure on labour markets around the 
world, job migration, etc., although offset by more consumer demand. 
                                                      
19 See Freeman (2005a and 2005b) and Pisani-Ferry (2005).  
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Table 3.5 Trade restrictiveness indices: Ranking of current EU member states among 91 countries 
 TR  OTR  MA-OTR 
 Real  income-related  Import-related Export-related 
 All  Manuf.  Agric. All  Manuf.  Agric.  All  Manuf.  Agric. 
EU-15 
(extra-EU trade) 
60 57 67 38 34 58  27 33  42 
             
Czech Rep.  5  10  3  3  7  1  11  29  68 
Estonia  8 14  4  6 11  3  51 73  50 
Hungary  32 46 35 19 28 28  25 36  64 
Latvia  41 35 48 27 22 48  54 56  33 
Lithuania  14 21 22  8 12 18  72 81  52 
Poland  22 31 39 21 26 37  41 53  31 
Romania  50 58 53 64 62 64  30 59  22 
Slovenia  46 49 70 36 36 70  35 70  86 
             
Memo items             
No. 1  Hong Kong  Hong Kong  Kyrgyzstan  Hong Kong Hong  Kong Czech  Rep.  Gabon  Gabon  Gabon 
No.  91  Egypt Sudan Egypt Sudan Sudan Tunisia  Nicaragua  Trinidad  & 
Tobago 
Thailand* 
China’s  position 52 64 40 39 46 34 5 10  16 
* Last in the ranking (in fact no. 88, owing to the lack of data for some countries) 
Source: Calculations based on data in Kee, Nicita & Olarreaga (2006). 30 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
How does this epochal development in globalisation show up in the openness 
indicators of the EU-27 analysed so far? From among the indices focusing on policies, 
the Sachs–Warner index shows a qualitative change for the new member states in the 
past 15 years, but no change for the 15 old member states. While we do not have a time 
series for the restriction-based indices of the TRI, OTRI and MA-OTRI, the impression 
is that the doubling of the global workforce is reflected only to a minor extent in the 
TRI and OTRI. (Notable exceptions are the Czech Republic, Estonia and Lithuania, 
which have achieved quite prominent places in these rankings.) The results for the 
MA-OTRI index (which is to some extent a mirror index of the OTRI) show that China 
and to a degree Russia have already reached favourable positions among the 91 
countries in the ease of access to export markets. In contrast, India can still be found 
among those countries that have the most difficult access to external markets.  
In principle, outcome-based indicators (such as trade/GDP) should reflect the effect 
of the doubling of the global labour force more strongly than policy-based measures. 
The detected change, however, has so far not been as dramatic as the formulation by 
Richard Freeman suggests. This result tempts the analyst to contemplate whether the 
traditional indices of openness are the right tools to reflect appropriately and in a 
timely manner the most recent developments in the globalisation process.  
3.1.3  Trade in services 
In the literature and public discourse on globalisation, there is a common perception 
that the liberalisation of services and the expansion of trade in services have made a 
considerable contribution to the present wave of globalisation. Owing to policies that 
are more liberal, the global scene of service provision has been reshaped in the past 
two decades by financial innovations, the development of telecommunication and 
information technologies, advances in the trade in services as well as the international 
outsourcing of services. 
Services are a diverse package of activities. There are two characteristics 
distinguishing them from goods with respect to production and trade, with most 
services having either or both of these. First, because of the simultaneity of production 
and consumption, trade proper is impossible, and the provision of services by non-
residents to residents requires that the factors of production (capital and labour) move 
to the location of the consumer. Second, barriers to entry are usually maintained not 
only against foreign suppliers, but also against emerging domestic producers (Mattoo, 
Rathindran & Subramanian, 2001; UNCTAD, 2004). The implications of these two 
characteristics are that in many lines of services, FDI (and to a lesser extent, labour 
migration) on the one hand has to be a prerequisite to and the major mode of 
penetration of foreign business in domestic services markets. On the other hand, this 
penetration has to be preceded by the liberalisation of domestic services markets for 
indigenous business.  
The implication of these features for measuring the openness of services markets 
is that it is necessary to focus on policy-based measures as well as on the evolution of 
services-related FDI. Because of the diversity of services, different lines of services 
usually require different indicators of openness. For instance, Eschenbach & François 
(2002), in their investigation covering 130 countries, use three indicators to characterise 
the openness of the financial sector in these countries, two of which are policy-related IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 31 
 
and one of which is outcome-based.20 Mattoo, Rathindran & Subramanian (2001) 
devised even more complex openness indices for two lines of services, the 
telecommunications sector and the financial services sector. These indicators are based 
on the degree of competition, the extent of foreign ownership and the nature of 
regulation in the sector in the given country. The values of these indicators for the EU 
member states are replicated in Figure 3.2.  
Figure 3.2 Financial and telecommunication liberalisation indices (1996–99) 
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As the data indicate, in the second half of the 1990s, the old member states of the 
EU achieved the maximum level of openness in financial services (which, in the 
classification of the authors, takes the value of 8) and a level quite close to the 
maximum in telecommunication services (8, while the maximum level is 9). The four 
new member states in the sample show a reasonable lag behind the old member states 
in the process of liberalisation.  
Table 3.6 gives evidence that in recent years, by utilising the opportunity of 
increasing openness, service activities have really become an attractive field for foreign 
investors. Although at the beginning of the 1990s, in the EU member states about half 
of inward direct investment flows targeted service activities, 10 years later these 
already made up three-quarters of total FDI inflows. While in this group of countries, 
the outflow of services-related FDI has not evolved as rapidly as FDI inflows, the 
reorientation of direct investments from industry (mainly manufacturing) towards 
services is a clear tendency. Data for the new member states are not complete, but it 
                                                      
20 These indicators are 1) the estimates of the tariff equivalents for financial services trade, based 
on GATS (General Agreement of Trade and Services) commitments within the World Trade 
Organisation; 2) the Heritage Foundation’s Bank Freedom Index; and 3) the share of the 
banking sector accounted for by foreign banks.  32 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
seems that these economies are going through the same stages of refocusing FDI flows 
towards services as the old EU member states did.  
Table 3.6 Share of services in total FDI (%) 
 Flows  Stock 
 Inward  Outward  Inward  Outward 
 Average 
1990–94 
Average 
2000–02 
Average 
1990–94 
Average 
2000–02 
2001 2001 
Austria  – 84.0 40.7 65.7 73.9  – 
Belgium  – – – – – – 
Bulgaria –  74.1  –  129.0  –  41.4 
Cyprus  – – – – – – 
Czech Rep.  42.8  82.0  –  93.9  60.5  82.0 
Denmark 46.6  87.1  49.6 75.2 89.2 78.4 
Estonia  41.8 82.0 22.2 87.6 78.2 87.5 
Finland  31.9 89.5 24.1 28.9 56.6 27.0 
France  69.5 70.8 57.9 81.4 80.2 75.9 
Germany 191.4  107.2  46.2  49.5  66.4  68.7 
Greece  – – – – – – 
Hungary –  62.8  –  30.2  53.3  76.3 
Ireland 3.4  50.7  –  26.4  –  – 
Italy  61.6 57.0 68.7 43.0 57.0 56.3 
Latvia  – – – –  77.2 – 
Lithuania  –  85.0 – –  69.7* – 
Malta  – – – – – – 
Netherlands  57.8 67.7 53.3 63.7 65.0 58.1 
Poland –  77.3  –  25.9  54.8  86.2 
Portugal  45.4 65.6 67.8 58.9 47.9  – 
Romania  – – – – – – 
Slovak  Rep.  – – – –  45.8*  60.4 
Slovenia  – – – –  52.1  43.7 
Spain  40.9 85.5 84.0 88.4  –  – 
Sweden  32.1 43.7 43.4 58.8 30.3 39.2 
UK  50.4 77.5 46.6 50.5 61.0 62.5 
        
Countries 
from EU-14 
57.4 73.9 52.9 57.5 62.8 58.3 
Countries 
from EU-10 
42.3 77.8 22.2 59.4 61.5 72.7 
Countries 
from EU-2 
– 74.1  –  129.0  – 41.4 
* Data from 2000 
Notes: Owing to scarce and distorted data, Luxembourg has been left out of the calculations. Since FDI flows can 
be both positive and negative (irrespective of whether they are inward or outward), substantial non-
service-related negative flows may cause the share of service-related FDI flows to exceed 100%. 
Source: UNCTAD (2004). IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 33 
 
As regards trade in services, the data presented in Table 3.7 demonstrate that 
growing openness to services trade (or an expansion in the relative weight of trade in 
services) is apparent, but its scale is not stunning, and unbroken growth has not been a 
general characteristic of all the EU member states in the past 10-15 years.  
Table 3.7 Openness to services trade in old and new EU member states since 1976 
(%, countries in descending order of the values in the period 2001–03) 
((exp. of services + imp. of services)/ 2) / GDP at PPP 
  1976–80 1981–85 1986–90 1991–95 1996–2000 2001–03 
Ireland 6.8  5.2  8.5  11.3  19.8  26.0 
Cyprus  12.9 13.1 17.2 20.4  22.5 22.5 
Belgium  11.5  8.7 12.7 16.4  15.5 16.7 
Denmark 8.5  6.9  9.2 11.1  12.1 15.9 
Austria  9.2  8.0 11.4 14.5  14.7 15.4 
Malta  21.2 14.9 19.0 18.5  15.4 14.0 
Netherlands  11.1  8.5 10.2 12.9  12.4 12.5 
Sweden  8.7 6.7 8.7 9.6  10.1  10.9 
Estonia  – – –  4.4  9.0  9.1 
Greece  3.3 2.7 3.3 4.7  6.4 7.8 
UK  5.5 4.5 5.0 5.8  7.3 7.8 
Spain  2.9 2.7 3.9 4.7  5.3 5.9 
Germany  4.5 3.7 4.6 5.3  5.5 5.8 
Slovenia  – – –  6.2  5.9  5.7 
Finland  5.3 4.6 5.8 7.1  6.4 5.6 
France  6.1 4.8 5.7 6.6  5.4 5.0 
Hungary  – 0.8 1.5 3.5  4.4 4.8 
Latvia  – – –  3.1  5.7  4.8 
Portugal  2.7 2.3 3.4 4.8  4.8 4.6 
Czech  Rep.  – – –  4.4  4.9  4.3 
Italy  3.0 2.5 3.6 4.7  4.6 4.2 
Slovak  Rep.  – – –  4.5  3.7  3.9 
Bulgaria  – 2.7 1.8 2.3  3.4 4.1 
Lithuania  – – –  1.6  3.2  3.4 
Poland  – – –  2.1  2.4  2.4 
Romania  – – –  0.9  1.3  1.7 
         
EU-14 6.4  5.1  6.9 8.5  9.3  10.3 
EU-10  – – –  6.9  7.7  7.5 
EU-2  – – –  1.6  2.3  2.9 
Notes: The group averages are unweighted averages. Owing to scarce and distorted data, Luxembourg has 
been left out of the EU-14 calculations. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from World Bank (WDI) (2005c). 
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Undoubtedly, some economies have traditionally been committed to trade in 
services because of their specialisation in trading in specific service lines. These 
countries, such as Cyprus, Malta, Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands, persistently 
show a high degree of openness. Others have achieved remarkable progress recently, 
particularly Ireland, but also Denmark, Estonia, Cyprus and Greece. The expansion in 
the full sample, however, is not staggering. An interesting characteristic emerges (not 
shown in the table) whereby countries that vigorously expand their export of services 
also tend to do this in their import of services. Since services are very diverse activities, 
in some lines of tradable services a real breakthrough has manifestly occurred in recent 
years, which could go on in the future. Aggregate data, however, do not bring out 
these developments. This could also be the case for India, the BRIC country for which 
specific evidence suggests that the cross-border export of services showed spectacular 
expansion in recent years. Data in Table 3.7 and the underlying export data show that 
on an aggregate level, service exports from India are still very limited, at less than 1% 
of GDP.  
3.2  Integration of capital and money markets 
As noted in a UN training paper, capital markets are in the process of rapid evolution 
(United Nations, 2001). Capital flows – which were formerly directed towards banks 
and controlled by governments – are now held by individuals, institutions or private 
mutual funds and can circulate freely and instantaneously to projects that will yield the 
maximum profit. Electronic computerised data transmission now gives them an 
unprecedented mobility on all the financial markets on the planet. Moreover, the 
volume of such flows has grown – tripling or increasing tenfold in the past few years – 
mainly as a result of the success of mutual funds, whose assets often exceed those of 
many governments. 
In the past, rivalries between nations were resolved by means of armed conflicts 
in which empires or ideologies clashed. Nowadays, the wars being waged seem ever 
more removed from the principal events taking place on the economic and financial 
front. During the cold war, the superpowers provided assistance in the form of official 
financial flows or subsidies to centralised economic systems and developing countries 
whose survival they ensured. Today, these flows and subsidies are considerably 
reduced or they have even disappeared in some cases. They have given way to the 
l a w s  o f  t h e  m a r k e t  p l a c e ,  w h i c h  g o v e r n  g r o w t h ,  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  
decline. 
Today, too, the main problem facing governments is how to attract new 
investment with a view to creating jobs and promoting sustained economic growth. 
Governments compete for capital. To this end, nations vie with each other through 
variations in their interest rates or their rates of exchange, and through the 
competitiveness of their markets. The world has become capitalist and the ever-
increasing financial movements can reward savings and productivity and thus 
strengthen a country’s economy. Conversely, foreign capital can also abandon an 
economy or withdraw abruptly if an unfavourable fiscal policy drives it away. 
Speculators may attack a weak currency to weaken it still further. Capital movements 
may penalise unproductive expenditure and thus help to destroy a country’s economy. IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 35 
 
Governments and heads of enterprises therefore strive to attract this capital by offering 
favourable conditions and to utilise capital more productively than their rivals do. 
With the end of the cold war, official subsidies and other financial flows dried up 
in countries such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Myanmar and Cuba, 
while investors preferred to steer their capital towards countries where the climate was 
more favourable to them, such as the Republic of Korea, the Taiwan province of China 
and other emerging countries. Capital has thus become more mobile and more difficult 
to stabilise and control. 
During the 1990s, over 50 developing countries established functioning capital 
markets. These countries need capital in order to launch their new market economies. 
In Asia and Latin America, economies are in a state of full expansion; they need to 
build up infrastructure and find capital to sustain their economic growth. After a 
period of recession, Europe and Japan also need capital to finance their expansion, 
create jobs, make good their budget deficits and privatise their state enterprises. 
In the face of this increased demand for capital, the competition has become 
increasingly fierce. In order to attract these financial flows and pay a return on them 
without over-burdening the costs of production, some countries have had to resort to 
reducing wages or extending working hours. Moreover, the mounting budget deficits 
of the US have triggered an additional demand for capital. Prior to the slowdown 
triggered by the sub-prime crisis in late 2007, the effect of these demands for capital 
was evident in rising interest rates in Europe despite moderate inflationary pressures. 
Loans are becoming progressively more expensive and risk breaking the recent cycle of 
recovery. The countries with economies in transition are also seeking capital. The 
dearth of capital led to the fall of the Soviet empire, which had been unable either to 
create sufficient capital or to utilise it effectively.  
All these countries are feverishly engaged in establishing a complete capital 
market infrastructure. The first countries to achieve this will have the benefit of direct 
and preferential access to international investors. In this context, many countries are 
also making ever-greater use of derivative markets, including futures markets and 
options, which will allow improved coverage of risks related to stocks and shares, 
bonds and exchange rates.  
The free circulation of capital outside government control has led to the transfer 
of the concept of power, traditionally invested in governments, to private holders of 
capital. This development explains the inability of central banks to curb the 
speculations that have recently attacked the value of the yen, the dollar and the 
European currencies. Governments have thus experienced erosion in their ability to 
control their budgets and their capital. Their fiscal resources appear to be reduced in 
relation to private capital, no longer enabling them to make the necessary investments. 
The same applies to the international financial institutions, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, which are financed by governments. 
In contrast, multinational financiers, managers of private funds and directors of 
companies or banks have tended to become more powerful. Governments urge them to 
steer their clients’ investments towards their countries: the emergence of private capital 
as a leading actor on the international scene marks a great turning point in the 
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After the Second World War, it was generally believed that governments were 
responsible for the allocation of resources. Today, it is the markets that have taken over 
this role, thus confirming the decline in state control or ‘New Deal’ trends. Moreover, 
until the early 1980s, governments sought to regulate the international monetary 
system and capital movements for fear of losing their natural capital and control over 
domestic economic policy. Those countries that have attempted to impose severe 
restrictions on capital movements have generally had to recognise the fluidity of the 
financial markets, which have moved towards more welcoming political centres, thus 
creating an offshore industry that still exists. As a result, governments have been 
compelled to reduce the barriers to capital movements and, in particular, to reduce the 
amount of tax deducted at source on foreign investments. From the standpoint of 
governments responsible for controlling emerging markets, the question of the taxation 
of capital flows is extremely important. Such taxes can be useful if they are used to 
build a market infrastructure. Too high a rate of taxation, however, would drive 
investors away.  
3.2.1  Consequences of the globalisation of capital markets 
Beneficial economic consequences. The globalisation of capital has beneficial 
characteristics in many respects. In order to attract the capital necessary for their 
development, national economies must become or remain open to foreign investment 
and must adopt responsible fiscal and monetary policies. 
The majority of governments have made economic stability one of their highest 
priorities. Thus, the lowering of customs barriers has introduced competition into 
previously protected markets. If governments impose excessive regulations or too high 
a rate of taxation, if public expenditure is too high in relation to revenue and if the 
central banks destroy too many liquid assets, foreign capital will not be attracted or it 
will be withdrawn if it is already there. International mutual funds have become a 
strategic weapon in the arsenal of democracies.  
Adverse consequences. The play of market forces may also have adverse 
consequences. Indeed, the decision-makers and controllers of capital turn away from 
states that have serious budget deficits or budgets burdened by considerable social 
expenditure. Deficits and the absence of economic and financial reforms may dissuade 
the investment of capital in the countries in question. The gap between rich and poor 
may therefore widen in the face of the exigencies of this social Darwinism and the rigid 
rules of capitalist disciplines. 
Lastly, it is believed that if governments reduce taxes on capital movements, 
create offshore markets and establish a stable and convertible currency, private capital 
will flow in. 
3.2.2  Domestic savings 
Domestic savings are the alternative solution to trying to attract foreign capital. Yet 
savings have decreased in recent years, since prosperity has placed more consumer 
goods on the market. Traditionally, national savings supplied the economy with 
investments that ensured growth and employment. These days, governments have 
difficulty in keeping these reduced savings within the country. For example, the US is 
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the use of domestic savings would help to clear or reduce; the US deficit, however, is 
financed mainly by foreign capital. In several countries, governments have established 
mandatory savings plans. Since the restructuring of pension systems, states have 
encouraged the development of private pensions, which have increased the rate of 
savings and which are mostly invested in the stock market. 
3.2.3  Effect of the integration of capital markets on globalisation 
The globalisation of capital markets and the growth of trade will help create new 
surpluses, which could meet the world demand for capital. Still, these financial 
resources, in search of attractive returns, will be invested in countries that achieve a 
fundamental balance in their public finances and introduce economic and financial 
measures to reduce budget deficits and current payments, rationalise and privatise 
public enterprises, develop private savings and the capital market, and liberalise trade. 
During the past decade, a growing number of developing countries, emerging 
countries and economies in transition have introduced the reforms necessary for the 
restoration of financial equilibrium. Even so, the need to attract external financial flows 
that could contribute to the creation of jobs and the growth of their economies requires, 
especially in the context of the globalisation of capital markets, a greater effort in 
favour of national capital markets. The development of such markets, combined with 
national capacity-building and the establishment of institutions connected to the 
international financial centres, would help enhance the effectiveness of financial 
mediation in the allocation of resources, to channel external flows and to increase and 
diversify the volume of medium- and long-term financial resources necessary for the 
economic development of these countries. Finally, these flows, both internal and 
external, cannot fail to constitute a source for the mobilisation of additional resources 
through appropriate taxation. 
In the past quarter century, governments of industrial and subsequently less 
developed countries have carried out widespread capital account liberalisation, which 
has led to the intensification of international financial integration. Appropriately 
measuring the pace of this progress in openness is perhaps even more important than 
measuring openness in trade, for two reasons. First, the beneficial nature of financial 
globalisation is more controversial than the gains achieved as a consequence of 
unfettered trade. Second, gauging the scope and scale of regulations on a great number 
of short- and long-term financial instruments and FDI is even more difficult than the 
extent of tariff and non-tariff barriers to exports and imports.21  
Owing to the complexity of these regulations, we do not deal with the policy-
based measures of financial globalisation here, but focus only on indices that reflect the 
progress in actual financial openness. This does not mean that the pace and the 
strategy of the process of financial integration, managed by the governments mostly 
through adjustments in the relevant regulations, are unimportant. On the contrary, 
particularly since the financial crises that started in East Asia in 1997, the fine-tuning of 
financial liberalisation has become a major issue. Experience shows that successful 
                                                      
21 See Chapter IV in IMF (2001), Edison et al. (2002), Prasad et al. (2003), Lane & Milesi-Ferretti 
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management of financial liberalisation needs, among other things, careful preparation, 
sound macroeconomic fundamentals, prudent fiscal policies, financial regulations and 
supervision, and the possible containment of short-term debts, notably those 
denominated in foreign currencies (see Prasad et al., 2003).  
3.2.4  Outcome-based measures 
Recently, various attempts have been made to assess the scale of capital mobility (and 
compare it across countries and time) either through calculating actual, specific capital 
inflows and outflows as a percentage of GDP, or by calculating composite indices of 
t h e  m a i n  f i n a n c i a l  f l o w s ,  a l s o  a s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  G D P .  W e  h a v e  m a d e  s i m i l a r  
calculations for the EU member countries and their groupings. Figures 3.3 to 3.6 show 
the results for the development of stocks of different categories of portfolio 
investments and FDI for the relevant groups of EU member states.  
Figure 3.3 Portfolio investments (assets) in groups of EU member states 
(% of GDP, unweighted average) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the IMF International Statistics database. 
 
The figures give evidence of the especially dynamic expansion of capital flows in 
this part of the world in the past decade. The main drivers of the expansion have been 
liberalisation and the development of domestic and international capital markets, 
large-scale privatisation programmes, demographic changes, such as an increasingly 
ageing population, and the rise in importance of institutional investors in the 
developed countries.  
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Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show that the new EU member states (notably the former 
communist countries) have simply been unable to catch up with the scale of openness 
to portfolio investments that the old EU member states have achieved despite major 
institutional transformations and their strong efforts to adopt liberalisation measures in 
domestic financial markets. The transition countries have been latecomers in 
establishing solid and open financial markets, and the hectic transformation period of 
the 1990s had not been attractive to portfolio flows either. Accordingly, it is no surprise 
that in terms of the accumulated portfolio of liability stocks, they hold the same 
position now as the old EU member states did 15 years ago.  
Figure 3.4 Portfolio investments (liabilities) in groups of EU member states (% of GDP, 
unweighted average) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the IMF International Financial Statistics database. 
 
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 indicate, however, that the picture for FDI inflows is 
completely different. As a result of the unique opportunities afforded by large-scale 
privatisation and the expected high returns in their markets, in the past decade the 10 
(now) new member states experienced massive inflows of FDI, and consequently, by 
2003 they showed a similar level of integration in inward investments as the more 
mature members of the EU. The EU-2 countries, by contrast, seem to lag behind the 
other two groups by four to five years. Yet in terms of outward FDI, the EU-10 and EU-
2 member states have a much lower relative stock than the old member countries. This 
is no surprise given their low level of development and relative scarcity of indigenous 
capital. 
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Figure 3.5 Inward FDI in groups of EU member countries (% of GDP, unweighted average) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the IMF International Financial Statistics database. 
 
Figure 3.6 Outward FDI in groups of EU member countries (% of GDP, unweighted average) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the IMF International Financial Statistics database. 
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Indicators that are more complex, representing the position of individual 
countries in global financial integration, can be calculated from the data of the IMF’s 
External Wealth of Nations database.22 This useful source of information has been 
developed by Lane & Milesi-Ferretti,23 who took the IMF’s concept of ‘International 
Investment Position’24 as a starting point. The database covers portfolio investments 
(both equity securities and debt securities), FDI, other investments (including various 
debt instruments), financial derivatives and reserve assets. Deriving from these raw 
data the authors offer two main outcome-based (or as they call them, ‘volume-based’) 
indicators for measuring the scale of international financial integration of countries. 
The indicator ‘IFIGDP’ adds up the stock of all external assets and liabilities of a country as 
a percentage of the country’s GDP. A subset of these financial instruments, called 
‘GEQGDP’, focuses on equity holdings in portfolio investments and FDI. Tables 3.8 and 
3.9 present the results of the calculations of these two indices for the EU countries for 
every fifth year since 1970. Data in Table 3.8 reflect the extraordinary acceleration of 
financial integration in the EU-14 since the middle of the 1990s, also experienced 
worldwide. Beyond this general tendency, we see a wide variation among the 
economies with Ireland, Belgium, the UK and the Netherlands being on the highly 
open end, and Greece, Italy, Spain and Germany on the less open end. Clearly, the 
difference between these groups of countries in international financial integration 
depends not only on the extent of liberalisation of their capital markets, but also on 
many other circumstances, such as the differences in how their domestic markets are 
habitually financed (i.e. by bank loan or equity financing).  
Table 3.9 presents similarly dynamic developments in the new member states, 
naturally starting from (and reaching) a lower level than the old member states of the 
Union. As expected (for instance after inspecting Figures 3.3 to 3.6), the less developed 
EU countries have based their integration relatively more on equities versus debt 
instruments than the more developed EU countries. This corresponds to the tendency 
that Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2006) found for two broader categories of countries, the 
“industrial country group” and the “emerging markets/developing countries” group, 
not only for all asset and liability instruments but also for liability instruments alone. 
This finding implies that, through increasing financial integration, these less developed 
countries are becoming gradually less vulnerable to the more mobile and volatile 
international financing instruments. As for the variation in terms of financial openness 
within the EU-10 and the EU-2, we find the traditionally highly open economies of 
Cyprus and Malta on the one hand, and a more or less balanced development for the 
rest of the countries on the other. Among this latter group of countries, Estonia stands 
out with its relatively fast financial integration and Romania is noteworthy for its slow 
pace. 
                                                      
22 See the IMF’s website http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/data/wp0669.zip. 
23 See Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2006), as their latest publication on the database. 
24 Used by the IMF, the methodology of the International Investment Position is described in 
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Table 3.8 Volume-based measures of international financial integration (IFIGDP) and its equity 
part (GEQGDP) in the EU-14 group (% of GDP) 
   1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Austria IFIGDP  43.5  55.2  96.2  160.7 133  145.7  291.9  393.1 
 GEQGDP  7.6  6.2  5.3  8.6 12.5 17.9 62.8 81.9 
Belgium IFIGDP 74.5  90.9  154.6  365.6 394.8 414.6 599.1 819.5 
 GEQGDP  8.8  10.6  14.4  42.5  70  96.5  224.6  300.2 
Denmark IFIGDP  49.8  53.3  81.8  158.7 199.9 166.3 329.4 403.1 
  GEQGDP  11.2 14.4 15.4 17.1 26.4  41  135.8  136.5 
Finland  IFIGDP  64.3 43.6 52.4 83.5 93.9  129.4  397.2  403 
 GEQGDP  1.9  2.3  2.7  6.4 13.1 29.9  250.4  155.3 
France  IFIGDP  36.9  43.6  67.8 113.3 131.5 176.1 344.7 418.1 
 GEQGDP  11.8  8.9  10.4  26.3 35.4 56.9  164.5  164.1 
Germany IFIGDP  43.5  48.5  59.2  100.2 118.6 126.7 267.3 326.2 
 GEQGDP  7.6  8.9  8.7  17.5 21.1 24.3 95.7 91.7 
Greece  IFIGDP  26.6 35.6 45.6 81.6 81.3 98.4  145.8  207 
 GEQGDP  2.6  2.2  5.8  8.6 11.3 14.7 26.7 36.1 
Ireland  IFIGDP  111.2 149.7 180.1 191.6 203.2 390.6  1337  1880 
  GEQGDP  9.8 16.9 25.8 52.6 47.8  131.1  528.6  692.5 
Italy IFIGDP  60.7  45.2  43.6  64.7  76  116.4  212  229.1 
 GEQGDP  7.6  6.3  4.6 11.1  15 23.7 69.9 65.5 
Netherlands  IFIGDP  128.7 112  136.9  227.9 260  270.3  624.9  810.9 
  GEQGDP  60.7 45.9 45.3 83.1 89.6  122.9  310.4  318.1 
Portugal IFIGDP  0  41  58.6  133.8  88.2  142  300.9  421.8 
 GEQGDP  2.5  4.8  5.5  10.6 17.1 26.9 67.9  102.6 
Spain  IFIGDP  30.7 29.1 44.5 64.9 63.8  115.3  232.5  300 
 GEQGDP  7.9  6.3  6.1  13  20.7  35.2  97  111.7 
Sweden IFIGDP 33.5  43.3  53.5  96.8 149.5 235.4 451.3 436.4 
 GEQGDP  8  7.8  7.9  18.8  39.5  86.2  278.5  215.3 
UK IFIGDP  128.4  166.5  195.2 349.1 351.2 423.8 618.2  728 
  GEQGDP  38.7 33.3 34.6 58.5 78.3  101  201.9  183.7 
EU-14 IFIGDP  59.4  68.4  90.7  156.6 167.5 210.8 439.5 555.4 
  GEQGDP  13.3 12.5 13.7 26.8 35.6 57.7  179.6  189.7 
Notes: IFIGDP = sum of the stock of external assets and liabilities (% of GDP); GEQGDP = sum of the stock 
of portfolio equity assets and liabilities and direct investment assets and liabilities (% of GDP); the 
group average is unweighted. 
Sources: Own calculations based on Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2006) and the IMF’s External Wealth of Nations 
database. 
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Table 3.9 Volume-based measures of international financial integration (IFIGDP) and its equity 
part (GEQGDP) in the EU-10 and EU-2 groups (% of GDP) 
    1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Cyprus IFIGDP  –  108.9  100.4  174.5 239.5 236.2 573.1 513.2 
  GEQGDP  – 27.3  22 26.9 21.4 23.1 69.5  110.2 
Czech  Rep.  IFIGDP  –  –  –  –  – 100.1 146.4 162.6 
  GEQGDP  – – – – –  19.6  50  67.4 
Estonia  IFIGDP  – – – – –  69.9  146.1  251.5 
  GEQGDP  – – – – –  20.1  61.4  121.2 
Hungary  IFIGDP  –  –  –  69.4  63.7 123.7 157.7  181 
  GEQGDP  –  –  –  0  1.5 27.3 60.1 80.7 
Latvia  IFIGDP  – – – – –  75.7  128.6  190.1 
  GEQGDP  –  –  –  –  – 17.9 28.5 36.7 
Lithuania  IFIGDP  – – – – –  48.6  83.4  105 
  GEQGDP  – – – – – 6  22.3  31.7 
Malta IFIGDP  489.8  322.3  190.6  240.8 178.9 226.6 572.8 820.2 
  GEQGDP  24.2 21.9 16.3 25.2 22.3 29.1 91.2  114.3 
Poland  IFIGDP  – 34.1 54.4 61.5  117.1 65.7 86.5  116.6 
  GEQGDP  –  0 0.4 0.6 1.2 6.7  24.5  42.3 
Slovak  Rep.  IFIGDP  – – – – –  93.4  126.6  156.5 
  GEQGDP  –  –  –  –  – 14.7 32.9 51.8 
Slovenia  IFIGDP  – – – – –  66.9  100.3  150.8 
  GEQGDP  –  –  –  –  – 11.8 20.6 36.9 
EU-10  IFIGDP  –  –  –  –  – 110.7 212.1 264.8 
    GEQGDP  – – – – –  38.9  96.5  109.6 
Bulgaria IFIGDP  – – – – –  125.2  175  173.3 
  GEQGDP  – – – – –  4.6  19.7  40.4 
Romania  IFIGDP  –  –  –  –  – 41.5 74.6 95.8 
  GEQGDP  – – – – –  1.5  18.3  28.4 
EU-2  IFIGDP  – – – – –  83.3  124.8  134.5 
  GEQGDP  – – – – – 3  19  34.4 
Notes: IFIGDP = sum of the stock of external assets and liabilities (% of GDP); GEQGDP = sum of the stock 
of portfolio equity assets and liabilities and direct investment assets and liabilities (% of GDP); the 
group averages are unweighted. 
Sources: Own calculations based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) and the IMF’s External Wealth of 
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Openness to financial flows and foreign ownership in different countries can 
only be incompletely characterised by policy-based indices and the actual aggregate 
flow and stock values of financial inflows. Based on historical roots, the level of 
development, the structure of the economy, the economic policies pursued, etc., the 
same amount of inflows may end up representing more or less foreign influence in 
different countries. For instance, in terms of the indicator of the stock of FDI inflows 
expressed as a percentage of GDP, by 2003 the new member states (EU-10) had 
achieved virtually the same level as the old member states (EU-14) (see Figure 3.5 
above). Even so, this does not mean that foreign control of business stands at similar 
levels in the two country groups. Table 3.10 presents data on the extent of foreign 
control in manufacturing, services and, as part of the latter, in the banking sector in 
selected countries of our sample. The term ‘under foreign control’ here means that the 
local company is an affiliate of a foreign company with majority ownership (more than 
50%) by the mother company. Data in the table demonstrate that in most of the new 
member states foreign control is much stronger than in most of the old member states. 
An example is Poland: the data underlying Figure 3.5 above show that the relative 
inward FDI stock of Poland stood at a mere 27.6% in 2003, much lower than the 
average of the old member states (51%).  
Table 3.10 Ratio of business under foreign control in 2000–01 (%) 
  Share of affiliates under foreign control a) Bank  penetration 
ratio b) 
 In  manufacturing  In  services   
 Turnover Employment  Turnover  Employment  Assets 
 2000  2000  2001  2001  2001 
Austria 27.1  19.6  16.3  9.7  – 
Belgium 47.5*  19.1*  26.6*  18.9*  – 
Bulgaria –  –  –  –  74.6 
Cyprus –  –  –  –  – 
Czech Rep.  39.5  24.9  25.6  16.0  – 
Denmark 12.0***  10.2***  –  –  0.0 
Estonia –  –  –  –  98.9 
Finland 16.2†† 17.2†† 18.1  11.9  6.2 
France 33.6***  28.5***  9.0**  5.3**  – 
Germany 5.9  4.2  –  –  – 
Greece –  –  –  –  10.8 
Hungary 73.7  47.2  34.0  16.5  88.8 
Ireland 78.2  48.1  23.8*  13.6*  – 
Italy 22.4***  13.8***  21.0*  7.2*  – 
Latvia –  –  –  –  65.2 
Lithuania –  –  –  – 78.2 
Malta –  –  –  –  – 
Netherlands 30.8***  18.9***  16.8*  8.9*  – 
Poland 34.7  20.9  23.9  13.4 68.7 
Portugal 17.4  10.1  11.9† 4.0† 17.7 IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 45 
 
Table 3.10 Continued 
Romania –  –  –  –  47.3 
Slovak Rep.  –  –  –  –  85.5 
Slovenia –  –  –  –  20.6 
Spain 29.7  16.8  –  – 8.5 
Sweden 34.3  29.1  18.1*  4.8*  1.8 
UK 36.1***  20.4***  17.2*  9.7*  46.0 
          
Countries 
from EU-14 
30.1 19.7  17.9 9.4  10.3 
Countries 
from EU-10 
49.3 31.0  27.8  15.3  74.5 
Countries 
from EU-2 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
61.0 
* 1997; ** 1998; *** 1999;  † 2000; †† 2001 
a) Ratio of turnover/employment in majority-owned foreign affiliates to total turnover/employment 
b) Ratio of assets of majority-owned foreign affiliates to total banking assets 
Sources: OECD (2003) based on OECD AFA and FATS databases, and UNCTAD (2004). 
 
According to Table 3.10, however, in all the categories of foreign control Poland 
shows the same or higher ratios than the EU-15. The striking difference between 
aggregate FDI data and ownership patterns can be explained by the pattern of the 
privatisation process in the transition period of the Central and Eastern European 
countries. In this process, foreign bidders could obtain stakes in relatively concentrated 
domestic enterprises easily and cheaply owing to the scarcity of indigenous capital. 
These stakes could either represent existing majority ownership or be consolidated to 
shares with majority control shortly after privatisation.  
3.3  Tax bases 
Globalisation means the lowering of barriers to economic transactions and to the 
mobility of goods, services, capital and people. The domain of rational decisions of 
economic agents in pursuing their goals expands from the national market to the 
global marketplace. Owing to the most recent technical developments – such as 
communication innovations, more complex and mutable financial instruments, cheap 
modes of transport and travel – as well as the evolving international tax competition, 
the bases of various taxes are becoming increasingly mobile. Agents have stepped up 
their efforts to search and find places around the world with low tax rates or even with 
possibilities for full tax evasion. Since the early 1990s, the threat of mobile tax bases for 
the fiscal stability of nations has been discussed with growing angst. The main source 
of worry has been that shrinking budgets would not be able to finance social 
protection, the aspect of public spending that, as a result of population ageing and the 
need for adjustments to the pressure of globalisation, is expected to keep its pivotal 
role in national budgets.  
Tanzi (2001) lists eight “fiscal termites” – elements of the “ecosystem” of 
globalisation that are gnawing away at the foundations of the tax systems. These are e-
commerce and transactions, electronic money, intra-company trade, offshore financial 
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tax financial capital and the incomes of persons with highly tradable skills, the 
increased activities of highly skilled individuals outside their country of residence and 
foreign shopping.  
While accepting that the mobility of tax bases has been increasing, most of the 
evidence reveals that so far, there has been no substantiation of either a race to the 
bottom in specific forms of taxation or a meltdown of total tax revenues.25 A realistic 
historical view suggests that the process of increasing mobility of tax bases evolves in 
the long term and affects various aspects of the tax structure differently, as shown in 
Table 3.11 based on Hufbauer’s (2000) qualitative assessment of the mobility of tax 
bases. Indeed, back in the 1970s, when international trade was mostly confined to 
merchandise trade, multinationals were not yet the main protagonists in the world 
economy and most individuals consumed and invested in their home country. The 
world has changed greatly since then; so too has the mobility of tax bases, which 
nonetheless follows the internationalisation process only gradually. In the next 30 
years, it is expected that with a different intensity, tax bases will become progressively 
footloose.  
Table 3.11 Changing mobility of tax bases 
 Mobility  in 
Tax base item  1970  2000  2030 
Wage and salary income  Low  Low  Moderate 
Consumption of goods  Low  Moderate  Moderate 
Consumption of services  Low  Low  Moderate 
Investment income  Low  Moderate  High 
Corporate profits  Low  Moderate  High 
Source: Hufbauer (2000). 
A quantitative comparison of the total tax burden of the EU countries for the past 
15 years also indicates that, for the time being, there is no evidence of big losses in the 
tax system for these economies (Table 3.12). From among the old member states (EU-
14) only Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands saw substantial shrinkage in the relative 
size of their total tax revenues between the periods 1991–95 and 2001–05. These 
developments, however, seem to be the result of conscious structural reforms, rather 
t h a n  d i r e c t  i m p l i ca t i o n s o f  t h e  p r e s s u r e  o f  m o r e  m o b i l e  t a x  b a s e s .  M o s t  o f  t h e  o l d 
member states have either maintained the relative size of their tax revenues or even 
managed to increase it.  
The new member countries have, on average, lower tax ratios than the old 
member states, and several of them (such as Estonia, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic) 
show a tendency towards reducing these ratios further. Most probably, both the 
perception of growing international tax competition and the desire to prevent the work 
of the ‘fiscal termites’ have contributed to the conscious efforts of these governments to 
cut their tax ratios. Yet, we have to add that the Central and Eastern European 
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economies also battle with a high level of indigenous tax evasion and tax avoidance 
(reflected in the high ratios of their hidden economies) as well as with excessive 
corruption. Both of these tend to prompt governments to simplify their tax systems 
and lower their tax rates (Lackó, 2004; Dreher & Schneider, 2006). 
Table 3.12 Total current revenue: General government (% of GDP at current market prices, 
countries in descending order of the values during 2001–05) 
 1986–90 1991–95  1996–2000 2001–05 
Sweden  –  57.7 59.2  55.8 
Denmark 55.6  55.3  55.7  54.4 
Finland 49.6  53.6  52.3  50.0 
Belgium 47.2  47.2  49.1  49.1 
France 46.5  47.3  49.2  48.4 
Austria 48.0  48.8  48.2  48.1 
Hungary –  –  45.1  45.0 
Italy 39.3  43.5  45.2  44.0 
Slovak Rep.  –  –  53.2  43.5 
Germany 42.7  43.7  45.1  43.1 
Netherlands 48.9  47.9  44.1  43.1 
Czech Rep.  –  42.7  41.5  41.9 
Malta –  –  34.6  40.2 
Greece 31.2  35.8  41.0  40.0 
Poland –  44.1  40.5  39.5 
Portugal 31.3  35.2  37.2  38.9 
UK 40.5  37.9  38.7  38.7 
Spain –  36.6  37.4  38.2 
Romania –  –  –  37.5 
Slovenia –  50.1  42.5  37.4 
Estonia –  46.8  39.9  36.7 
Cyprus –  –  32.2  36.7 
Latvia –  34.9  39.4  34.9 
Ireland 39.3  38.6  35.0  32.5 
Lithuania –  34.9  37.2  32.3 
Bulgaria –  –  –  – 
       
Countries from EU-14  43.3  44.9  45.5  44.6 
Countries from EU-10  –  42.3  40.6  38.8 
Countries from EU-2  –  –  –  37.5 
Source: Own calculations based on European Commission (2006i). 
 
3.4  Summary and conclusions on the degree of openness  
The analysis of the dynamics of various openness measures shows that in the past one 
and a half decades, financial integration has been the fastest expanding facet of 48 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
globalisation in the EU. Both portfolio and direct investments have increased several-
fold relative to GDP. As a result of more intense financial integration, in most countries 
foreign influence in business has increased, including the substantial control by foreign 
owners through majority-owned foreign affiliates. Such rapid development has not 
been detected in the international trade of goods and services: in recent decades, the 
pace of countries’ growing openness to trade has not shown a striking acceleration. 
Openness to cross-border service activities has increased, but the qualitative change 
has taken place in the mounting share of FDI devoted to services, rather than in the 
rising volume of trade in services relative to GDP. The much-discussed increasing 
mobility of tax bases does not seem to have hit the EU countries so far: on the 
aggregate level, there is little evidence of a meltdown of aggregate tax revenues and 
only a few countries show signs of active participation in international tax competition.  
The analysis shows wide variation in openness changes across the EU member 
states, with avant-gardes of economic globalisation and those that are falling behind. 
Among the old member states, the avant-gardes are Ireland, Belgium and the 
Netherlands. Among the new member states, there are no apparent avant-gardes: 
Estonia and the Czech Republic excel in several dimensions, but in a few other areas, 
they are behind other countries (such as Cyprus and Malta). One can only find out 
with more sophisticated analysis whether a country has achieved its position because 
of its special, idiosyncratic conditions or because of deliberate policy decisions. In most 
dimensions of globalisation, the new member states are gradually catching up with the 
old ones. Still, contrary to common perceptions, openness to trade in the new member 
states on average continues to lag behind openness in the old member states. The area 
in which the new member states have shown the most marked development is the 
absorption of FDI inflows and the exposure of domestic business to foreign control. 
When facing international tax competition, it seems that the new member states are 
more ready to join this practice than the old ones are, although one cannot exclude 
reversals in the current tendencies. 
This chapter has attempted to look at aggregate data on the economic openness 
of the EU-27 countries in order to analyse the progress of globalisation in a sober way. 
On the aggregate level and in the analysis of yearly data (sometimes smoothed out for 
longer periods), we have found clear, but not earth-shattering tendencies in the 
intensification of global integration. There are many other ways of investigating the 
process of globalisation, which disclose its more dramatic sides. These include detailed 
analyses of developments in specific sectors or lines of business, discussion of certain 
events that take place in periods of less than a year (such as the immediate de-
stabilising impact of particular events or news worldwide) and consideration of the 
non-economic sides of globalisation – such as its technological, social, political and 
cultural aspects. Nevertheless, the aim of this overview has been to measure the 
evolution of the globalisation process in the region with the help of carefully selected 
and more or less widely accepted indicators, with the aspects listed above lying 
beyond the scope of this study.  
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4.  EFFECTS OF OUTSOURCING ON LABOUR 
MARKETS AND WAGES 
utsourcing is seen by many companies as a logical response to cost pressures, 
since it allows them to optimise their costs by subcontracting parts of their 
value chain to more efficient subcontractors. A phenomenon that has been 
strongly advocated by business schools and management consultancies for some time, 
it has taken on new urgency as options have emerged to outsource across national 
boundaries. The French term delocalisation implies that the search for greater cost 
efficiency is more a threat, portraying it as competition from low-wage workers. This 
chapter considers the impact of what has become a politically sensitive issue, yet also 
one that is prone to many myths. 
4.1  The impact of outsourcing on labour markets 
Data on the effects of the processes of relocation and outsourcing of jobs as part of 
restructuring have been collated by the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) (2005, p. 10, 
chart 2), which show that around 6% of jobs lost in total restructuring resulted from 
these processes. Yet, in four smaller member states (Greece, Denmark, Finland and 
Portugal), the share was significantly higher, reaching a third in Greece. By contrast, 
the EPC analysis finds no reported losses for this reason in four other smaller member 
states (Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania and Luxembourg). While these data have to be 
treated with caution, they suggest that the impact is far from uniform.  
Broadly speaking, there is also evidence from the EU and other countries that 
international outsourcing leads to a shift in the relative demand for labour, and that 
this can have implications for the wage bill as well as the employment share of highly 
skilled versus low-skilled labour. What are the policy implications of these findings? 
First, it is important to stress that the crucial issue for policy-makers is the medium- 
and long-term effects of international outsourcing. Yet, empirical studies generally deal 
with partial equilibrium (short-term) effects. Thus, factor movements between sectors 
or long-term repercussions on competitiveness that stem from outsourcing are not 
taken into account. Still, the partial equilibrium results give some indication of the 
direction in which the labour market adjustment seems to go in response to 
international outsourcing.  
A common conclusion of most theoretical contributions is that international 
outsourcing usually offers the potential for substantial efficiency gains. But only with 
sufficiently flexible factor prices can potential gains from trade be realised. In addition, 
adjustment costs can consume a substantial share of these gains if workers experience 
unemployment or have to be retrained. Hence, policies that mitigate adjustment costs 
can certainly increase the ability to reap gains from international outsourcing (and 
trade more generally). 
Furthermore, even if international outsourcing does indeed lead to welfare gains, 
the question remains as to how to strike a balance between collective and individual 
management of the adjustment. Particularly low-skilled workers feel the pressure from 
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international outsourcing. As a reaction, it may be essential for workers either to obtain 
higher qualifications or to find new employment opportunities in other sectors of the 
economy (or both). 
Insurance schemes that partly compensate workers for their potentially lower 
post-displacement earnings are therefore especially interesting for fostering the 
transition between economic sectors. The risk that public policy entails crowding out 
private adjustment or market-based insurance should thus be taken into account when 
fixing the scope of action for policy-makers. 
4.2  The effect of outsourcing on wages 
Based on analysis using the German Socio-Economic Household Panel Survey, 
international outsourcing appears in the German case to raise wages for highly skilled 
workers, a finding that is in line with the idea that firms outsource the low-skilled, 
intensive parts of production and, consequently, increase the relative demand for 
skilled workers. For medium- and low-skilled workers the coefficients on the 
outsourcing intensity are negative, which is also in line with this reasoning.  
The results for those skilled workers whose job requires a defined minimum level 
of education further support the above findings. International outsourcing has a 
statistically significant positive impact on workers who report that their job requires 
college or technical school training. For example, an increase of 1 percentage point in 
the narrow outsourcing intensity ceteris paribus raises wages by about 2%. For workers 
in jobs requiring lower levels of qualifications there is a statistically significant negative 
effect of outsourcing, with an increase of 1 percentage point in narrowly defined 
outsourcing yielding a wage loss of around 1.3%, all other things being equal. 
Low-skilled workers are therefore the losers from this form of globalisation of 
production, while highly skilled workers are, on average, the group liable to gain. This 
conclusion may have implications for policy-makers, who need to debate whether 
losers should be compensated or in any other way be the focus of policies aimed at 
easing the adjustment costs of globalisation. 
In order to obtain a better idea of the true impact of international outsourcing, 
Geischecker & Görg (2006) calculate cumulative marginal effects based on the 
statistically significant coefficients derived from econometric analysis. These indicate 
that real wages for workers in the lowest skill categories were reduced by outsourcing 
by up to 1.5% or 1.3%, depending on whether outsourcing is defined in a narrow or 
wide sense. By contrast, real wages for highly skilled workers grew by 2.1% in the case 
of narrowly defined outsourcing, while the coefficient was statistically insignificant for 
widely defined outsourcing. To calculate numbers that are more economically 
meaningful, Geischecker & Görg multiply the percentage point changes in the 
outsourcing intensity starting from the basis year 1991 with the point estimate of the 
outsourcing variable from the wage regression (i.e. 1.5%, 1.3% and 2.1%, respectively) 
and the average wage for each respective skill group in 1991.  
Overall, the narrowly-defined outsourcing intensity in Germany increased by 3 
percentage points between 1991 and 2000. Applying the wide outsourcing definition 
the increase was about 5 percentage points. As a result, the average hourly wage for 
low-skilled workers decreased by 4.5% and 6.5%, respectively between 1991 and 2000, 
while the average hourly wage for highly skilled workers increased by 6.3%.  IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 51 
 
For low-skilled workers, applying the definition of the International Standard 
Classification of Education, they calculate that between 1991 and 2000, increased 
outsourcing accounted for a reduction in hourly earnings by €0.67 and €0.87 for 
narrowly and widely defined outsourcing respectively. For an average low-skilled 
worker with, say, 1,600 working hours per year, this amounts to an earnings loss of 
respectively €1,067 and €1,392 owing to increased outsourcing. On the other hand, 
highly skilled workers significantly gained from increased outsourcing. On average, 
their hourly wages increased by about €1.85 in 2000 compared with 1991. Again, with 
the assumed 1,600 working hours per year this amounts to an earnings gain of €2,960 
per annum.26 
Of course, this average figure hides differences across sectors. Table 4.1 therefore 
calculates the cumulative wage changes as above, yet instead of an average overall 
outsourcing intensity, it applies outsourcing intensities by two-digit sector. The 
implied percentage changes in average wages by sector owing to outsourcing are 
shown in the table. Based on the narrow definition of outsourcing, highly skilled 
workers in the transport equipment and leather industries gained most from 
outsourcing, with percentage increases of over 30%. Skilled workers in the textiles, 
apparel, office machinery and TV & telephone industries also gained by more than 
10%. On the other hand, low-skilled workers in transport equipment, leather and 
apparel had the highest reductions in their wages attributable to outsourcing, at 20%, 
19% and 12%, respectively.  
Two interesting questions that these results bring up are i) how important each 
industry is in the economy and ii) how important skilled and unskilled workers are in 
each industry. We address the first issue in Table 4.2, which shows the importance of 
each industry in terms of its employment share in the total manufacturing sector. For 
example, Table 4.2 shows that the food & beverages industry accounts for 6% of total 
employment in the manufacturing sector.  
A look at Table 4.2 reveals that those industries with the highest gains for skilled 
workers and the highest losses for unskilled workers (apparel, leather and transport 
equipment) are also those that are of low importance relative to the total 
manufacturing sector, jointly accounting for less than 3% of total employment in this 
sector. By contrast, fabricated metals is the largest industry in the manufacturing sector 
but also shows among the lowest gains for skilled workers and losses for unskilled 
workers.  
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workers in 1991 and 2000, increased international outsourcing accounted for hourly wage 
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Table 4.1 Cumulated wage effects of international outsourcing by industry (%) 
    Narrow outsourcing  Wide outsourcing 
  Industry  Highly skilled  Low-skilled  Highly skilled   Low-skilled 
15  Food & beverages  0.59  -0.34  2.56  -1.75 
17 Textiles  12.92  -7.45  15.04  -10.29 
18  Wearing  apparel  20.80 -12.00  25.08 -17.16 
19  Leather  34.53 -19.92  25.15 -17.21 
20  Wood  0.35 -0.20  2.01 -1.38 
21  Pulp & paper  6.46  -3.73  8.99  -6.15 
22  Publishing & printing  0.04  -0.02  1.05  -0.71 
23  Coke  &  petroleum  -5.53 3.19  -3.17 2.16 
24  Chemicals  11.07 -6.39  9.41 -6.44 
25  Rubber & plastics  1.09  -0.63  4.51  -3.08 
26  Non-metallic  minerals  0.46 -0.26  3.88 -2.65 
27  Basic  metals  7.85 -4.52  13.29 -9.09 
28  Fabricated  metals  0.78 -0.45  2.29 -1.57 
29  Machinery & equipment  2.91  -1.68  4.37  -2.99 
30  Office  machinery  15.73 -9.07  9.27 -6.34 
31  Electrical  machinery  9.22 -5.32  10.01 -6.85 
32  TV & telephone  13.14  -7.58  9.52  -6.51 
33  Medical & optical instruments  1.16  -0.67  4.18  -2.86 
34  Motor  vehicles  4.97 -2.86  7.14 -4.88 
35  Transport  equipment  36.20 -20.88  25.96 -17.76 
36  Miscellaneous  9.48 -5.47  7.74 -5.29 
Sources: Based on own calculations and data in Geischecker & Görg (2006). 
To address the second point, i.e. the relative importance of skilled and unskilled 
workers in each industry, we report the percentage share of skilled, semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers in Table 4.3.27 This table shows that in food & beverages, 10% of the 
workforce is skilled and 68% is low-skilled according to the skill classification used. 
Except for some high-technology industries such as office and electrical machinery, 
and TV & telephone, by far the major proportion of the workforce in all other 
industries is unskilled. At the same time, there is much more heterogeneity in terms of 
the importance of skilled workers. For example, in wearing apparel, which shows 
among the highest gains to skilled workers, their employment share is minimal (less 
than 0.01%). On the other hand, in office machinery, where skilled workers 
experienced reasonable gains (Table 4.1), their employment share at 60% is also by far 
the highest.  
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Table 4.2 Employment shares of industry (%) 
Industry  Share 
Food & beverages   6.08  
Textiles   2.53  
Wearing apparel   0.22  
Leather   0.47  
Wood   1.87  
Pulp & paper   1.84  
Publishing & printing   2.69  
Coke & petroleum   0.55  
Chemicals   11.31  
Rubber & plastics   3.84  
Non-metallic minerals   3.41  
Basic metals   3.49  
Fabricated metals   21.54  
Machinery & equipment   11.67  
Office machinery   0.19  
Electrical machinery   7.80  
TV & telephone   1.40  
Medical & optical instruments   3.09  
Motor vehicles   12.46  
Transport equipment   1.68  
Miscellaneous   1.87  
Sources: Based on own calculations and data in Geischecker & Görg (2006). 
Table 4.3 Employment shares by skill group within industry (%) 
Industry   Highly skilled    Medium-skilled   Low-skilled 
Food & beverages   10.61    21.22    68.16  
Textiles   2.94    11.76    85.29  
Wearing apparel   0.00    27.78    72.22  
Leather   21.05    0.00    78.95  
Wood   0.00    7.28    92.72  
Pulp & paper   6.08    7.43    86.49  
Publishing & printing   18.89    13.82    67.28  
Coke & petroleum   15.91    4.55    79.55  
Chemicals   20.75    14.16    65.09  
Rubber & plastics   3.24    10.03    86.73  
Non-metallic minerals   0.36    15.64    84.00  
Basic metals   9.61    9.61    80.78  
Fabricated metals   7.72    12.62    79.65  
Machinery & equipment   20.96    16.70    62.34  
Office machinery   60.00    0.00    40.00  
Electrical machinery   29.14    22.45    48.41  
TV and telephone   30.97    23.89    45.13  
Medical & optical instruments   18.07    31.73    50.20  
Motor vehicles   16.63    13.45    69.92  
Transport equipment   22.96    15.56    61.48  
Miscellaneous   5.96    7.95    86.09  
Sources: Based on own calculations and data in Geischecker & Görg (2006). 54 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
Munch & Skaksen (2005) report a similar study on the effect of international 
outsourcing on wages using individual-level data combined with sectoral outsourcing 
measures for Denmark. In their estimations, they find that real wages for low-skilled 
workers were reduced, while real wages for highly skilled workers were increased by 
international outsourcing (narrowly defined). Their data relate to the period 1993–2002. 
Their point estimates suggest that real hourly wages for low-skilled workers decreased 
by roughly 10%, while wages for highly skilled workers rose by 13% to 30%, 
depending on the estimation method. Taking these estimates at face value suggests 
significantly higher average effects, both negative and positive, in Denmark than in 
Germany. Yet they are in line with some of the more striking results by industry sector 
for Germany as discussed in Table 4.1 above. Unfortunately, Munch & Skaksen do not 
present sufficient data to allow a calculation of ‘economic significance’ similar to the 
one undertaken by Geischecker & Görg (2006).  
Geischecker et al. (2007) extend this analysis to three European countries, 
Denmark, Germany and the UK, allowing them to discuss the significance of the social 
model as well as the impact depending on which class of jobs are predominantly 
outsourced from the country. The study, again, does not include as many control 
variables in the empirical model as Geischecker & Görg (2006). Thus, for example, they 
confirm the negative effect on outsourcing on the wages of low-skilled German 
workers but find no statistically significant impact on the wages of the high-skilled.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II. 
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n part I, the reality of globalisation was established. Some of its elements may be 
more contentious than others are, but the key processes and trends are shown to be 
both enduring and pervasive. Across the EU, there has been a widespread 
questioning of whether the social structures and policies that have been at the heart of 
the European social model can be sustained in the face of globalisation. A ‘race to the 
bottom’ is sometimes assumed inevitable. According to Sinn (2004a, p. 16),  
[w]hile the old systems [of] competition took place within closed borders, 
globalisation has brought about a new type of systems competition that is driven 
by the mobility of factors of production. The new systems competition will likely 
imply the erosion of the European welfare state, induce a race to the bottom in the 
sense that capital will not even pay for the infrastructure it uses and erode national 
regulatory systems. 
Others are much more sanguine about the ability of the European social model to 
resist dismantlement, however. Even so, one line of argumentation is that there is a 
systemic problem to address, rather than just a need for ad hoc reforms, an example 
being the statement from Eichengreen (2006): 
[T]he same institutions of coordinated capitalism that had worked to Europe’s 
advantage in the age of extensive growth now posed obstacles to successful 
economic performance. In this sense, the continent’s very success at exploiting the 
opportunities for catch-up and convergence after World War II doomed it to 
difficulties thereafter. And the durability and persistence of institutions, which had 
worked to Europe’s advantage after World War II, were now less positive 
attributes than impediments to growth.  
De la Dehesa (2006) also analyses the challenges the EU has to confront, arguing 
that especially population ageing should be central to policy thinking, but he is less 
pessimistic than other contributors are about the EU’s scope for reform and ability to 
prosper under globalisation. 
Too often, the debates about social Europe take place in a statistical vacuum, with 
strong positions being asserted with little firm support. This part of the report therefore 
aims at redressing the position by presenting a credible account of how the social 
dimension of globalisation is unfolding in the EU. It starts with a conceptual discussion 
that builds on the existing academic literature. The first part of chapter 5 concentrates 
on the interplay between globalisation – notably the openness of markets – and 
inequality, demonstrating that there is by no means a clear set of theories or 
predictions. An assessment follows of the various other channels of social impacts, 
with a focus largely on the circumstances of the EU. Chapter 6 then provides an 
extended overview of key social indicators. Two of the most politically salient social 
aspects of globalisation are then examined in more detail in chapter 7. The first, 
migration, includes a discussion of the issues and a summary of empirical material on 
trends, before going on to present the findings of an exercise to document policy trends 
in this area. The last chapter of this section offers a deeper analysis of inequalities in the 
EU at the country and regional levels, noting that inequality has increased overall in 
recent decades, raising questions about whether globalisation is the reason. 
I 
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5.  CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
he social repercussions of globalisation come about above all through changes in 
the distribution of income and assets on the one hand, and through their effects 
on job opportunities on the other. Re-distribution affects the balance of political 
power and political changes may accentuate the impact of global changes. In Europe, 
the picture is complicated by the presence of endogenous social changes: notably 
ageing populations and the erosion of traditional family structures. Globalisation is a 
complex phenomenon that overlaps with the shift to a post-industrial type of economy, 
with the attendant emphasis on flexibility and fast-paced innovation, and the 
decreasing relative importance, in the most developed economies, of large-scale 
industrial operations with a workforce employed in lifetime, assembly-line work. 
Globalisation is certainly not manifested in the same way across countries. There 
are countries that trade extensively but do not have substantial inward foreign 
investment (Japan). There are others where foreigners own more than half the 
economy, but which are not major players in the manufactured products’ global 
market, with trade largely confined to the immediate neighbourhood (Canada). A third 
type of country is very open to exports and imports as well as to foreign investment – 
for example, some new EU member states, where trade openness exceeds 100% and 
foreign capital owns three-quarters of the economy (Hungary and Slovakia). On other 
dimensions of globalisation, however, for example the export of capital, these countries 
are insignificant. 
Furthermore, the “distribution of income in a society depends on the distribution 
of income-generating assets or factors of productions – who owns the land and capital 
and how human capital is distributed in the labour force” (Robinson, 2001, p. 9), and it 
also depends on the returns to these assets. Even though there are authors who stress 
that asset ownership is driven by efficiency (Grossman & Hart, 1986), this is not borne 
out by empirical evidence. “Different countries might have very different asset 
distributions, despite identical preferences and technology” (ibid.). In other words, 
radical redistributions of assets can change patterns of income for good, with the 
implication that the impact of globalisation on economies depends on how it is 
handled by domestic institutions. There is nothing to prevent governments from 
responding (Rodrik, 1997). But the political economy dimension is important 
(Robinson, 2001, pp. 10–11). In general, Latin American income inequalities have 
widened in the last decade. In Africa, likewise, governments have mostly failed to 
respond to globalisation. Social sector spending is usually badly targeted and often 
regressive (Castro-Leal et al., 1999; Tsikata, 2001, p. 13). Moreover, “[g]lobalisation 
affects inequality when the distribution of assets is fixed and it can change the rates of 
return on different assets under an unchanged set of institutions and policies” 
(Robinson, 2001, p. 10). 
5.1  Determinants of changes in inequality: Alternative explanations 
The link between globalisation and inequality is at the heart of much of the debate on 
the social impact of the former. Yet the literature shows that there are considerable 
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problems in the conceptualisation and measurement of inequalities and even if these 
problems are resolved, it is not at all evident what to expect from today’s more open 
economic environment. This section documents and assesses the commonly agreed 
and widely analysed factors that are adjudged to have an effect on the shape of income 
distribution. 
5.1.1  Trade liberalisation, growth and inequality 
The effects of globalisation on income distribution (defined as reducing transaction 
costs and the freer movement of goods and services), can be approached through 
theories of international trade. In a simple version of a Hecksher–Ohlin setting (two 
economies with two goods and two factors of production – capital and labour or highly 
skilled and low-skilled labour), country A is characterised by a high ratio of 
skilled/unskilled work, while country B is characterised by a low ratio of 
skilled/unskilled work. With no trade, equilibrium wages will be relatively low for the 
highly skilled in country A and they will be low for the low-skilled in country B. The 
introduction of trade leads to an increase of skilled wages in country A and higher 
unskilled wages in country B, leading to increased inequalities in country A and 
decreasing inequalities in country B. Trade openness would, therefore, lead to benefits 
first in the low-wage country, especially for the low-skilled. There are, of course, a 
great number of reasons for the departure of facts from these theoretical predictions. 
Extreme variations in initial endowments, differential labour-market institutional 
settings, diverse pay norms and many other factors can cause such departures. 28  
Another departure point for assessing the relationship between globalisation and 
inequalities is trade liberalisation through reductions of tariffs in international trade. 
Milanovic & Squire (2005), using occupational wage datasets, find that tariff 
liberalisation between 1980 and 2000 led to increased inter-occupational wage 
inequalities (that is, to increased wage premia for higher skills) and increased inter-
industry wage differentials in low-income c o u n t r i e s  ( y e t  d e p e n d i n g  v e r y  m u c h  o n  
union density). This type of relationship was also found to operate the other way 
round, however, for countries with incomes above the world median per capita GDP 
(around $4,000 at purchasing power parity (PPP)).  
Some other empirical papers point to non-linearities with respect to the growth–
openness–inequality relationships. Even though the sign and significance of the effects 
of globalisation on inequality may change depending on the concept of openness 
deployed (Li, Zou & Squire, 1997), certain types of non-linearities seem to be accepted 
in the literature. Barro (2000) suggests that there is a positive relationship between 
openness and inequality in low-income countries and a negative relationship in higher-
income countries. Dollar & Kraay (2001 and 2002) argue that trade openness leads to 
significantly higher growth and this leads to a proportionate increase in the incomes of 
the poor. 
Certain other types of non-linearities may also appear in other dimensions. The 
differential effects of open markets and of wage premia may affect low-income, 
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middle-income and higher-income groups differently. Milanovic (2005) finds that for 
relatively poor countries (below $4,000 PPP per capita), increased openness leads to a 
top-driven inequality increase. That is, the income shares of the higher deciles increase 
while lower-income groups lose some ground. But for those countries between $4,000 
and $7,000 PPP per capita, the share of the poor and the middle classes begins to be 
positively affected by openness. “At low income levels, openness is bad for equality; at 
high income levels it promotes equality” he concludes (ibid.). In an innovative paper, 
Birdsall et al. (2000) point to an increased middle-class stress during the process of 
globalisation, meaning that changes in socio-economic settings in the last decades have 
led to top-driven inequalities at the expense of the middle-income groups.  
Economic growth and income inequalities 
Simon Kuznets, one of the pioneers of research on growth and inequality in an 
international context, admitted in his seminal paper that some 5% of empirical 
information and 95% of speculation led him to his conclusions about the famous 
inverted U-curve of income growth (Kuznets, 1955). Although since then, there have 
been spectacular advances in methods, data quality, measurement tools and 
computing power used for international comparisons, research on income distribution 
in an international context is still full of noise, non-comparable data and contradictory 
findings. It is especially so in the research on global inequalities and the potential 
effects of globalisation on social developments. In addition, theoretical explanations for 
the now-abundant empirics are needed more than ever.  
The growth-inducing effects of openness are widely recognised in the literature, 
but the links between growth and inequalities are far from clear. As Ravallion (2004a) 
puts it, empirical findings about the relationship between inequality and economic 
growth show virtually zero correlation.29 Growing economies are just as likely to be 
associated with rising as with falling inequality.30 The almost complete absence of 
correlation may stem from measurement error (of inequalities), the inability of Gini 
coefficients to capture growth-induced inequalities and poverty reduction, the 
incapacity of cross-section inequality measures to capture ’churning’ phenomena and 
the need to use absolute rather than relative Gini coefficients for inequality measures 
(Ravallion, 2004a). Nevertheless, when and while growth looks distribution-neutral, 
the absolute poverty-reducing effects of growth seem proved by many studies (see 
Ravallion, 2004a and World Bank, 2005a and 2005b for recent accounts). Therefore, 
globalisation (increased trade openness) may lead to increased (in itself, distribution-
neutral) growth and, hence, absolute poverty reduction. The mechanics of it should be 
                                                      
29 This view may cast doubt on the appropriateness of Kuznets’ curve to describe inequality–
growth relationships. A reminder of the dangers of mixing cross-country data with 
explanations of a longitudinal nature is also warranted. Furthermore, the effect of growth on 
inequalities is best understood as part of a complex portfolio of relevant explanations with a 
great number of alternative candidates. 
30 For surveys, see Ravallion & Chen (1997) and Dollar & Kraay (2002), as well as more recent 
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clarified further, however, with special attention devoted to the role of various 
institutions channelling growth to societal developments.31  
There is a substantial body of empirical literature on these issues, which is not 
repeated here. Still, as both the increase in openness and the poverty-reducing 
capacities of growth depend very much on endowment effects, one additional factor 
deserves attention. There is a very complicated relationship between inequality, 
growth and poverty – although it seems proved that the poverty-reducing ability of 
economic growth depends very much upon initial inequalities in a country. Therefore, 
when growth accelerates in a very unequal society, the reduction in poverty is smaller 
than in a society with more equal endowments, as discussed for example by Cornia & 
Court (2001). As they put it, there is an “efficient inequality range”, that is, very low 
and very high levels of initial inequalities will impede growth prospects while 
inequalities in the middle range seem to provide a favourable environment for growth. 
This inverted U-shape of the growth–inequality relationship deserves attention in 
future research. 
Skill-biased technological change 
Skill-biased technological change is another important influence on inequality. Much of 
the empirical literature (reviewed, for example, by Acemoglu, 2002a and 2002b) shows 
that increasing college output has been accompanied by an increase in wage premia for 
more highly educated workers over the past 60 years. On the other hand, sharp rises in 
education output have not always been followed by a fall in returns to education later 
and inequalities (mostly of a within-group nature) have widened. Therefore, 
technological change has proved to be skill-biased and fast (at least relative to 
education expansion): even increased higher education has been unable to catch up 
with it. Technological change may have accelerated, and hence, the explanation for the 
simultaneity of rising college output and wage premia. There is no need here to go into 
the debate over the nature of this phenomenon (that is, whether explanations should be 
based on endogenous processes or whether supply reactions should be treated as 
exogenous facts).  
It should be noted that skill-biased technological change would only directly 
affect wages, while income inequalities in a country also reflect the evolution of 
incomes of other household members, social benefits and inter-household transfers. 
Differential labour market institutions on the one hand, and the extent of state 
                                                      
31 Under certain circumstances, large inequalities may be harmful to growth prospects. 
Endogenous growth theories allow for heterogeneity in the relative positions of various 
representative agents in macro models. This makes it possible to analyse the effect of income 
distribution (the relative positions of representative agents) on growth prospects. Of course, this 
can go through channels of representative democracy: formation of the fiscal preferences of 
central budgets, the inducement of rent-seeking behaviour in some subgroups of society and 
threats of social unrest belong here (Alesina & Perotti, 1994). Some models operate with 
overlapping-generations assumptions and observe preferences for investment or consumption 
(Persson & Tabellini, 1994). Others, such as Galor & Zeira (1993) and Bénabou (1996), put 
forward a more general account of endogenous public policy formation and their effects on 
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regulations and of the welfare state itself on the other, may affect wage inequalities. In 
addition, trade (in a Hecksher–Ohlin setting) between a skill-rich and a skill-poor 
country will increase the demand for skills in the skill-abundant economy, resulting in 
a prediction of increased wage premia for the highly skilled.  
There is a great deal of evidence in support of technology-driven change in wage 
inequality (see Acemoglu, 2002b for a review). In the income-inequality literature, this 
line of reasoning is much less prevalent. Nevertheless, many of the decomposition 
analyses by education levels show a growing share of the between-group components 
in overall inequalities (Tóth, 2005; Bailey, 1997) in the context of transition countries. 
Also, as far as the G20 overview is concerned, Smeeding (2002) concludes that there is 
evidence that both the supply and demand for skills help to explain earned-income 
changes in the observed country grouping. Acemoglou (2002b) derives differential 
inequality developments in the US and the UK compared with continental European 
countries stemming from the differential relative skills supply for these two country 
groupings.  
In terms of overall income-inequality consequences, the second order effects of 
skill biases should also be analysed. The assumptions of simple models of skill-biased 
technological change include distinguishing between two levels of skills (high and low) 
and most of the models do not take explicit account of age heterogeneity in human 
capital supply. It is clear that assuming low and high skills is an over-simplistic view 
and at least a medium level should be introduced into the analysis. In addition, as new 
skill supplies come mostly (depending on the differential dispersion of lifelong 
learning opportunities) from those leaving the education system, when talking about 
supply/demand mechanisms for various skills, it should be taken into account that the 
skill composition of the various cohorts differ. Hujer & Radic (2005) point out that 
despite the extensive literature on skill-biased technological change, its impact on the 
age structure is scarcely researched. They find that technological change discriminates 
against older workers as well as against low-skilled workers. At the same time, they 
find that the winners of technological change are the highly skilled, regardless of their 
age. Sabirianova Peter (2006), based on Russian surveys, presents empirical evidence 
supporting the thesis that transition has been skill-biased. Kertesi & Köllő (2002) and 
Kézdi (2002), report strong and asymmetric growth in the second half of the 1990s in 
returns to higher education by age cohort in Hungary. Wage premia increased for 
younger workers much more than for their older counterparts (among the highly 
skilled). Tóth (2006a), based on the decomposition of incomes (not wages) of 
households (not individuals), concludes that transition has been simultaneously age- 
and skill-biased. 
5.1.2  Regional productive factors as determinants of inequality changes 
Globalisation means rising trade and increased flows of production factors (capital and 
labour) among integrating regions or countries. Economic theories suggest that 
increasing flows of factors among regions might as well promote convergence as well 
a s  d i v e r g e n c e  o f  r e g i o n a l  i n c o m e  l e v e l s .  I n  t h e  s t a n d a r d  g r o w t h  m o d e l ,  b a c k w a r d  
regions are poor because of their lower endowment of capital (physical or human) 
relative to labour. With immobile factors, the catching-up of poorer regions can occur 
through investment to increase the capital/labour ratio. If factors are mobile, regional 
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have an incentive to move to poorer regions where capital is less abundant and the 
marginal product of a unit of capital is higher. In contrast, workers have an incentive to 
move to richer regions where capital is more abundant, such that labour productivity 
and wages are higher. If factor prices are free to adjust, the mobility of factors could 
eliminate regional differences, equilibrating regional differences in the capital/labour 
ratio.  
But decreasing trade costs and factor mobility can also lead to divergence in 
regional income levels. ‘New economic geography’ models take into account both the 
forces that induce dispersion of economic activity among regions and consequently 
promote regional convergence, and the forces that facilitate concentration of economic 
activity and regional divergence. An important agglomeration force is increasing 
returns. Increasing returns might be a result of high fixed costs at the firm level, or 
fixed costs at the generation of innovations or with the accumulation of a minimum 
level of physical capital or public infrastructure. Krugman (1991) shows that increasing 
returns combined with labour mobility across regions might result in two initially 
identical regions evolving into a core–periphery structure. Suppose there are two 
identical regions, and one firm32 (operating in an industry with increasing returns) 
decides to move to the other region (all else remaining unchanged). Increasing 
competition on the product and factor markets in the receiving region will put 
downward pressure on firms’ profits, but increasing wages and decreasing product 
prices will attract workers from the relocating firm’s original region. If workers start to 
migrate, then this action results (in the receiving region) in the growth of the regional 
market and the decrease of wages, and thus more firms (of the original region) will 
find it profitable to move as well.  
This cumulative mechanism could lead the initially identical regions to evolve 
into an industrialised core and reindustrialised periphery.33 Although it is not the only 
mechanism leading to regional divergence, labour mobility accelerates divergence in 
these models (Ottaviano & Puga, 2002). In Europe, labour mobility is less important 
than in the US, and thus other potential mechanisms of this divergence process might 
dominate. These include input–output costs and demand linkages between firms, 
factor accumulation or intertemporal linkages (for a survey, see Ottaviano & Puga, 
2002). Regional polarisation and convergence are not the only possible outcomes, 
however. Convergence does not necessarily take place even when agglomeration gains 
are absent and factor mobility is limited. If distortions on the labour market prevent the 
adjustment of wages according to productivity, capital will not move to the 
underdeveloped region, which will result in regional stagnation and unemployment 
(Faini, 2003). 
Decreasing income disparities between countries and increasing regional 
inequalities within countries might be understood in this theoretical framework. 
                                                      
32 The model is a two-sector economy, with a competitive sector and a monopolistically 
competitive one with increasing returns (labelled ‘industry’). The firm that moves is an 
industrial firm. 
33 S u c h  r e g i o n a l  d i v e r g e n c e  c o u l d  o c c u r  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  l a b o u r  m o b i l i t y  a s  w e l l .  F o r  a n  
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Martin (2005) presents a small model of three integrating regions, one rich, one 
intermediate and one poor region, where the latter two belong to the same country. He 
argues that increasing integration (lower trade costs) leads to the observed pattern of 
interregional inequalities if the international cost advantages of the poorer country are 
higher than the cost advantages of the p oorer regions vs. richer regions within the 
poorer country. Martin (2005) (and see also Puga, 2002) suggests that wage-setting at 
the national level (and other nationwide labour institutions) resulting in within-
country homogeneity and inter-country heterogeneity in labour costs might produce 
such an effect. If the labour cost advantage of the poorer region within the poor 
country is not high enough, firms will choose to locate in the richer region of the poor 
country, which translates into a simultaneous rise in regional inequality in the poorer 
country and a fall in between-country inequality. Labour market institutions might 
also account for the divergence in unemployment levels. If, because of national level 
wage-setting, agglomeration effects on regional productivity are not reflected in 
regional wage differences, they may instead be reflected in unemployment levels: 
regions with lower productivity will tend to have higher unemployment rates.  
Although migration is less important in the EU than in other economic areas (e.g. 
the US), according to Faini (2003) there is some evidence that migration favours the 
convergence of regional income levels. He finds that net outward migration is positive 
in those initially poor regions that show convergence towards the average but negative 
for converging rich regions. This finding is consistent with the theory, which would 
predict that labour migrates from initially poor regions to initially rich regions during 
the convergence process. Logit analysis of convergence indicators on mobility confirms 
the same conclusion for the 1980s, but in the 1990s, the relationship was much weaker. 
5.1.3  Competing theories, unexplained variance  
Arguably, the technology argument (of mostly labour economists) and the 
globalisation argument (of mostly trade theorists) are, in a sense, competing theories. 
Among them, the skill-bias argument seems to receive the most empirical support. 
Analysis in Employment in Europe 2005 (European Commission, 2005i) reveals that the 
employment shifts to skill-intensive industries might be too small; therefore, the 
relevance and explanatory power of ‘increased international trade’ may not be 
satisfactory.34 On the other hand, demand shifts for the educated labour force that are 
not followed by adequate supply reactions lead to widening wage dispersions. Also, an 
increase in technology-related indicators seems to correlate positively with increased 
skills demand and wage dispersion (ibid., p. 198).  
After a review of studies on the US experience, Katz & Autor (1999) concluded 
that trade theory explains no more than some 20% of the inequality increase while 
some 80% of the rise is accounted for by skill-biased technological change. Yet, it might 
well be that there are interactions between trade and a shift in the skill bias of 
production and services. Other papers (Atkinson, 1999; Singh & Dhumale, 2000; Dreher 
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& Gaston, 2006) suggest that these two theoretical approaches together still only 
account for part of the variance in inequality changes. 
The elements of the ‘transatlantic consensus’ (Atkinson, 1999) are that inequality 
changes observed on both sides of the Atlantic are induced by increased demand for 
highly skilled work. Whatever the causes assumed (increased trade flows or 
alternatively, the spread of skill-rewarding technology), increased wage dispersion in 
the US and higher unemployment in Europe are the results of a common trend. The 
difference in outcomes can be attributed to institutional differences: rigid labour 
markets and the welfare state in Europe and flexible labour markets and a minimal 
welfare state in the US. These arguments are forcefully put by many economists. There 
are a few interesting questions here, however. First, as both theories leave a great deal 
of variance unexplained, one should concentrate on those contingencies that may be 
responsible for the rest. Second, as the institutional setting seems to be a crucial factor, 
some space should be devoted to the channels and operations of institutional influence. 
Candidates for the unexplained variance vary in different parts of the world. 
Smeeding (2002) (while underlining that studies based on the Luxembourg Income 
Study do not prove the role of trade liberalisation in increasing inequalities and 
showing evidence that shifts in skills supply and demand can explain some of the 
changes in earned incomes across rich nations) calls for further research to find out a 
fuller list of real causes. As Cornia & Court (2001) point out, there may be ‘traditional’ 
and ’new’ causes of inequality. Traditional causes include extreme land concentration, 
the mounting influence of the mineral sector on GDP, changes in access to education 
and increasing urban–rural divergence. Among the new factors, in addition to 
technological change and trade liberalisation, various policy measures may also play 
an important role in increasing inequalities, namely stabilisation packages, financial 
and labour market liberalisations as well as changes in the tax and transfer schemes. As 
they warn, care in making generalisations is necessary: country-specific mixes of 
circumstances and policies drive real changes in inequalities. Singh & Dhumale (2000) 
point out that the argument behind the transatlantic consensus provides insufficient 
explanatory power. They imply that some of the inequality increase is owing to a 
gradual erosion of the efficiency of central welfare-state institutions that were built 
during the three ‘golden age’ decades after the Second World War and changing social 
norms.  
Atkinson (1999) warned that there might be at least two different narratives 
behind empirically observed facts. Changes in inequalities may be associated with 
technological changes (induced or exacerbated by liberalised trade and increased 
competition from the developing world) or, on the other hand, with changes in social 
arrangements. Skill-driven pay reflects social conventions as well as the acceptance of 
widening inequality (both in terms of micro and macro perspectives) and a shift in 
social norms and conventions. This (at least as normative as positive) view of pay and 
income determination obviously draws attention to the operation of the welfare states. 
He concludes that to the extent that norms (and moreover institutionalised 
redistributive norms) can be influenced, there is room for political leadership and 
action (ibid., p. 24).  
From a different angle, though, Sapir (2000) also highlights institutional factors. 
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elimination of trade barriers and the emergence of the information revolution) has led 
to an unprecedented growth of wealth for the US and the EU. At the same time, 
declining wages and rising job insecurity in the US and growing unemployment in 
Europe have accompanied the process on the respective sides of the Atlantic. “Whereas 
economists continue to argue about whether trade or technological change is the main 
culprit behind the waning future of labour, ordinary citizens tend to see the two as 
simply different facets of ‘globalisation’” (ibid., p. 31). As for the European regimes, a 
reform of the welfare state (and within that, labour market regulations and institutions) 
may be the clue to efficient survival. 
5.1.4  Norms and institutions 
Major studies on income distribution in the developed countries refrain from drawing 
over-simplistic conclusions about the causes of levels or trends in inequalities.35 It is 
widely agreed that inequalities in the context of a specific country are the results of a 
complex of factors (for a comprehensive overview, see Atkinson & Bourguignon, 2000).  
The most important direct influences on income inequalities can be associated 
with various elements of the income package. Probably the most significant, labour 
incomes, are determined by the employment patterns of the various household 
members, the availability of jobs and the wages earned from selling labour. Still, the 
distribution of human capital depends on access to education, the functioning of the 
school system, etc. On top of that, wage dispersion is also determined by the relative 
demand for skills. In this respect, periods of skill-biased technological change are 
characterised by growing returns to education and skills. Within the developed world, 
there are diverging trends in this respect. While there have been increasing wage-
inequality trends in, for example, the US, the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands and 
Poland (and presumably in most of the transition countries), some countries have 
experienced no change or even a decline in the last decade (European Commission, 
2005i). There does not seem to be a consensus about the reasons for these trends. In any 
case, there is a great deal of variance that cannot even be explained as a combined 
effect of technological change and trade. Also, to a certain extent, pay norms are social 
constructs (Atkinson, 1999) and depend on tolerance in society towards high wages. In 
addition, probably the most important determinant is the institutional setting, broadly 
defined (including labour legislation, minimum wage rules, active labour market 
policies, tax/benefit schemes, etc.). It is exactly this feature that leads analysts to say 
that technological change leads to either higher wage dispersion (in countries with less 
rigid labour markets such as the US or the UK) or to a growth of unemployment (in 
countries like France, for example).  
Perhaps surprisingly, labour incomes are distributed more unevenly in the EU-10 
than in the EU-15 countries in general. Decile ratios of earnings show that the highest 
inequalities are in the Baltics, Poland and the two recently acceded countries (Bulgaria 
and Romania), while the most unequal EU-15 country, Ireland, only comes after them. 
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The lowest degrees of inequalities can be found in the Scandinavian tier (more 
specifically in Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark).36 
Other types of incomes from the market (capital incomes) and incomes stemming 
from ownership are probably the least-known area of income inequalities. Although 
there are interesting studies on this topic, little systematic evidence is available on the 
effect of capital incomes on cross-country income differentials.  
The other large and very important influence on income distribution is the wide 
array of redistributed incomes (social insurance benefits, public social transfers, and for 
the sake of simplicity, we also mention benefits in kind under this heading). The 
relationship between social spending and poverty is generally shown to be negative in 
the OECD countries (Förster & d’Ercole, 2005; Schwabish, Smeeding & Osberg, 2003) 
and in the EU (Council of the European Union, 2006), but two important qualifications 
need to be borne in mind. First, the effect of the welfare state on income inequality 
(rather than poverty) is not that obvious (Tóth & Gábos, 2006). Furthermore, the 
relationship between inequality and public social expenditure may be spurious: there 
is empirical evidence that a high level of inequality may constrain redistribution rather 
than induce it (Schwabish, Smeeding & Osberg, 2003). Second, the actual effects of 
welfare states on income distribution depend on the institutional settings in those 
welfare states. 
5.2  Globalisation and European social changes 
The sources of pressure for change in European social protection mechanisms fall 
under three broad headings: 
•  First, there are the pressures stemming from globalisation and the move to a 
more post-industrial economy, as described above. Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
disentangle the effects of globalisation as such and some of the attendant 
repercussions that affect society at the same time. 
•  Second, family structures are changing. The nuclear family can be relied upon 
less and less to help individuals absorb risks. It is particularly the countries 
belonging to whatever remains of Esping-Andersen’s cluster of ‘corporatist’ 
welfare states – with their focus on the male breadwinner – that are in the most 
urgent need of reform (Esping-Andersen, 2002). Incomplete households, 
unofficial cohabitation and multiple marriages throughout an individual’s life – 
all of these change the landscape of social protection needs. But different life-
course practices are also accompanied by different fertility patterns, most notably 
by postponing the birth of the first child or deciding not to have children at all. 
More generally, the diversification of life-course practices as opposed to fairly 
uniform patterns observed in the past adds another dimension to the demand for 
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making social protection systems more ‘flexible’. Social protection, if it is to 
respond to these changes, would need to be more clearly life-course oriented.37  
•  Third, there is the problem of demographic ageing, which is brought about by 
two factors. People live longer and they are having fewer children. Falling birth 
rates are a phenomenon observed practically everywhere in the developed and 
increasingly in the developing world. As countries grow richer, people have 
fewer children and, as countries undergo major social transformations 
accompanied by the availability of birth control, birth rates plummet even more 
dramatically – as recently seen in Central and Eastern Europe (UNIFEM, 2006, 
Tab. 1.5). 
Adverse demographics particularly affect the health care and pension systems. 
They also affect overall economic performance. European populations will start 
stagnating between 2010 and 2020; whatever economic growth is to be achieved after 
the latter date will have to come purely from rises in productivity (European 
Commission, 2005a, p. 28). That, at least, is the scenario based on observed trends. A 
recent project sponsored by the European Commission, called DEMWEL38 
(Demographic Uncertainty and the Sustainability of Social Welfare Systems) has 
addressed the need for basing policies on demographic uncertainty rather than 
baseline forecasts, by drawing attention to probabilistic projections. Arguably, policies 
need to be made robust for any change, and not simply tailored to the most pessimistic 
scenario. 
The pressures on the welfare state translate in the public sphere into the debate 
on reforms to the mechanisms of social protection and those that underpin the welfare 
state. Sometimes this can result in a string of parametric changes to the system, as 
seems to be the case with health care, but there are also more fundamental 
paradigmatic changes motivating reforms to not only the labour market, tax and 
pension systems but also to childcare and education. Some of the radical reforms 
debated may not be feasible or warranted, but they deserve consideration. The 
following sections therefore discuss the reform processes in these areas. 
5.2.1  Unemployment 
The persistence of high unemployment in a number of European countries is 
frequently identified as the key issue for the EU, and it increasingly ranks in first place 
in lists of priorities for social policy across the Union. In 2005, the Lisbon agenda was 
relaunched with a narrower focus on two areas: economic growth and employment 
(European Commission, 2005a). Empirical evidence that relates employment rates with 
labour market institutions is sometimes scarcer than is the host of theoretical 
arguments (IMF, 2003, p. 129). Nevertheless, empirical studies (Nickell, Ochel & 
Quintini, 2001) and recent econometric exercises – for example using the IMF’s Global 
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Economy Model (IMF, 2003) – indicate that comprehensive labour market reforms can 
generate significant gains. At the same time, labour market institutions are a necessary 
component of market economies, given that labour markets cannot be, by definition, 
perfectly competitive (ibid., p. 130; Blanchard, 2002). They have an important risk-
reducing role (Agell, 1999) and other economic rationales (Blanchard & Giavazzi, 
2002). 
Indeed, it is important to point out that comparisons of European labour markets 
with other advanced economies, especially with the US, are often exaggeratedly 
critical. They produce a lower dispersion of pay within the same narrowly-defined 
skills groups. Moreover, lower employment among women compared with the US is 
largely related to the fact that US households rely much more on the marketisation of 
traditional household activities (Freeman, 2004). 
Globalisation contributes to the destruction as well as the creation of jobs. Recent 
studies on the relocation of production indicate that only 6% of job losses in the EU in 
the period 2002–05 resulted from the relocation or offshoring of activities (Economic 
Policy Committee, 2005, p. 10). There is a sense that globalisation contributes to 
instability in social relationships because of the pressure for fast changes in the labour 
market. On the other hand, long-term employment relationships, while still dominant, 
no longer convey a sense of security. It is often the flexibility of the labour market 
combined with extensive social protection that provides a better sense of security as 
well as a higher quality of work (Auer, 2005). 
L a b o u r  m a r k e t  r e f o r m s  f a c e  a  n u m b e r  o f  c o m p l i c a t i o n s .  A l m o s t  a l l  n e t  j o b  
creation today comes from service sector jobs. Between 1979 and 1993, the OECD 
countries lost (as an unweighted average) 22% of their manufacturing jobs (ibid.). Yet 
new jobs are not created fast enough to absorb deindustrialisation job losses in the 
same way as was done during the pre- and post-war de-ruralisation periods. Three 
dilemmas can be identified here. 
First, the expansion of the tertiary labour market brings about a larger share of 
low-skilled services. Second, much (although by no means all) of the services sector 
expansion is subject to the well-known ‘Baumol cost-disease effect’ (Baumol, 1967). 
Third, much depends on household consumption choices, since households in 
principle can often use household work as a substitute for services (Esping-Andersen, 
1999, pp. 103–04). Esping-Andersen (1999, pp. 117–19) promotes the idea of a ‘new 
Keynesian household’ to deal with job creation problems. The idea here is that policies 
that facilitate the spread of two-earner households create exactly the type of intensely 
service-consuming households that we need today. 
Deindustrialisation, of course, differs from country to country, with massive 
losses in some countries with uncompetitive industries such as in the UK or Spain, and 
much better adaptation in others, as in Germany, Denmark or Italy (ibid., 1999, p. 120). 
The political economy of reforms is crucial here. Industrial relations models vary in 
their receptiveness to change. The worst-case scenario, it seems, is where industrial 
organisations are strong but neither centralised nor capable of coordination, 
supporting militancy and strong gains for the insiders but neglect for the outsiders. 
“Economic performance is likely to be superior when either ‘markets’ or ‘neo-
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theoretical studies of Lindbeck & Snower (1988a and 1988b) and the ‘hump-shaped 
curve’ hypothesis of macroeconomic performance (Calmfors & Driffill, 1988). 
But which way should the reforms generally go? Some diagnose European 
problems as ‘Eurosclerosis’ and give the recipe as ‘flexibilise!’ (Siebert, 1997). 
Nevertheless, there is a difference here between the continental corporatist systems 
with rigid labour market policies and the Nordic systems with flexible labour markets 
but comprehensive social protection. The Swedish Rehn–Meidner model deliberately 
sought to reduce employment in uncompetitive industries (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 
123). The Danish and the Dutch ‘flexicurity’ model (Wilthagen & Tros, 2004) has 
become the latest buzzword in the world of social protection. 
In general, Scandinavia’s triple accent on generous income guarantees, active 
labour market policies and welfare-state employment growth (Esping-Andersen, 1999, 
p. 123) seems to be a viable alternative to pure-market reforms. Scandinavian successes 
in employment and growth draw attention and inspire governments of countries that 
had traditionally been thought of as belonging firmly in the ‘liberal’ camp (Giddens, 
2005, pp. 109-10 and p. 112). 
5.2.2  Pension reforms 
Population ageing puts pressure on existing social protection mechanisms. This 
tendency is most explicit in the form of the fiscal pressure on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
pension systems. As the ratio of the working-age population to the retired decreases, 
the lack of economic power to provide for the elderly manifests itself as the need for 
adjustment – an increase in contributions, less generous pensions or the raising of the 
retirement age. Shortfalls can be at least partly offset by rising productivity. That is 
why pension reforms would ideally address the challenge by effecting changes in a 
combination (or possibly all) of these areas: adjusting the statutory pension age in line 
with longevity gains, cutting over-generous pensions and making contributions higher, 
ideally in absolute volume by promoting economic efficiency. Such changes can be 
accomplished by having a pension system that provides for the efficient allocation of 
assets (savings of the future retirees) in the economy and provides the right labour 
market incentives. At the same time, pension reforms involve important issues of 
fairness and justice. Reforms may be perceived as producing winners and losers, and 
finding the right social contract might not be easy, although some frameworks have 
been suggested (Myles, 2002). 
The post-communist countries have often opted for a multiple pillar system39 as 
recommended by the World Bank (1994) in a report that was later widely criticised for 
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unreasonably extolling the virtues of the funded component (Stiglitz & Orszag, 1999, p. 
9; Barr, 2001, p. 101; World Bank, 2006a). In Western Europe, the most radical overhaul 
of a pension system has been undertaken by Sweden, which introduced a notional 
defined contribution (NDC)40 system in 1999 (and a small, mandatory funded 
component). NDC has proved to be a generally popular reform option, also applied in 
Latvia and Poland for their PAYG pillars and recently adopted in Italy. The World 
Bank published a study (2006b) that generally looks highly favourably on this type of 
pension scheme. 
5.2.3  Reforming tax systems 
The wider issues of incentives to work and management of entrepreneurial and labour 
market risk also embrace taxation. The recent interest in guaranteed minimum income 
schemes, the growing interest in negative income taxation (one way of boosting the 
income of low-paid workers), as well as public discussions on the flat-rate income tax 
should not be overlooked in the social protection debate, since taxation should be seen 
as a more or less integral part of welfare regimes. A guaranteed minimum income is 
linked to incentives to work. Under this concept, every individual is entitled to a 
minimum income, whether s/he is in or out of work, thus avoiding the poverty trap. A 
standard tax rate is deducted on every source of income (Aglietta, 2000, pp. 444–45). 
The idea is usually associated with the Belgian economist Philippe Van Parijs, for 
whom it is directly related to the changing nature of work in the post-industrial age 
(Aglietta, 2000, p. 445). In this approach, income should be seen as something separate 
from the nature of the individual job, owing to advances in collective productivity. The 
same instrument, however, is viewed in a different light by Michel Aglietta, with work 
as the principal means of social integration. A related concept is that of negative 
income tax, first put forward by Milton Friedman over 40 years ago (1963). 
Guaranteeing a certain minimum income as a way of reintegrating individuals into 
society is today being put on the agenda in countries that combine high unemployment 
with high labour costs. 
This trend in policy-making coincides with the debate on the flat-rate tax, 
a l t h o u g h  h e r e  t h e  f o c u s  o f  t h e  d i sc u s s i o n  s e e m s  t o  b e  o n  t h e  h i g h e r  i n c o m e  s tr a ta  
(although in principle a guaranteed minimum income and especially a negative income 
tax system is basically a flat-rate system). In academic circles, the debates were sparked 
by the 1985 publication of Hall & Rabushka’s book, The Flat Tax, republished in 1995. 
More recently, the flat-rate personal income tax has been introduced in five post-
communist member states of the EU – the Baltic States, Romania and Slovakia. The 
latter is also a member of the OECD, and the only OECD country with this radical tax 
arrangement on a national scale. This move has helped to bring the issue to wider 
attention in the European policy scene, surfacing for example during the 2005 German 
elections (although without being adopted by any party). 
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5.2.4  Poverty and the issue of the underclass 
Against the backdrop of discussions on the dismal performance of European labour 
markets, it is necessary to remember that today’s unemployment is associated with 
much higher participation rates than in the past. “Unlike before, we must now include 
women in the nation’s full employment promise” (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 1). 
Regardless of the widespread discussion about the efficacy of the welfare state, which 
started right after the post-war boom waned in the early 1970s, social protection has 
become more, not less, widespread since then. Despite the expansion of social 
protection, poverty remains a major problem for the European social model(s). 
Absolute poverty has continued to decline across the EU and generally in the OECD 
countries in recent years, but relative poverty has been on the rise (Förster & d’Ercole, 
2005). This development, again, is very much connected with problems in job creation 
(European Commission, 2005a, p. 5). Nevertheless, the issue of social exclusion and 
sometimes the downright creation of an underclass cut across various other aspects of 
social policy, and especially relevant to it are education policies (Esping-Andersen, 
2006). 
The problem of the underclass may come from familiar structural causes, but it 
manifests itself in many new ways. Many social risks are closely correlated with 
lifestyle habits. Examples include smoking or, in a post-scarcity society, over-eating 
junk food. In turn, these habits are closely correlated with social divisions (Giddens, 
2005, p. 108). Obesity is usually the problem of the low-income strata and has become a 
serious issue.41 Lifestyle policies are clearly becoming an important component of state 
intervention. 
5.2.5  Investing in the future – Childcare and education 
Childcare is crucial for women’s employment. Econometric evidence suggests that if 
the supply of childcare were to increase by 20 percentage points for countries such as 
Germany, Italy, Spain or the Netherlands, women’s employment could post a gain of 
as much as 10 percentage points (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 59). Yet despite its evident 
significance, childcare is an often-neglected aspect of social policies, with equally 
evident adverse effects on women’s employment prospects. In the spring of 2003, the 
Barcelona European Council addressed the issue by setting quantitative targets, for 
childcare facilities to be available for 90% of children aged between 3 years and the 
mandatory school age, and for 33% of children under 3 years old. The latter is very far 
from being attained in most EU countries. Other initiatives suggested include ‘daddy 
days’ and ‘baby bonds’ (Ferrera, 2005, p. 33). 
Adequate child benefits and services thus cut across the wider array of 
employment-cum-growth and social inclusion processes, and they are pertinent to the 
issue of ‘adverse demographics’. The Scandinavian countries and France have 
relatively high birth rates, and these are precisely the countries that provide 
comprehensive benefits and services connected with childcare (Giddens, 2005, p. 112).  
At the same time, the issue of reforming European education systems (especially 
at the university level) to make them more globally competitive has also resonated in 
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the public debate (Lambert & Butler, 2006). Early school-leaving is seen as a specific 
problem in many member states,42 albeit with a large diversity. In the EU as a whole, 
the proportion of the 18-24 age cohort with only lower secondary education and not in 
further education or training has been falling over recent years – down from 17.7% in 
2000 to 14.9% in 2005. Even so, it remains well above the rates in the US or Japan and 
some way from the benchmark of 10% that the EU has set itself. There is a substantial 
gender gap in this indicator, with significantly more men than women lacking these 
qualifications, a difference found in a large majority of member states. 
5.2.6  Reconceptualising the welfare state 
The prototypical client of the post-war, industrial welfare state was an unskilled or 
semi-skilled male manufacturing worker, often the sole breadwinner of the family. The 
main risk for the family was that the breadwinner would lose his job. The accent was 
therefore on job protection and income maintenance. Risks of poverty were mostly 
related to children in large families and people in old age. Hence, policies aimed at 
providing family allowances and pensions. Lone motherhood, the risks associated with 
labour mobility, retraining needs, youth unemployment and long-term unemployment 
were never assumed. Life-course risks were mostly a simple question of consumption 
smoothing, with brief periods of unemployment covered by insurance. 
Intergenerational risks were deemed overcome by steadily rising productivity. 
New risks include de-skilled workers, the new underclass in a ‘two-speed 
society’, ‘welfare mothers’ and so on. The social risks can be formulated as issues of 
potential traps (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 5). One is the ‘low-fertility equilibrium’ 
emerging from the pressure on women to combine career and family roles. Another is 
the potential ‘low-wage, low-skill equilibrium’ that may arise from extensive labour-
market deregulation. Yet so far, it seems that the issue of de-skilling has not been given 
systematic, EU-wide analysis. 
There are two distinctively different strategic responses to the ‘equality–jobs 
trade-off’ (Soskice, 1994). In ‘uncoordinated economies’, wage adjustments and 
weakened employee protection resulted in rising inequalities. This model seems 
particularly vulnerable to the low-skills equilibrium. On the other hand, ‘coordinated 
economies’ moved in the direction of high-quality, well-remunerated production that 
privileges the core, stable workforce of highly skilled and highly productive workers. 
The Nordic countries fall between these two polar opposites. Not so long ago, some 
commentators were pronouncing the Scandinavian third way as ‘stranded’ (Esping-
Andersen, 1999, p. 152). Today, as we have seen, the Nordic model has become the one 
to emulate. 
How is Europe dealing with the new challenges? Different welfare regimes 
promote different institutionalised mindsets, which in turn produce different 
responses to social pressures and difficulties. A simple but insightful story is told by 
                                                      
42  See Council of the European Union, Modernising Education and Training: A Vital 
Contribution to Prosperity, and Social Cohesion in Europe, 2006 Joint Interim Report of the 
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Esping-Andersen, featuring three actors: Homo liberalismus, Homo familius and Homo 
socialdemocraticus (1999, pp. 170–74). In a similar vein, Held & Koenig-Archibugi (2003) 
have suggested four classes of respondents to globalisation:  
•  the sceptics (who do not believe any significant changes are needed);  
•  the  deregulators  (who believe the welfare state needs to be rolled back as a 
response to globalisation);  
•  the reversers (the anti-globalists who believe there is need to organise resistance 
to the phenomenon); and  
•  the internationalists (who believe an internationalisation of politics is needed to 
help deal with the adverse effects of economic liberalisation). 
Certain common strands are coming to the fore in the EU, notably around the 
notion of flexicurity in the context of the relaunched Lisbon strategy (European 
Commission, 2005i). Key here is the expanding set of governance and meta-governance 
capacities embodied in the open method of coordination covering social protection and 
social inclusion, despite the fact that formally the member states retain sovereignty in 
welfare state policies (Scharpf, 2002). These capacities arose out of the Union’s 
coordinating role for economic policies, and it is therefore perhaps not surprising that 
some commentators note how “the emergence of social policy at the European level 
tends to assume a workfare rather than a welfare orientation” (Jessop, 2002, p. 207). 
The dominant tone of current policy-making at the European level is seen by 
some as “not so much social integration but rather the instrumentalisation of policy as 
a resource for competition oriented structural change” (Deppe, Felder & Titow, 2000). 
This policy direction seems to be partly the result of analysts and policy-makers being 
at a loss for solutions and shy about promoting any specific comprehensive policies. 
Thus, in the view of some commentators, “the social dimension of the Lisbon agenda” 
for example, “has fallen into the hands of specialised circles of ‘insiders’”, and social 
justice is often just being paid lip service (Ferrera, 2005, p. 34). Anthony Giddens has 
stated this in robust terms:  
Although the Lisbon Agenda, Sapir report, Kok report and other similar 
contributions all talk about the ESM [European social model], social exclusion and 
so on, they have little to say about them in a direct way. They lack a systematic 
discussion of how the innovations they propose can be reconciled with social justice 
and welfare. (Giddens, 2005, p. 103, emphasis in the original) 
He similarly criticises the Commission’s 2005 Communication on the Social Agenda for 
lack of analysis of “changing patterns of class, inequality and social division”. 
Giddens goes on to propose a positive welfare programme replacing the negative 
of Beveridge’s ‘evils’: “In place of Want, personal autonomy; not avoidance of Disease, 
but active health; instead of Ignorance, education, as a continuing part of life; rather 
than Squalor, prosperity; and in place of Idleness; initiative” (Giddens, 2005, p. 105). 
The state he pictures is an agency underpinning paths to prosperity: 
Rather than the ‘welfare state’, we should speak of a society of positive welfare, in 
which the state plays a central, but not a dominating, role. The state is primarily a 
social investment and regulatory agency. Many over recent years have talked of the 
welfare state as an enabling force, but it is better to speak of the ensuring state in the 
positive welfare society. An ensuring state is one that enables – one that uses social 
investment whenever possible to help people to help themselves. (Ibid., p. 106) 74 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
Yet the Union undeniably has a social dimension. Despite the differences within 
the European social model, Begg & Berghman (2002) point out that it still entails 
s h a r e d  v a l u e s  t h a t  m a k e  c o m m o n  a p p r o a c h es feasible. These values couple social 
norms with economic requirements. As Begg & Berghman (ibid., p. 183) state, the 
minimum wages and benefits established by EU member states implicitly set minimum 
productivity requirements. The European social model is alive but needs to deepen the 
dynamic approach to policies. From a life-course perspective, investing in the health 
and education of children contains social expenditures later on and creates a good 
framework for an effectively functioning market. “The focus on capabilities means that 
the state, as well as the market, must promote the development of each person’s 
capabilities to work in the context of that [which] a person values” (ibid., p. 185).  
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6.  SOCIAL EUROPE AND GLOBALISATION: 
A RACE TO THE BOTTOM? 
ne of the most contentious questions surrounding globalisation is whether it 
leads, inexorably, to retrenchment in social policy and the progressive 
weakening of the welfare state. The European social model is widely regarded 
a s  o n e  o f  t h e  c o r e  v a l u e s  t h a t  d e f i n e s  w h a t  t h e  E U  s t a n d s  f o r .  I t  i s  c l e a r  fr o m  t h e  
orientations of the strategy for growth and employment (the relaunched Lisbon 
strategy) and the sustainable development strategy that social aims are accorded a 
prominent, if not always equal, weight in the way Europe moves forward. 
Consequently, if globalisation were to put at risk the achievements of the European 
social model, it would give rise to many political challenges. 
Previous work (e.g. Bertola, Blau & Kahn, 2001) has shown that closer product 
market integration and pressures from globalisation are not inducing a uniform, 
across-the-board tendency towards reducing social welfare provisions in Europe. Some 
schemes, such as unemployment benefits, are becoming less generous and there is a 
marked development towards cutting back the system of job guarantees offered in the 
past to employees. In other fields, the most noticeable being social assistance, the trend 
goes the other way round: the generosity of provisions has been increasing over time.  
Thus, experience does not yet lend support to the view that European social 
welfare systems are being tested and are at serious risk of being cut back, let alone 
dismantled because of the competitive pressures associated with globalisation. Instead, 
the evidence is that such cuts as have occurred have been selective, and more often 
motivated by internal reassessments within national systems. This may suggest that 
some rationalisation is going on, but governments retain leverage in deciding which 
institutional features should be kept in place and which ones should be scaled down. 
Many governments have even opted, as in the case of income support of the last resort, 
to make existing provisions more generous over time. These trends in welfare reform 
are examined in greater detail in section 6.1. 
Many of the studies of the social impact of globalisation suggest a plethora of 
potential effects, yet it is noteworthy that, especially in studies that focus on the 
contrasts between the richer and poorer parts of the world, there is by no means a 
consensus. Based on similar evidence, different studies arrive at diametrically opposed 
– and usually very robustly expressed – conclusions. Part of the problem is that many 
of the concepts behind the indicators used can be deployed in differing ways.  
The subsequent sections of this chapter present information on social trends in 
the EU that bear on the impact of globalisation. After a brief look at the problems in 
using social indicators, some major trends are discussed. Section 6.2 considers the 
methodological issues that arise. Section 6.3 then presents some key trends, while 
section 6.4 highlights certain poverty and inequality issues, and section 6.5 focuses on 
gender. The last section discusses the links between the social and the competitive 
indicators. Underlying the whole chapter is the question of what the evidence reveals 
about whether or not competitive pressures have affected social policy, and thus 
whether there are any credible signs of a race to the bottom. 
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6.1  What kinds of reforms are taking place?  
Based on a variety of sources (including country economic reviews carried out by the 
OECD, the Income Data Source studies, MISSOC reports, etc.), we have taken stock of 
the reforms undertaken in Europe in the field of non-employment benefits 
(encompassing not only unemployment benefits, but also the various cash transfers 
provided to individuals of working age),43 pensions and employment protection. 
Details on the inventory of social policy reforms produced by the Fondazione Rodolfo 
Debenedetti (fRDB) and on the single regulatory changes are explained on the fRDB’s 
website and in publications. The information here summarises the criteria followed in 
the classification of the various reforms. 
The fRDB inventory of reforms is organised along two main lines. On the one 
hand, reforms are classified based on their broad orientation, that is, whether they tend 
to reduce or increase the generosity of public pensions and non-employment benefits 
and make employment protection more or less stringent. It should be stressed that 
increasing rewards from labour market participation do not necessarily mean phasing 
out existing cash transfer mechanisms to non-employed individuals. It may simply 
involve the introduction of wage subsidies, employment-conditional incentives or a 
switch to activation policies (including sanctions) for beneficiaries of existing schemes. 
On the other hand, we distinguish reforms depending on whether they are 
marginal or radical. This procedure is done in two stages. Initially, we rely on qualitative 
assessments, which are based on an evaluation of the scope of the various reforms. In 
particular, we first classify as radical those reforms that satisfy at least one of the 
following criteria:  
•  They reduce replacement rates at the average production-worker level by at least 
10%. 
•  They are comprehensive, that is, do not address just minor features of cash 
transfer schemes (for example, the minimum employment record required to 
qualify for unemployment benefits), but rather reform their broader design. 
•  They involve existing entitlements rather than being simply phased in for the 
new beneficiaries of the various schemes (thus, reforms of employment 
protection should also concern workers under permanent contracts).   
In the second stage of the classification procedure we look at the actual behaviour 
of the series that should be most affected by the reforms and only if we observe a 
change in the underlying trend of these series do we confirm our initial qualitative 
assessment. The second stage can only be implemented for the reforms carried out 
before 1993, as we need a minimum number of observations in order to establish 
whether a change in the underlying trend has occurred. Sometimes, even in the case of 
reforms undertaken before 1993, the second-stage validation procedure cannot be 
implemented as some reforms are followed just a few years later by regulatory changes 
moving in the opposite direction, undoing some of the initial institutional changes. In 
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all the cases where the second stage procedure cannot be implemented, only the first 
stage assessment is used. The latter was validated in 85% of the cases. 
Which series were used in the empirical validation procedures? It obviously 
depends on the institutional features subject to reforms. On employment protection, 
we looked at labour market flows, especially unemployment inflows, as previous work 
has found a strong negative correlation between employment protection and the 
incidence of unemployment.44 I n  a n y  e v e n t ,  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  r e f o r m s  o n  s t o c k s  ( o f  
employment and unemployment levels or labour force participation rates) can only be 
appreciated when working with longer series than are available in the database. On 
pension reforms, we looked at the dynamics of pension expenditures and revenues 
earmarked for the public pension funds: we expected radical reforms to affect at least 
one of the two significantly, thereby altering equilibrium contribution rates (the payroll 
rates required to clear the public pension budget). Examples of radical reforms are the 
1998 Swedish pension reform, as well as the Amato reform carried out in Italy in 1992. 
Finally, in the case of non-employment benefits, we used proxy outflows from 
unemployment45 (or outflows from the live registers to jobs in the countries for which 
such data are available): we expected radical reforms to affect exit flows from 
unemployment significantly (unfortunately, we had no data on outflows from non-
employment). 
The main results of this exercise are summarised in Table 6.1. The table shows 
that, contrary to popular wisdom and to the belief that labour market and social 
welfare institutions cannot be modified, many changes have occurred over the 
observation period (lasting 18 years). We counted some 414 reforms, that is, more than 
1.6 per year and country. Nevertheless, the changes have often been marginal (388 out 
of 414 reforms, roughly 95% of the regulatory changes, did not pass our two-stage 
procedure identifying radical reforms). Moreover, the reforms are almost evenly split 
between those reducing generosity (increasing rewards from participation) and 
protection (241 out of 414, that is, about 58%) and those moving in the opposite 
direction. Nor is it infrequent to find reforms undoing one another over a few years. 
These inconsistencies and the marginal nature of most reforms have significantly 
increased the complexity of the European institutional landscape.  
In the field of employment protection, for instance, we have seen a multiplication 
of contractual types, with a number of fixed-term and unstable jobs going hand-in-
hand with permanent and still heavily protected positions. To give an example, in Italy 
35 different contractual types have been recently counted by the Statistical Office. The 
number increased to 42 with the ‘Biagi’ 2003 reform. All this has increased the dualism 
of European labour markets, making them more segmented, not only between insiders 
and outsiders, but also among various types of outsiders. 
                                                      
44 See Boeri & Jimeno (2003) for a survey of the literature on the effects of employment 
protection legislation on labour market stocks and flows. 
45 Proxy outflow rates are computed as follows:  ) ( 1 1 , 1 , t t t t t t U U I O − − = + + + , where O denotes proxy 
outflows,  I inflows and U unemployment levels. All primary data come from the OECD 
Unemployment Duration database.  
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Table 6.1 Trends in social reforms 
  
Decreasing protection and 
generosity, increasing 
rewards from participation  
Increasing protection and 
generosity, decreasing 
rewards from participation 
 
 
    1985–90 1991–96 1997–2002 1985–90 1991–96 1997–2002 Total  per  row 
Of which 
decreasing (%) 
Marginal  6 11  34  6  8  36  101  51  Employment protection legislation 
Radical  0 5  1 0 2  2  10  60 
Marginal  9 34  92 10  9  27  181  75  Non-employment benefits 
Radical  1 4  1 0 0  0  6  100 
Marginal  10 10  22 13 27  24  106  39  Public pensions 
Radical  1 0  0 1 5  3  10  10 
Total per column    27  64  150  30  51  92  414  – 
Source: fRDB. IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 79 
 
Table 6.1 also documents an acceleration of reforms in the last six-year period 
(roughly corresponding to a parliamentary term) covered by the data. Furthermore, in 
recent years, reforms would seem to have taken an orientation that is better defined in 
the area of in-work benefits: here they are, for the most part, oriented towards 
increasing rewards from labour market participation (93 out of 120). In all areas, 
reforms are still mainly ‘marginal’ as defined above, and the ratio of marginal to 
structural reforms has increased since 1990. 
It should be stressed that among the reforms that have tightened benefits, 
increased rewards from participation or reduced employment protection (298, that is, 
more than 1 per year and country) not a few (12) have been carried out at times of 
recession (negative GDP growth) and some (59) under slow growth (0–2% of GDP 
growth). Indeed, Table 6.2 suggests that during recessions or at times of economic 
stagnation, it is more frequent to carry out these ‘politically difficult’ reforms than 
proceeding the other way round, while pressures to increase generosity are strong 
under buoyant macroeconomic conditions. In particular, when GDP was growing at 
more than 2% per year, there were 205 difficult reforms, but also 119 reforms doing the 
popular job of increasing generosity, adding more protections and reducing rewards 
from participation. That being said, only four of the politically difficult reforms were 
radical among those carried out when GDP was growing at less than 2% per year. The 
above findings indicate that reform activity is important, but very much constrained by 
the need to build up popular consensus, notably at times of relatively strong growth. 
This suggests that rather than globalisation per se, it is unreformed social welfare 
systems that are a threat to the survival of the so-called ‘social Europe’. 
Table 6.2 Reforms of labour markets and the macroeconomic environment 
    Politically difficult reforms  Politically popular reforms 
   GDP  growth*  GDP  growth* 
   Negative  Stagnant  Slow  Strong  Negative  Stagnant  Slow  Strong 
EPL  Marginal  1 –  9  51 – 1  4  52 
  Radical  – 1  –  6 2 –  –  2 
NEB  Marginal  6 3  25  109 – –  5  54 
  Radical  – 1  1  4 – –  –  4 
Pensions  Marginal  4 3  10  47 4 –  8  30 
  Radical  1 1  –  7 – –  –  1 
              
Total  labour  market 12 9  45  224 6 1  17  143 
Avg. per year and 
per country ** 
(0.86) (0.60)  (0.32)  (0.69) (0.67)  (1)  (0.28)  (0.47) 
* GDP growth: stagnant implies 0<g<1, slow implies 1<g<2, strong implies g>2 
** In brackets, average number of reforms per year and country 
Note: EPL refers to employment protection legislation; NEB refers to non-employment benefits. 
Source: fRDB. 
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6.2  The use of social indicators: Methodological issues 
There are numerous difficulties in obtaining accurate, comparable and timely 
information on poverty, inequality and other aspects of social exclusion that might be 
affected by globalisation. Many of the relevant data can only be obtained from survey 
data that rely on large-scale household surveys conducted by the member states. Such 
surveys employ differing methodologies and they may be carried out at different 
times, with the results often only available with a substantial lag. As a result, 
information on recent developments is not readily available, while comparisons across 
time or among countries are problematic. In addition, seemingly similar figures may be 
conceptually different, a good example being the calibration of poverty, where the EU 
standard is to set a ‘poverty line’ at 60% of median income, whereas the OECD sets the 
threshold at 50%. Elsewhere, poverty may be measured in absolute terms (for example 
in terms of basic subsistence) without taking account of the relativities involved. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the latter is essentially the approach adopted in official US 
poverty statistics. Statistics for individuals may tell a different story from those for 
households, and there are diverse techniques for correcting (‘equivalence’) for 
household size. Panel data based on surveys may be subject to compositional changes, 
with some individuals dropping out and not necessarily being replaced by identical 
individuals or households.  
There is an extensive and continuing debate on all these issues,46 and the point 
has to be made that there is no single unambiguously ‘correct’ approach. Many of the 
concepts and methodologies, moreover, have normative underpinnings that in turn 
reflect the values embodied in the European social model. Thus, for example, by 
electing to use a 60% threshold for poverty, Europeans are implicitly setting a tougher 
target than those countries that adopt 50%. It is important to stress and to repeat these 
‘health warnings’ about much of the social data reported below.  
Several sources of data have been used in this chapter. Eurostat compiles a range 
of indicators relevant to the social inclusion and social protection policy areas. Many 
relevant data are also presented in the Joint Report on Social Inclusion and Social 
Protection (European Commission, 2006f). The OECD carries out a variety of studies of 
social conditions among its members (which, it should be noted, exclude some of the 
smaller, recently acceded EU member states) and these studies have the merit of 
allowing comparisons with other developed countries. Some use is also made of data 
from the International Labour Organisation (ILO), which embrace labour market 
trends and some social conditions; these data allow certain comparisons with emerging 
competitor nations such as China. 
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6.3  Key trends 
Despite these reservations about data quality and definitions, even cursory 
examination of social statistics at an aggregated level points to some striking 
conclusions about many of the presumed effects of globalisation, presented below. 
•  Social protection expenditure has broadly been stable as a share of GDP in the 
EU since the early 1990s, contrary to the expectation that it would be squeezed in 
the interests of bolstering competitiveness (Figure 6.1). Indeed, its growth over 
the period 1992–2003 exceeded GDP growth for the EU-15, with the implication 
that the European welfare state has become more, not less generous. In fact, the 
evidence of Dreher et al. (2006) suggests that globalisation has not even affected 
the composition of social spending in OECD countries. 
Figure 6.1 Trends in social protection outlays, 1990–2003 (% of GDP) 
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Source: Eurostat. 
•  Nonetheless, at the member state level, wide disparities have persisted (Figure 
6.1), although the share of GDP has to be treated with some caution for two main 
reasons. First, rapid GDP growth increases the denominator of the ratio, such 
that even if (as in Ireland) per capita spending on social protection has grown 
quite significantly, the ratio falls. Second, in dynamic economies, the 
employment rate is bolstered with the result that the number of working-age 
inactive or unemployed persons tends to diminish, reducing the calls on social 
protection. In other words, the budget needed to meet a lower demand falls. In 
such cases, a declining share of social expenditure in GDP may well signify 
progress rather than retreat of the European social model, although it will be 
evident that one indicator cannot convincingly answer two such different 
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•  Social protection provided by the state is not the only source of funding for the 
risks that individuals confront. The US, for example, devotes comfortably the 
largest share of GDP among advanced countries to health care, at just under 15%, 
around 50% more than the EU average (although, as a large number of health 
outcome indicators suggest, this does not translate into better health outcomes 
for the population as a whole in the case of the US). Even so, much of this is 
funded privately, with the health-care package constituting a major element in 
collective bargaining. Similarly, there is a wide range of examples across the 
developed world of other ‘social’ expenditure that is partly or wholly financed by 
the private sector. Such expenditure raises awkward methodological problems: 
although it typically covers similar risks to social protection (which would 
vindicate counting it as ‘social’), it does not necessarily do so based on need or 
other social values (which would argue against counting it as like for like).  
•  Some such private spending is mandatory (for example, paid sick leave or 
mandatory private pensions), while some is voluntary (third-pillar pensions) as 
shown in Table 6.3. In addition, countries vary in the degree to which they 
subsidise private provision or tax benefits. The OECD (2005b) has attempted to 
bring together all these factors by estimating the aggregate of public and private 
social spending (Figure 6.2). This shows that the overall social outlays for the EU 
countries with the highest gross spending on social protection for which 
comparable data are available (such as Denmark, Sweden, Austria and Belgium, 
although less so Germany), overstate true social spending. By contrast, the US 
and the UK are shown to devote significantly more to social spending than is 
revealed by gross social protection outlays. In fact, the calculations show that the 
US share (26%) is very close to the shares of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands 
and Austria – countries that might be considered representative of the Nordic or 
corporatist social models. Germany, on this measure, has the highest overall 
social spending, followed by Sweden and the UK. In relation to globalisation, the 
salient point is that the share for the most advanced countries is in a much 
narrower range than might appear from comparisons of gross public spending 
on social protection. Still, what tends to be very different is how such 
expenditure is distributed. Tax breaks, for example, almost inevitably accrue 
disproportionately to individuals at the upper end of the income distribution. 
Table 6.3 Gross private social spending, 2001 (% of GDP) 
  OECD highest  OECD lowest  EU highest*  EU range 
Mandatory DE/IT  1.4  FI  0.1  DE/IT 1.4  1.3 
Voluntary US  9.9  HU 0.0  NL  5.5  5.5 
Total US    10.3  LU  0.1  NL  6.2  6.1 
* In several EU member states, there is neither a mandatory nor a voluntary programme. 
Source: OECD (2005b). 
•  Evidence on the generosity of components of social protection presents a mixed 
picture. Primarily for demographic reasons, old-age pensions, on the whole, have 
risen significantly in nearly all member states over the medium term, but there 
have been recent signs of a decline in generosity. For the same reasons, health IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 83 
 
care has also tended to increase significantly in nearly all countries, although 
Germany (with a high base level) has held steady, allowing only very marginal 
growth in the share of GDP devoted to health-care spending. These trends are 
well documented in official publications and data are not presented here. 
Figure 6.2 Public and private ‘social’ spending, 2001 (% of GDP) 
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Note: The public and private components may not be strictly comparable in the risks they insure against, 
such that comparisons have to be made with caution. 
Source: OECD. 
•  By contrast, the generosity of unemployment benefits has declined in several 
member states over the medium term, although the economic downturn of the 
period 2000–03 saw a shorter-term increase. The longer-run trend could be 
regarded as an indirect consequence of globalisation in pushing member states to 
restrict benefits as part of policies to liberalise labour markets. 
•  Even though social inclusion has become a more high-profile objective, data 
presented in the Joint Report (European Commission, 2006f) show that benefits 
associated with alleviating it have grown at a much lower rate than other 
elements of social protection. 
•  Hourly wages and hourly labour costs have also continued to increase in the EU, 
despite the spectre of low-wage competition, suggesting that there has not been a 
globalisation-induced squeeze on wages (although it should be noted that in a 
number of developed countries the share of wages in GDP has declined in recent 
decades). This contrasts with the position in the US where, according to ILO data, 
real wages in manufacturing actually fell between 1980 and 2002 (Table 6.4).  84 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
Table 6.4 Real wages in manufacturing, selected countries and years (index, 1995=100) 
  1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Canada  - 94.9 93.9  100.0  102.6  101.5  102.0  100.7 
China  -  -  77.4 100.0 155.3 172.2 195.4  - 
Cyprus  -  -  -  - 103.3 107.1 109.1  - 
Czech  Rep.  -  -  - 100.0 116.1 118.6 122.0  - 
Denmark  -  -  - 100.0 110.1 113.5 115.3  - 
Estonia  -  -  - 100.0 121.9 127.0 135.2  - 
Finland  -  -  - 100.0 110.4 110.9 113.2  - 
Germany  -  -  -  - 102.4 101.9 102.6 104.1 
Hungary  -  -  - 100.0 110.9 116.6 124.5 129.1 
India  186.3 151.7 134.3 100.0  73.4 104.4  -  - 
Ireland  85.2 86.5 93.7  100.0  141.8  149.2  152.8  155.6 
Japan  -  -  - 100.0 103.6 105.9 106.4 106.8 
Korea  32.4 42.2 71.0  100.0  117.3 119.8 130.6 137.3 
Luxembourg  -  - 102.5 100.0 101.9  99.9 101.6 102.5 
Malaysia  - 85.1 80.0  100.0  118.6  129.1  -  - 
Malta  -  -  -  - 100.0 100.9 103.3 103.6 
Netherlands  79.3 78.2 85.4  100.0  107.1  -  -  - 
Portugal  - -  97.6  100.0 - - - - 
Singapore  -  -  73.5 100.0 134.4 136.7 138.8 143.0 
Slovakia  - 30.8 30.6  100.0  109.9  112.9  117.2  116.0 
Slovenia  -  - 113.1 100.0 117.0 119.5 122.1 124.4 
Spain  70.7 78.6 91.9  100.0  104.3  -  -  - 
Sweden  94.5  90.8 100.3 100.0 101.7 102.5 103.2 104.6 
Taiwan,  China  -  -  81.5 100.0 111.1 109.7 109.7  - 
UK  -  -  91.4 100.0 111.7 115.8 118.8 121.0 
US  108.9 109.5 102.3 100.0 102.7 102.9 105.0  - 
Source: ILO Key Indicators of the Labour Market database. 
 
•  Minimum wages might have been expected to be especially threatened, as they 
tend to be paid to the least qualified workers and are most susceptible to 
competition from unskilled workers in other parts of the world, but here too the 
evidence is that rates have been maintained (Figure 6.3). Seven EU member states 
achieve the social aims of minimum wages through collective agreements, rather 
than by government intervention. ILO data suggest that the rates set are 
comparable to those of peers with similar levels of GDP per head. Insofar as 
women are more likely than men are to be paid the minimum wage or just above 
it, the absence of downward pressure on minimum wages has meant that a 
possible threat to the incomes of working women has not materialised. 
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Figure 6.3 Minimum wages compared with the EU highest (PPS index, Luxembourg=100) 
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* French PPS adjustments appeared to change in 2003, markedly reducing PPS value in the 
latter two years. 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
•  Minimum wages are also a feature of most major global competitor nations, 
including China, the US and India. Table 6.5, derived from information collated 
by the ILO, sets out the characteristics of minimum wage provisions in a number 
of these nations. The data suggest that minimum wages are more a feature of 
domestic policy considerations than pressures of globalisation. Thus, in the US, 
the minimum wage set at the federal level has remained unchanged for nearly a 
decade, although individual states are free to set higher (but not lower) 
minimum wages, which many do, as in Canada. By contrast, China, Australia 
and many others upgrade the rate – in effect – annually.  
•  In a number of countries, an explicit social policy choice has been made to 
increase minimum wages at a faster rate than average earnings. Nevertheless, 
only in the UK and Poland are minimum wages high enough to take the net 
income after taxes and benefits of a single-earner family with two children (with 
one parent working full-time on minimum wages) above the poverty threshold 
of 60% of median income (European Commission, 2006f, section 3.3 and Figure 
3.4).  
•  Employment rates have been edging up in the EU in recent years, partly 
reflecting the priority given to raising the rate in the Lisbon strategy. The 
implication is that despite some of the threats emanating from competition from 
the rest of the world, notably to unskilled jobs, the dynamic of job creation has 
been sustained. Employment rates for women, although uniformly lower than 
those for men, have tended to increase more rapidly than for men in recent years 86 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
in most member states, rising by three percentage points in the period 2000–05. 
The only exceptions in this trend for the period were the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Slovakia and Sweden, whereas for men the EU-25 employment rate remained 
virtually unchanged. Half the member states had a fall in the men’s employment 
rate, including the three most populous ones. Yet despite recent increases, there 
remains a strikingly large gender gap in the employment rates of older workers; 
indeed, it is only in the Nordic countries that older women have had 
employment rates close to those of their male peers. Employment growth figures 
exhibit similar differences both between men and women and across countries. 
Indicators of lifelong learning suggest that women are more likely than men are 
t o  h a v e  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  t r a i n i n g .  T h i s  i s  t r u e  o f  e m p l o y e d  a n d  u n e m p l o y e d  
women. 
Table 6.5 Overview of minimum wage arrangements among key global competitors 
 Is  there  one?  Nature  National?  Level  Adjustment 
Australia Yes  Mixed  statutory 
and collective 
agreement 
National rate, but 
with an option for the 
state level to also set 
rate 
National  
$303 per week 
(2004) 
Annual, in 
practice 
Brazil  Yes  Set by law and 
universal 
Uniform, but with 
scope for higher 
negotiated levels 
$84 per month 
(2003–04) 
Formally, every 
three years; 
annual in practice 
Canada Yes  Statutory  Obligation  on 
provinces from 
federal law 
$5 per hour; varies 
among provinces 
(2004) 
No formal 
provision; annual 
revision of three-
year deal in 
Ontario 
China Yes  Responsibility 
of the state 
Set regionally  $23-77 per  month, 
varies by region 
(2003) 
At least every two 
years 
India Yes  Minimum 
Wages Act, 1948 
Applies mainly to 
non-unionised 
labour; otherwise 
collective agreements 
$1.1-2.0 per day for 
least skilled, 
varying between 
rural and urban 
(2001) 
At most every 
five years 
Japan  Yes  Mix of directed 
and negotiated 
Regional and sectoral 
rates 
$5.2-6.1 per hour, 
varies by prefecture 
(2003) 
No formal rule; 
annual in practice 
Korea  Yes  Set by the 
ministry, on 
proposal of 
wages council 
Provision for higher 
negotiated minimum 
rate 
$2.1 per hour (2004)  Annual 
Singapore  No  –  May be set in 
collective agreements 
– – 
Thailand Yes  Government 
sets rate on 
advice of wage 
committee 
National minimum, 
but provision for 
higher levels set by 
provinces 
$3.2-4.1 per day, 
varies by province 
(2003) 
At least annually 
US Yes  Fair  Labor 
Standards Act, 
1938 
National minimum, 
but states may set 
higher rates 
$5.15 per hour 
(1997) 
Not stipulated; 
not changed since 
1997 
Source: Derived from ILO labour statistics online. IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 87 
 
•  Since the two oil shocks of the 1970s, the rise in unemployment in the EU as a 
whole and its persistence has become a notable feature of the EU’s social 
landscape. Still, the aggregate disguises quite marked differences among member 
states, with some, such as Spain, managing to achieve sizeable reductions in 
unemployment, while others have struggled to contain it. Table 6.6 presents 
figures on the long-term unemployment rate, which shows the diversity of 
experience – possibly as a result of policy initiatives – with the rates having fallen 
sharply in some countries while rising in others. This suggests that globalisation 
cannot easily be advanced as a common cause. 
Table 6.6 Long-term unemployment rate (total men and women, % of labour force) 
  1992 1995  1998 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004  2005 
EU-25  n.a.  n.a.  4.4 3.9 3.8 3.9 4.1  4.1  3.9 
EU-15  n.a. 4.9  4.4 3.4 3.1 3.1 3.3  3.4  3.3 
Euro  area  n.a. 5.3  5 3.9 3.6 3.6 3.9  4  3.8 
              
Belgium  4 5.8  5.6 3.7 3.2 3.7 3.7  4.1  4.4 
Czech  Rep.  n.a.  n.a.  2 4.2 4.2 3.7 3.8  4.2  4.2 
Denmark  2.4  2  1.3 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.1  1.2  ||  1.1 
Germany  n.a. 3.9  4.5 3.7 3.7 3.9 4.5  5.4  5 
Estonia  n.a.  n.a.  4.2 5.9  6 5.4 4.6  5  4.2 
Greece  3.8 4.6  5.8 6.2 5.5 5.3 5.3  5.6  5.1 
Spain  7.1  10.3  7.5 4.6 3.7 3.7 3.7  3.4  ||  2.2 
France  3.4 4.4  4.5 3.5  3 3.1 3.7  3.9  3.9 
Ireland  9.2 7.6  3.9 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.6  1.6  1.5 
Italy  n.a. 7.1  6.8 6.3 5.7 5.1 4.9  4  3.9 
Cyprus  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 1.2 0.8 0.8  1  1.2  1.2 
Latvia  n.a.  n.a.  7.9 7.9 7.2 5.5 4.4  4.6  4.1 
Lithuania  n.a.  n.a.  7.5  8 9.3 7.2  6  5.8  4.3 
Luxembrg  0.4 0.7  0.9 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9  1.1  1.2 
Hungary  n.a.  n.a.  4.2 3.1 2.6 2.5 2.4  2.7  3.2 
Malta  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 4.4 3.7 3.3 3.2  3.4  3.4 
Netherlands  2.5 3.1  1.5 0.8 0.6 0.7  1  1.6  1.9 
Austria  n.a.  1  1.3  1 0.9 1.1 1.1  ||  1.3  1.3 
Poland n.a.  n.a.  4.7  7.4  9.2  10.9  11  10.3  10.2 
Portugal  1.3 3.1  ||  2.2 1.7 1.5 1.7 2.2  3  3.7 
Slovenia  n.a.  n.a.  3.3 4.1 3.7 3.5 3.5  3.2  3.1 
Slovakia  n.a. n.a.  6.5 10.3 11.3 12.2 11.4  11.8  11.7 
Finland  n.a.  n.a.  4.1 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.3  2.1  2.2 
Sweden  0.5  2.3 2.6  1.4 1 1 1 1.2  1.2 
UK  3.5 3.5  1.9 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1  1  1 
              
US  0.8 0.5  0.4 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7  0.7 n.a. 
Japan  0.3 0.6  0.8 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.8  1.6 n.a. 
Notes: || = break in series; n.a. = not available 
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•  The disincentive effects of social protection have been declining slightly in nearly 
all member states in recent years, but are still extremely high. For someone 
receiving unemployment benefits, in some cases, taking a low-paid job (half of 
average earnings) results in income loss because of benefit withdrawal (European 
Commission, 2006f, Table 3.1). 
•  There are similar, although less pronounced disincentives for the inactive, with 
the difference explained by the relatively higher (often time-limited) benefits 
paid to recently unemployed persons as opposed to the inactive.  
The  Joint Report (European Commission, 2006f) explores the determinants of 
demand for social protection and identifies key influences. Pensioners, as one of the 
main target groups of social protection, receive average per capita transfers more than 
double those of the population as a whole, so that the well-known problem of 
population ageing will add to the costs of social protection (assuming no shifts in 
policy). According to the report (ibid., p. 47), the projected costs of pensions, health 
care and long-term care will rise by 2.5 percentage points of GDP in the EU as a whole 
by 2030, from 17.9% to 20.4%. The average disguises large inter-country variations, 
with Cyprus, Portugal and Belgium all facing rises of more than double the average in 
pensions (the largest component), whereas the projections show scope for the pensions 
share in GDP to fall sharply in Poland. 
6.4  Poverty and inequality 
Within the EU, the latest data on poverty are for 2005 and show that, using a 60% 
threshold, the range of poverty risks remains substantial and has increased over time 
i n  s o m e  c a s e s .  I t  i s  h a r d  t o  a s c r i b e  t h e  c h a n g e s  t o  g l o b a l i s a t i o n ,  a b o v e  a l l  b e c a u s e  
examination of individual countries shows that the profile can be associated with 
specific economic developments or policy shifts, rather than there being a general 
pattern. For example, Finland endured a steep recession in the early 1990s, following 
the asymmetric shock of losing much of its trade with the former Soviet Union and the 
parallel banking crisis, and it is no surprise to see significant shifts in indicators. 
Similarly, the UK implemented a substantial welfare reform programme in the 1980s, 
also with consequences for indicators. A key concern identified in some of the 
literature on globalisation is that its impact will fall disproportionately on the poor and 
the least skilled. A number of general observations are germane: 
•  Indicators of social cohesion compiled by Eurostat as part of its structural 
indicators database provide extensive documentation of the incidence of poverty, 
although breaks in series and incomplete coverage make comparisons over time 
and across countries difficult. These detailed data show that the risk of poverty is 
higher among the youth and those aged 65 and over, and in all age groups tends 
to be higher for women than for men. Thus, the at-risk-of-poverty rate for 
women, after social transfers, for the EU-25 was 17% of the population in 2005 – a 
figure that has been stable over recent years – while for men the corresponding 
rate was 2 percentage points lower. There is substantial variation among member 
states in both the size of the risk and its trend: rates are highest in southern 
Europe and lowest in the Nordic countries. 
•  The data also show that the social protection system makes a pronounced 
difference. For the EU-25 as a whole, the at-risk-of-poverty rate before social IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 89 
 
transfers was 27% and the variation was surprisingly low among the member 
states; for men the pattern was similar.  
•  Absolute poverty, although difficult to define in a way that makes cross-country 
comparisons possible, has continued to fall across the developed world as real 
income has risen. The OECD notes that the fall in the decade to the mid-1990s 
was of the order of a third, with a further 25% fall in the following five years. 
This figure refers to changes in the poverty rate when the national poverty line 
remains constant in real terms to the value of the base year. These lines differ 
across countries, however.  
•  The long-run trend reported by the OECD (2005c, p. 32, Figure 2.5) is for the 
profile of poverty to change, with significant falls in poverty among older age 
groups, offset by some increases in child poverty. 
•  An international comparison, albeit one based on a different poverty threshold 
(50% rather than 60% of median income as is customary in the EU) shows that 
EU countries – generally – have lower poverty rates and smaller poverty gaps 
(the difference between the average income of the poor and the poverty line) 
than most other developed countries. Yet, there is very considerable variation, 
with the Mediterranean countries and Ireland recording high rates while the 
Nordic countries, Luxembourg and the Czech Republic have the lowest. 
Although the picture is not uniform, the majority of member states for which 
data covering longer periods are available reduced these two rates between the 
mid-1990s and the year 2000, the last for which comprehensive figures are 
reported. An obvious problem with these findings is that they are dated and 
subject to quite substantial problems of heterogeneity in definitions, but the fact 
that the relevant ratios are fairly stable over time can be interpreted as 
encouraging evidence that globalisation is not (or at least not so far) having a 
visible impact on indicators of poverty. 
•  There is some long-run evidence that inequality has been increasing among the 
OECD countries since the mid-1970s (Table 6.7 and Figure 6.4), but most of the 
increase occurred in the 20 years up to the mid-1990s and has since stabilised. 
The important role of social protection in reducing the risk of poverty emerges 
clearly in published data. Including pensions, reductions of between 46% (Ireland) and 
80% (Czech Republic) in the numbers at risk of poverty were achieved in 2003 through 
social protection, according to work by the OECD. Without pensions, the 
corresponding range is from 13% (Greece) to 64% (Denmark). Nevertheless, as Figure 
6.5 shows, there remains a substantial risk of poverty in a number of member states. 
After social transfers, it is highest in Poland, Lithuania and Portugal, followed by 
Greece and Spain – all with roughly twice the proportion of persons as in the best-
performing member states (the Czech Republic, Slovenia, the Nordic countries and the 
Netherlands, with a clutch of others not far behind). The Nordic countries are shown to 
be by far the most effective in reducing the risk of child poverty through social 
protection, whereas the Mediterranean countries do the least well, although many 
commentators sound a note of caution about the need to take account of benefits in 
kind. 
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Table 6.7 Changes in poverty rates over time 
   Poverty rates at 50% of median income  Trend  Poverty rates at 60% of median income  Trend 
   Mid-70s  Mid-80s  1990  Mid-90s  2000    Mid-70s  Mid-80s  1990  Mid-90s  2000   
Czech Rep.  –  –  3.2  4.3  4.3 –  –  –  8.1  9.9  9.7 – 
Sweden  3.9  3.4  3.7  3.7  5.3 –  9.6  7.5  8.9  7.9  10.8 – 
Denmark  –  5.3  –  3.8  4.3 Decreasing  –  12.7  –  10.4  11.6 Decreasing 
Netherlands  2.5  3.1  5.2  6.3  6.0 –  5.7  7.1  12.0  13.5  12.4 – 
Luxembourg  –  5.4  –  5.5  5.5 Stable  –  11.5  –  12.4  12.9 – 
Belgium  –  10.5  –  7.8  7.2  Decreasing  –  15.5  –  13.2  13.1  Decreasing 
France  –  8.0  7.2  7.5  7.0 Decreasing  –  13.7  14.4  13.5  13.4 Stable 
Finland  9.9  5.1  –  4.9  6.4 –  15.8  10.7  –  10.8  13.8 – 
Germany   –  –  –  8.3  8.9 –  –  –  –  13.8  14.0 – 
Hungary  –  –  6.3  7.4  8.2 –  –  –  12.9  14.4  14.4 – 
Germany (West)   –  7.4  7.2  8.9  9.5 –  –  13.3  13.1  14.5  14.6 – 
Austria  –  6.1  –  7.4  9.3 –  –  11.4  –  13.7  15.6 – 
Poland  –  –  –  9.9  9.8 –  –  –  –  16.2  16.3 – 
UK  6.4  6.9  14.2  10.9  11.4 –  13.0  17.6  22.2  19.5  19.2 – 
Italy  –  10.3  10.7  14.2  12.9 –  –  17.0  19.2  21.6  20.1 – 
Spain  –  15.0  11.4  12.6  12.1 Decreasing  –  21.3  17.2  19.6  20.2 Decreasing 
Greece  17.8  13.4  –  13.9  13.5 Stable  23.7  19.6  –  21.7  20.5 – 
Portugal  16.2  –  13.8  14.6  13.7 –  22.3  –  20.6  22.1  20.6 Stable 
Ireland  –  10.6  –  11.0  15.4 –  –  19.5  –  20.7  23.3 – 
                       
Norway  –  6.9  –  8.0  6.3 Decreasing  –  12.9  –  14.6  12.1 Decreasing 
Canada  14.4  10.7  –  9.5  10.3 Stable  20.1  17.3  –  15.9  17.1 Stable 
Australia  –  12.2  –  9.3  11.2 Decreasing  –  21.0  –  18.8  20.2 Decreasing 
New Zealand  –  5.8  8.7  7.8  10.4 –  –  14.2  19.3  15.6  20.3 – 
US  15.4  17.9  18.1  16.7  17.1 Stable  21.2  23.8  24.2  23.8  23.7 Stable 
Japan  –  11.9  –  13.7  15.3 –  –  17.9  –  19.7  21.2 – 
                       
Mexico  –  20.7  –  21.7  20.3 Stable  –  27.6  –  27.7  26.9 Stable 
Turkey  –  16.4  –  16.2  15.9 Stable  –  24.3  –  23.4  22.7 Decreasing 
Source: Förster & d’Ercole (2005).IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 91 
 
Figure 6.4 Trends in the distribution of equivalised household income (OECD average, index) 
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Notes: Gini coefficient of income inequality, an average of 17 OECD countries in the mid-1980s, mid-1990s and 
2000. Changes over the period from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s are based on the average values for 
only 7 OECD countries. The Gini coefficient is defined as the area between the Lorenz curve (which plots 
cumulative shares of the population, from the poorest to the richest, against the cumulative shares of 
income that they receive) and the 45 line, taken as a ratio of the whole triangle. Its values range between 0 
in the case of ‘perfect equality’ (each share of the population receives the same share of income) and 100 in 
the case of ‘perfect inequality’ (all income goes to the share of the population with the highest income). 
Source: Reproduced from OECD (2005c), based on a questionnaire to member countries. 
Figure 6.5 At-risk-of-poverty rate for the EU-25, 2005 
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Many of the foregoing observations assume that social benefits are fully taken 
up, which is not always a reasonable assumption. For instance, there are systematic 
differences (resulting from the nature of social protection systems) among member 
states in the degree to which the unemployed receive benefits they are entitled to as a 
direct result of job loss, ranging from hardly any in Italy to over 70% in Belgium and 
Denmark. Some insights into the relative positions of different member states can be 
obtained by cross-tabulating poverty and inequality indicators, as in Table 6.8 
reproduced from the European Commission’s (2006f) Joint Report. 
Table 6.8 Conjunction of poverty gaps and poverty risks 
   At-risk-of-poverty headcount 
   Low Medium  High 
  Low  CZ, SI, DK, LU, FI,   CY, LT  UK, IE 
At risk    SE, HU, NL, AT, FR     
of poverty  Medium   BE,  LV,  PL  EE 
intensity       
  High      IT, EL, ES,  
       PT,  SK 
Notes: Member states are classified as having a medium at-risk-of-poverty headcount (or rate) and at-risk-
of-poverty intensity (or gap) if the corresponding figure is respectively within +/- 1 point from the 
EU average. The highlighted member states are those with a higher than average risk of poverty. 
Source: European Commission (2006f), Table 1.1. 
Child poverty 
Child poverty has recently come to the forefront as a problem of growing concern in 
the EU, becoming a policy priority for the EU as a whole as well as for most member 
states. In a majority of member states, the at-risk-of-poverty indicator for children 
exceeds the national average, the exceptions being the Nordic countries, Slovenia and 
Cyprus. The intensity of poverty or the poverty gap (which compares the average well-
being of those at risk of poverty with the poverty line) follows similar patterns, with 
the Nordic countries again revealed to have the lowest poverty gaps, along with the 
Czech Republic and Luxembourg. It is important to recall, however, that these data 
relate to country median incomes and that if an EU median were used, the picture 
would be very different. 
In a recently published study using the Luxembourg Income Survey, Heuveline 
& Weinshenker (2008) examine whether it is the demography of countries that 
accounts for differences in child poverty rates (see Table 6.9), but find that it is instead 
the “anti-poverty effectiveness of tax and transfer policy” that accounts for the 
differences. They conclude that the high incidence of child poverty, especially in 
households headed by single women, is amenable to policy action, the implication of 
which is that globalisation per se is not a convincing explanatory factor. Still, it should 
be noted that these comparisons rely exclusively on monetary incomes, and thus 
ignore the substantial – and considerably different across countries – role played by 
transfers in kind (for example, in the case of children, the existence of free childcare 
services).  IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 93 
 
Table 6.9 Actual child poverty rates by household type – Selected economies 
  Household type 
Country   All 
Married 
couple 
Co-
habiting 
couple 
Single 
male 
head 
Single 
female head, 
no other 
adults 
Single 
female head 
and other 
adults 
US (2000)  22  13.9  29.7  25.6  55.4  36.9 
Australia (1994)  16  12.1  *  25.8  51.6  27.2 
Belgium (1997)  7.7  7  10.9  19  9.3  12.2 
Canada (2000)  14.9  10.4  14.4  13.3  48.3  16.8 
Estonia (2000)  13.6  10.2  15.5  10.9  27.3  15.2 
Finland (2000)  2.8  1.9  3  2.1  9  0 
France (1994)  7.9  5.2  11.7  13.3  27.3  19 
Germany (2000)  9  4.1  12  10  42.1  11.3 
Netherlands (1999)  9.8  6.6  15.9  11  38.4  16 
Norway (2000)  3.4  2.1  1.6  5.4  11.6  8.6 
Poland (1999)  12.7  12.2  *  10.5  20.1  15.1 
Russia (2000)  23.4  20.7  30.6  16.6  41  24.9 
Slovenia (1999)  6.9  5.6  7.4  16.8  28.8  14.4 
Sweden (2000)  4.2  2.3  2.3  4.2  13.5  7.1 
UK (1999)  15.3  9.2  15  21.4  37.3  9.8 
* For Australia and Poland, no distinction is made between married and cohabiting couples. 
Source: Heuveline & Weinshenker (2008), using Luxembourg Income Survey data. 
Main implications 
The implication of the figures presented in this section is that global pressures have not 
prevented the welfare system from achieving a considerable reduction in poverty and 
(although the caveat about the reliability and comparability of data over the years 
needs to be repeated) it is noteworthy that there is no systematic evidence of 
worsening poverty ratios in recent years. A second inference to draw is that the design 
of social protection systems has a marked influence on the incidence of poverty, 
highlighting the importance for the EU of building on the policy diversity among 
member states to arrive at optimal solutions. 
In the discussion of poverty and inequality, it is obvious that the fact that there is 
little or no sign that globalisation has aggravated the position does not mean that it 
may not do so in future. Equally, it is reassuring to note that social protection systems 
have been able to cope with the challenges to date. We return to these questions in a 
more analytic exercise in chapter 8. 
6.5  Gender effects of globalisation in the labour market 
In the ILO (2004) study of the social impact of globalisation, a key finding was that 
women were more affected than men were. Many of the worst social consequences for 
women, for example in relation to health or basic subsistence, are far removed from the 
circumstances of the EU. Even so, it might be hypothesised that other aspects of the 
drive towards gender equality in the EU could be compromised by globalisation, 
notably in the labour market. A clear example is in unemployment, where in the EU-25 
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women than for men since 2000. To the extent that some of the unemployment is 
attributable to global competitive pressures, a tenuous connection between 
globalisation and gender can by inferred. The gap has been diminishing, however: in 
2000, it was 2.6 points, but by 2005, it was down to 1.6 points.  
Long-term unemployment for women has generally been higher than for men, 
although here too the gap is diminishing (Table 6.10). Overall, the long-term 
unemployment rate for women is consistently higher than the total rate (shown in 
Table 6.6, above), although the disparity has been edging downwards. The aggregates 
disguise quite substantial differences, with the three Mediterranean countries (Greece, 
Italy and Spain) standing out. Women’s unemployment in Greece has been some two 
and a half times that of men in recent years, and in Spain it has tended to be double. 
But in Spain and Italy the gap has been narrowing, coming down from 10.8 points in 
Spain in 2000 to 5.2 points in 2005 (a period when unemployment in Spain fell 
substantially), and in Italy falling from 6.4 points above that of men in 2000 to 3.9 
points by 2005.   
Table 6.10 Long-term unemployment rates for women (% of labour force) 
  1992 1995  1998 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004  2005 
EU-25 –    –    5.5 4.8 4.6 4.6 4.7  4.7  4.5 
EU-15  –    6.1  5.5 4.3 3.8 3.8 3.9  4.0  3.7 
Euro area  –   7.3  6.6  5.2  4.6  4.6  4.8  4.9  4.5 
Belgium  5.8 7.7  7.1 4.6 3.5 4.3 4.2  4.7  5.0 
Czech Rep.  –   –   2.6 5.2 5.1 4.6 5.0  5.3  5.3 
Denmark  2.8 2.2  1.7 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0  1.3  1.2 
Germany  –    5.5  6.0 4.6 4.6 4.8 5.2  6.1  ||  5.4 
Estonia –    –    4.1 5.0 5.4 4.4 4.4  4.4  4.2 
Greece  7.2 8.1  10.0  10.2 9.1 8.6 8.9  9.4  8.9 
Spain  13.3  16.4  11.6 7.4 6.0 5.9 5.7  5.1  ||  3.4   
France  4.4 5.3  5.3 4.3 3.6 3.5 4.1  4.3  4.4 
Ireland  8.4 6.7  2.8 1.0 0.8 0.8 1.0  1.0  0.8 
Italy  –    10.0  9.1 8.4 7.6 6.9 6.6  5.5  5.2 
Cyprus –    –    –    2.2 1.2 1.0 1.3  1.6  1.8 
Latvia –    –    7.5 7.5 6.3 4.6 4.4  4.3  3.7 
Lithuania –    –    7.0 6.5 7.7 6.8 6.0  6.2  4.5 
Luxembourg  0.5 1.0  1.1 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.9  1.4  1.2 
Hungary –    –    3.8 2.5 2.1 2.2 2.3  2.6  3.2 
Malta –    –    –    4.2 2.7 2.4 2.4  2.9  3.2 
Netherlands  3.3 3.4  1.8 1.0 0.7 0.9 1.1  1.6  1.9 
Austria  –    1.5  1.8 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1  ||  1.4  1.4 
Poland –    –    6.3  9.1 10.8 12.3 11.7  11.0  11.4 
Portugal  1.3 3.2 ||  8 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.7  3.4  4.2 
Slovenia –    –    3.3 4.2 4.0 3.6 3.6  3.4  3.3 
Slovakia –    –    7.1 10.2 11.3 12.5 11.7  12.4  12.3 
Finland –    –    3.9 2.7 2.3 2.0 2.0  2.0  1.9 
Sweden  0.1 1.0  1.8 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8  1.0  1.0 
UK  2.1 2.0  1.2 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7  0.6  0.7 
US  0.6 0.5  0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6  0.6  –   
Japan  0.2 0.3  0.5 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2  1.0  –   
Note: || break in series 
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The disparities are still disturbing, but an inference might be that globalisation 
has at least not worsened the gap between men and women and it appears to have 
coincided with a reduction. It is noteworthy that this relative improvement has been 
against the backdrop of a significantly more rapid increase in the supply of labour of 
w o me n  th a n  t h a t  o f  m e n . 47 I n  n e a r l y  a l l  m e m b e r  s t a te s ,  t h e  a n n u a l  i n c r e a s e  i n  t he  
labour supply of women was consistently above that of men between 2000 and 2005. 
Part of the explanation may be that women are more likely than men are to work in 
services, a sector generally less exposed to the competitive pressures of globalisation.  
There remain sizeable gender differences in many other relevant gender 
indicators. In particular, the gender pay gap, shown in Figure 6.6, reveals that there has 
been some narrowing in pay differences, but that the spread among EU member states 
is still substantial. Again, however, the pressures of globalisation do not seem to have 
prevented progress, although the slow pace of change should still be noted in some 
cases. Data on the risk of poverty in work suggest that there is not much difference 
between men and women, but that the risk varies hugely from one member state to 
another. Women are more likely than men are to live in households in which no one 
works, however: in 2006, the ratio for the EU-25 was 8.8% for men and 10.8% for 
women. For both men and women, the indicator of jobless households is highest in 
Belgium and Poland, but is lowest in the Baltic countries for women and in southern 
European countries for men.  
Figure 6.6 Gender pay gap, 1995–2004 (% difference in average hourly earnings, as a 
percentage of men’s earnings, ranked by 2001 gap) 
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Source: Eurostat. 
                                                      
47 See the European Commission’s database of indicators for monitoring the employment 
guidelines (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment_strategy/ 
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6.6  Social policy and competitiveness 
One of the key challenges from globalisation is competitiveness and here the financing 
of the social protection system is germane. The 2006 Joint Report reveals that social 
charges on employers and employees continue to be the main source of financing for 
social protection, amounting on average to some 60% of the costs of social protection in 
2003 (European Commission, 2006f). Yet, as Figure 6.7 shows, the cross-country 
variation is enormous.  
General taxation is the main source of funding in Denmark, Ireland and Cyprus, 
with social charges contributing a third or less. The financing is roughly equally split 
between general taxation and social charges in the UK, Sweden, Poland, Finland, 
Portugal and Luxembourg. Then, there is a quantum leap to all the other member 
states, which rely predominantly on social charges.  
Moreover, even within the structure of social charges, big differences can be 
found: Denmark, for example, puts most of the burden on employees, whereas many 
other countries tend to look more towards employers. 
Figure 6.7 Financing of social protection, 2003 
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In relation to globalisation, it is also important to note that even where the cost of 
f i n a n c i n g  s o c i a l  p r o t e c t i o n  i s  p r e d o m i n a n t l y  m e t  b y  s o c i a l  c h a r g e s ,  i t  d o e s  n o t  
inevitably translate into a loss of competitiveness. Given that Danes spend much the 
same proportion of their GDP on social protection as other richer EU member states, 
the average Danish taxpayer can be expected to ask for higher nominal wages to 
c o m p e n s a t e  f o r  t h e  t a x  b u r d e n  t h a t  h e  o r  s h e  f a c e s  t o  f u n d  s o c i a l  p r o t e c t i o n .    
By contrast, for a Belgian or Estonian worker, relatively lower pre-tax wages will be 
worth more in terms of spending power because the general tax burden is ceteris 
paribus lighter as a result of financing social protection through social charges. In short, 
the revenue neutrality of different funding approaches needs to be kept in mind.  
Equally, the overall choices a country makes about how much public expenditure 
to undertake will also affect the competitive position, although the effect will depend 
crucially on how the money is spent. Here again, there is no simple answer, since the 
evidence shows that countries that devote both high (Sweden) and low (Ireland and 
several of the recently acceded member states) shares of GDP to public spending fare 
well. 
Nevertheless, microeconomic factors may intrude and it is possible that 
globalisation pressures may have had an influence for the simple reason that the 
‘wedge’ between wages and labour costs can adversely affect competitiveness in 
certain markets. To a limited extent, the trend in gross social charges has been towards 
a reduction, reflecting a combination of financing changes and welfare reform.  
Vulnerability to globalisation and opportunities to benefit from it can partly be 
gauged by the relative specialisation of a member state. Broadly, it would be expected 
that member states that rely most heavily on segments of economic activity for which 
the EU is losing its competitive position would face more acute problems than those 
that are relatively specialised in growth sectors. Starting with the major aggregates, 
Tables 6.11 and 6.12 show the longer-term trends. Total employment in nearly all the 
countries included in the OECD’s STAN database was substantially higher in 2003 than 
in 1995, and for those countries for which consistent data are available, it can be seen 
that the growth over the last three decades has been considerable. Disaggregation into 
broad sectors shows nonetheless that the tertiary sector has been responsible for most 
of the job creation. Even high- and medium-high technology industries have seen a 
decline in share in most OECD countries (Table 6.13). 
With respect to job losses, the EPC also reports a mixed story about the resilience 
of the EU in response. Table 6.14, reproduced from the EPC study, suggests that the US 
has been better at re-employing workers, whereas the EU-15 manages to provide re-
employed workers with a higher income. Table 6.15 shows the overall trends in 
unemployment benefit replacement rates as computed by the OECD in a complicated 
exercise to average among different sorts of claimants. These rates vary substantially 
across EU member states, but they have also been surprisingly stable in most cases, 
suggesting that they are not a significant consideration in competitiveness. It is, 
however, noteworthy that there is a big gap between the most generous countries and 
those OECD members that might be labelled ‘Anglo-Saxon’. 
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Table 6.11 Changes in levels of employment 1995–2003 (total employment headcount, %) 
 
Agriculture,  
hunting,  
forestry and 
fishing 
Total 
manu. 
Textiles, 
textile prod., 
leather & 
footwear 
Wood and 
products of 
wood & cork 
Machinery 
and 
equipment 
Wholesale 
& retail 
Finance, 
insurance 
& real  
estate 
Community, 
social and 
personal 
services 
Total 
services 
Business 
sector 
services Total 
 Austria  -6.8  -7.1  -35.3  -12.4  -2.4  6.5  50.8  11.7  15.4  17.8  6.1 
 Belgium  -12.6  -9.5  -32.2  -13.3  -13.2  1.2  27.9  15.6  13.6  12.0  7.8 
 Czech Rep.  -37.7  1.3  -27.1  4.5  7.8  -4.3  16.6  -0.5  0.8  1.5  -5.2 
 Denmark  -16.3  -11.4  -42.3  -15.4  -5.8  11.8  24.6  9.4  11.5  13.5  5.9 
 Finland  -24.8  6.3  -21.7  3.0  16.2  23.5  38.6  18.4  21.3  24.3  14.8 
 France  -9.0  -1.9  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  15.0  29.8  9.9  17.0  23.4  9.9 
 Germany  -18.5  -8.3  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  7.2  36.9  8.5  12.2  14.9  2.5 
 Greece  -17.9  -9.2  -18.9  -12.9  6.8  12.4  33.2  11.3  13.4  14.7  4.1 
 Hungary  -27.1  8.9  -15.3  6.3  29.7  20.1  59.2  4.5  12.7  20.3  8.3 
 Ireland  -19.1  13.6  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  49.9  82.6  40.9  54.5  65.2  41.2 
 Italy  -18.7  1.4  -15.3  -2.5  9.3  14.5  43.6  9.5  16.6  22.2  10.4 
 Luxembourg  -13.3  -1.2  -27.3  n.a.  2.1  21.6  84.2  37.8  48.8  53.7  36.0 
 Netherlands  -4.8  -3.5  -30.8  10.0  3.5  15.6  33.2  20.6  21.7  22.5  16.1 
 Poland  1.5  -20.4  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  19.9  52.4  3.0  12.4  19.2  -0.9 
 Portugal  -9.3  0.5  -14.3  -4.6  17.9  20.4  20.6  19.6  19.1  18.7  11.7 
Spain -10.8  16.7  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  23.3  45.8  20.7  25.2  28.7  22.6 
Slovak Rep.  -51.8  -10.5  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  47.6  21.8  -4.4  11.5  26.3  -2.2 
UK -24.7  -17.0  -54.9  -11.2  -21.9  10.5  26.0  13.6  15.7  17.0  9.3 
                      
EU-18 -11.0  -5.2  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  13.2  34.5  11.4  15.9  19.3  8.1 
                      
Canada -19.6  11.2  -0.7  7.4  13.0  19.4  40.3  11.2  19.4  24.6  16.7 
US 1.1  -14.5  -48.0  -8.2  -20.3  9.2  16.2  15.5  13.4  11.8  9.6 
Japan -19.0  -17.6  -46.7  -31.7  -15.3  -1.4  -3.3  15.0  5.9  -1.4  -2.5 
Korea -18.9  -12.7  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  8.1  49.8  45.2  25.8  18.7  8.4 
Source: OECD STAN database, 2005 edition.IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 99 
 
Table 6.12 Share of manufacturing in total employment, selected OECD countries 
(headcount, %) 
  1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003  Change 
1995–2003 
Austria  22.9 20.9 19.9 17.7 16.5 16.2  16 15.7 15.5  -2.2 
Belgium  23.6 21.4 19.7 17.6 16.6 15.9 15.8 15.2 14.7  -2.9 
Czech  Rep.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 28.4 30.8 29.3 30.4 30.6 30.7  2.3 
Denmark  20.3 20.2 19.3 18.5 17.0 16.6 16.3 15.8 15.4  -3.1 
Finland  24.7 22.5 20.3 20.1 20.1 20.0 19.8 19.3 18.7  -1.4 
France  23.6 21.1 19.2 17.1 16.3 15.7 15.6 15.2 n.a.  -1.9* 
Germany  31.3 29.2 28.4 22.6 21.6 20.9 20.9 20.5 20.2  -2.4 
Greece  n.a. n.a. n.a. 16.4 15.8 15.3 15.3 14.8 14.3  -2.1 
Hungary  n.a. n.a. n.a. 23.5 24.8 24.3 24.8 24.8 23.6  0.1 
Ireland  21.1 18.8 19.4 19.4 18.9 17.7 17.2 16.2 15.6  -3.8 
Italy  29.1 25.3 24.6 23.4 23.1 22.3 21.9 21.7 21.5  -1.9 
Luxembourg  - 22.7 19.2 15.3 13.9 12.5 12.0 11.6 11.1  -4.2 
Netherlands  19.6 17.8 17.0 14.9 13.9 13.4 13.0 12.7 12.4  -2.5 
Poland  n.a. n.a. n.a. 21.1 19.7 18.2 17.7 17.3 n.a.  -3.8* 
Portugal  25.3 24.2 23.6 21.8 21.0 20.4 20.2 19.7 19.6  -2.2 
Slovak  Rep.  -  -  - 27.3 26.6 25.6 25.4 25.3 25.0  -2.3 
Spain  23.2 20.5 19.7 18.1 18.6 18.3 18.2 17.9 17.2  -0.9 
Sweden  22.8 20.9 19.4 18.2 18.3 17.5 17.3 16.8 16.4  -1.8 
UK  26.4 22.1 19.4 17.3 16.8 15.2 14.5 13.6 12.9  -4.4 
             
US  19.3 16.9 15.1 13.8 13.1 12.7 12.1 11.3 10.8  -3.0 
Canada  19.1 16.7 15.6 14.2 14.3 14.5 14.2 13.7 13.5  -0.7 
Japan  23.1 23.4 23.2 20.6 19.4 18.7 18.4 17.7 17.4  -3.2 
             
Mexico  -  - 12.6 11.2 12.3 12.8 12.2 11.5 11.1  -0.1 
Korea  22.7 24.3 27.9 23.6 19.7 20.3 19.8 19.1 19.0  -4.6 
* Change up to 2002 for France and Poland 
Source: OECD STAN database, 2005 edition. 
Table 6.13 Share in total employment of high- and medium-high technology industries 
  1990 1995 2001 2002 2003 
Austria  6.3 5.5 5.3 5.3 5.2 
Belgium  6.9 6.1 5.7 5.4 5.2 
Denmark 6.6  6.5 5.9 5.7 5.6 
Finland  6.3 7.3 7.6 7.3 7.0 
France  6.7 5.9 5.5 5.4  n.a. 100 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
Table 6.13 Continued 
Germany 13.9  10.3  10.1  9.8  n.a. 
Greece -  2.5  2.4  2.3  2.2 
Hungary -  7.3  8.6  8.5  8.3 
Ireland 6.4  7.7  7.8  7  n.a. 
Italy 7.5  6.9  6.7  6.6  6.5 
Luxembourg 3.1  2.9  2.4  2.3  2.2 
Netherlands 5.7  4.6  4.2  4.1  4.0 
Portugal 3.6  3.2  3.3  3.1  3.1 
Slovak Republic  -  9.2  8.0  -  n.a. 
Spain 5.4  4.9  5.1  5.0  n.a. 
Sweden 7.7  7.7  7.7  7.5  7.2 
UK 7.4  6.3  5.5  5.1  4.8 
         
US 5.6  5.0  4.4  4.1  3.8 
Canada 4.6  4.3  4.0  3.9  3.9 
Japan 9.1  8.1  7.6  7.4  7.3 
         
Mexico 3.8  3.5  4.2  3.9  3.8 
Korea 10.3  10.0  9.2  n.a.  n.a. 
Source: OECD STAN database, 2005 edition. 
Table 6.14 Labour market responses to displaced workers (%) 
         EU-15 1994–2001  US 1979–99 
  High competition 
manu. 
Total 
manu. 
Services High  competition 
manu. 
Total 
manu. 
Services 
Share re-employed 
two years later 
52 57  57  63  65  69 
Share with no 
earnings loss 
or better 
44 46  50  36  35  41 
Share with 
earnings loss of 
30% or more 
5 7  8  25  25  21 
Notes: Columns relate to manufacturing with high levels of international competition, total manufacturing and 
services (including utilities for the US).  
Source: Reproduced from EPC (2005). 
Moreover, there is evidence that the generosity of unemployment insurance is 
positively associated with more stable employment prospects after re-employment 
(Tatsiramos, 2006). Whether these are direct trade-offs is a matter for conjecture, not 
least because the underlying performance of the economy will tend to have a greater 
effect on re-employment prospects than the detailed type of unemployment insurance.  IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 101 
 
Table 6.15 The OECD summary measure of benefit entitlements, 1961–2003 
   1961 1971 1975 1981 1985 1987 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 
Netherlands  13 48 48 48 55 57 53 53 52 52 52 53 53 
Denmark  20 34 39 54 53 49 52 51 65 62 61 51 50 
Belgium  42 41 47 45 43 43 42 40 39 40 39 38 42 
Portugal  0  0  5  9 22 31 34 35 35 35 45 41 41 
France  25 24 26 31 34 38 38 38 37 37 37 44 39 
Ireland  17 17 21 28 28 30 29 31 26 29 29 36 38 
Finland  5  8 24 24 34 36 39 38 36 34 34 35 36 
Spain  9 12 21 28 34 34 34 32 39 39 38 36 36 
Italy  4 2 2 1 0 0 3  17  19  18  34  34  34 
Austria  20 23 21 29 29 28 31 27 33 32 33 32 32 
Germany  30 29 29 29 28 28 29 28 26 26 27 30 29 
Sweden  4  6 22 25 28 30 29 28 27 27 24 24 24 
UK  24 25 22 24 21 19 18 19 18 18 17 17 16 
Greece  6 6 6 6 7 8  13  13  15  16  17  13  13 
               
Norway  4  5  8 29 39 39 39 39 39 39 41 42 34 
Switzerland  2  1  3 13 22 22 22 30 30 34 37 38 33 
New  Zealand  42 26 28 29 31 33 30 30 27 32 29 28 28 
Australia  17 14 22 22 24 25 26 27 27 27 25 25 22 
               
Canada  14 13 20 18 19 19 19 19 19 15 15 15 15 
US  7 11 12 15 15 11 11 12 12 14 14 14 14 
Japan  12 13 13  9 10 10 10 10 10 11 12  9  8 
Note: The OECD summary measure is defined as the average of the gross unemployment-benefit replacement rates for 
two earnings levels, three family situations and three durations of unemployment.  
Source: OECD, Social Expenditure Database.  
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7.  GLOBALISATION AND MIGRATION 
n Europe, the coexistence of high unemployment rates, an ageing population and 
tensions in the social protection systems raises many questions concerning the 
design of an appropriate immigration policy. Recently, migration has often been 
considered both a threat and an opportunity. From the latter perspective, it can be seen 
as an instrument to overcome specific shortages of labour supply in the host country 
and to counteract population ageing. In this context, migration can contribute to the 
rescue of the existing social welfare systems, especially of public pension and health 
insurance schemes.  
The evidence suggests that the skills of non-EU immigrants in EU member states 
are usually complementary to the skills of domestic workers, leading to positive effects 
on economic activity in the host country (Faini et al., 1999). Yet, immigrants are usually 
less integrated into society for a number of reasons, such as their cultural differences 
from the rest of the population, the fact that they are more often subject to racist 
behaviour and discrimination, and the existence of various legal restrictions that do not 
apply to EU citizens. In addition, a significant share of non-EU migration is illegal, 
with important negative consequences both for the social integration of immigrants 
and for their impact on the social security system. Asylum seekers are a further 
category that can stretch the resources of some countries. Indeed, in some of the new 
entry points in the EU (notably the Mediterranean member states), a lack of experience 
of immigration and limited capacity to deal with it has become a growing social 
difficulty. Cyprus and Malta are currently very exposed in this regard, but Italy too is 
under growing pressure (Begg & Marlier, 2007). 
In the case of Europe, two types of migration have to be distinguished: cross-
border movements within the EU and immigration from non-EU countries. Intra-EU 
migration is regulated by Art. 39 of the EC Treaty and is among the fundamental 
freedoms on which the EU is based, although with an extended transition period 
currently in effect for the recently acceded member states in a majority of EU-15 
countries. In contrast to intra-EU migration, immigration from non-EU countries is 
regulated by national law, which differs among the member states, although the EU 
member states have agreed to develop a legal framework for a common immigration 
policy at the EU level in the future. This chapter presents conceptual and empirical 
information on migration, highlighting the dilemmas it poses. It discusses the 
perceptions of migrants and provides an inventory of changing policy orientations 
towards migration, based on new research carried out by the Fondazione Rodolfo 
Debenedetti (fRDB) to construct a migration reform database. 
7.1  Migration: The background 
For some years now, net migration has contributed significantly to population changes 
in the EU. Indeed, according to rough estimates, illegal immigration into the EU 
amounts to 500,000 persons per year.  
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The immigrant population is on average younger than the native population. 
Furthermore, the personal characteristics of a migrant are crucial – not only for his/her 
motivation to migrate but also for the economic and fiscal effects of migration.  
Intra-EU-15 migrants show nearly the same employment rate as natives. The 
lowest employment rate is reported for the group of non-EU migrants. The 
employment rates of women are lower than are those of men. With regard to skills, 
internal migration and migration from non-EU countries are generally not substitutes. 
The difference stems from the varying skill profiles of EU-10 and non-EU migrants, 
with both groups offering skill mixes that differ from those of natives. The outcome 
could be a sound base for future economic growth, since these profiles are 
complementary.  
The eastern enlargement of the EU led to an increase in cross-border migration 
between the EU-8 and the EU-15. Still, the shares of EU-8 (the new member states from 
Central and Eastern Europe that acceded to the Union in 2004) and EU-10 nationals in 
the EU-15 member states remain relatively low. In general, EU-10 migration seems to 
follow labour market conditions. So far, transitional regulations concerning labour 
migration have been in place in several countries. Yet, the low degree of mobility can 
also be the result of favourable factors, such as the understandable preference for living 
in the home country, as reported in many EU member states. 
One important figure in this context is the amount of net migration. Most EU 
member states not only show considerable migration inflows, but also remarkable 
outflows, and for some years now net migration has contributed significantly to 
population changes in the EU.48 The effects of migration on changes in the total 
population differ widely among the EU member states – some of them, such as Poland 
and (for a long time) the Baltic States, have been reporting negative net migration rates. 
Without migration, several countries such as Germany, Italy and Greece would have 
reported a decrease in population some years ago. In 2005, nearly 70% of the net 
migration to the EU stemmed from migration to Spain, Italy and the UK (Table 7.1); net 
migration to France and Germany accounted for 6% respectively. 
In economic theory, it is assumed that migration is mainly determined by the 
chance to participate in the labour market of the host country. In practice, however, 
directly work-related migration accounts for a relatively small share of total migration 
(OECD, 2006b). In France, Sweden, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Italy, Finland 
and the UK, work-related migration amounted to less than 40% of total immigration in 
2004. Consequently, economic theory, which focuses on labour migration, can only 
explain a certain proportion of total immigration.49 
 
                                                      
48 By the 1990s, net migration had become the most prominent factor of population growth in 
m a n y  E U  m e m b e r  s t a t e s .  ( N e t  m i g r a t i o n  i s  the difference between immigration into and 
emigration from the areas during a given period.) See the European Commission’s (2003b) 
Communication on immigration, integration and employment. 
49 The OECD uses permit data on the reasons for entry. For EU citizens such permits are not 
necessarily required. The data exclude illegal migrants.  
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Table 7.1 Net migration, including corrections (in thousands) 
   1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
EU-25  1,118.4  826.0  632.5  732.7  658.0  468.5  644.6  905.7  993.2  1,311.5  1,707.3  2,091.5 
EU-15  1,216.1  896.9  678.8  765.9  684.2  482.8  665.1  903.2  1,055.6  1,321.8  1,701.2  2,052.1 
Eurozone  1,139.9  763.0  533.2  608.6  556.8  377.4  429.3  716.1  852.6  1,096.9  1,534.2  1,755.9 
Belgium  25.7  18.3  17.3  1.8  15.1  9.8  11.6  16.7  12.9  35.7  40.5  35.6 
Czech Rep.  11.8  5.5  10.0  9.9  10.2  12.0  9.5  8.8  -28.0  -8.5  12.3  25.8 
Denmark  11.6  11.4  10.5  28.6  17.5  12.1  11.0  9.4  10.1  12.0  9.6  7.0 
Germany  776.3  462.4  315.6  398.3  281.5  93.4  47.0  202.1  167.8  274.8  218.8  142.2 
Estonia  -41.5  -28.3  -20.9  -15.6  -13.4  -6.9  -6.7  -1.1  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.0 
Greece  94.5  86.5  78.1  77.3  70.9  61.5  54.8  45.1  29.3  37.8  38.0  35.8 
Spain  54.2  59.2  54.7  60.4  73.5  83.6  148.8  227.3  378.5  427.8  649.9  738.5 
France  36.5  16.5  -3.5  -14.5  -18.5  -13.5  -6.5  45.0  50.1  60.4  65.1  55.0 
Ireland  1.7  -3.4  -3.0  6.0  15.9  17.4  16.2  24.3  31.5  38.8  32.7  31.3 
Italy  27.8  24.2  25.7  31.5  59.5  55.7  64.1  46.4  55.2  47.6  349.3  600.6* 
Cyprus  10.7  8.7  7.0  6.6  6.0  5.5  4.2  4.2  4.0  4.6  6.9  12.4 
Latvia  -53.5  -32.4  -22.8  -13.8  -10.1  -9.4  -5.8  -4.1  -5.4  -5.2  -1.8  -0.9 
Lithuania  -24.5  -24.0  -24.2  -23.7  -23.4  -22.4  -22.1  -20.7  -20.3  -2.5  -1.9  -6.3 
Luxembourg  4.1  3.9  3.8  4.3  3.5  3.6  3.8  4.4  3.5  3.3  2.6  2.1 
Hungary  18.5  18.2  18.0  17.8  17.8  17.5  17.3  16.8  16.7  9.8  3.5  15.5 
Malta  0.9  1.0  1.0  -0.2  0.7  0.6  0.4  0.5  9.9  2.2  2.0  1.8 
Netherlands  43.2  44.5  20.4  15.0  21.3  30.5  44.1  43.9  57.0  56.0  27.6  7.0 
Austria  71.5  33.5  3.1  2.1  3.9  1.5  8.5  19.8  17.2  43.5  34.8  38.2 
Poland  -11.6  -16.8  -19.0  -18.2  -12.8  -11.7  -13.2  -14.0  -19.6  -16.8  -18.0  -13.8 
Portugal  -4.5  8.4  17.3  22.3  26.2  29.4  32.3  38.0  47.1  64.9  70.1  63.5 
Slovenia  -5.5  -4.5  0.0  0.8  -3.5  -1.4  -5.5  10.9  2.7  4.9  2.2  3.6 
Slovakia  -2.9  1.7  4.7  2.9  2.2  1.8  1.3  1.5  -22.4  1.1  0.9  1.4 
Finland  9.1  9.1  3.7  4.2  4.0  4.8  4.5  3.4  2.4  6.1  5.2  5.8 
Sweden  19.8  32.1  50.8  11.7  5.8  5.9  11.0  13.6  24.5  28.6  30.9  28.7 
UK  44.8  90.2  84.2  117.0  104.0  87.4  213.8  164.2  168.5  184.3  126.4  260.5 
  * These figures are largely the result of the legalisation of a large number of ‘undeclared’ immigrants. 
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According to the OECD, the most important motivations for migration are family 
reunification (accompanying the worker) and migration for humanitarian reasons. 
Because of the Balkan war and other factors, the number of asylum seekers increased 
tremendously during the 1990s. For the EU-15 as a whole, this development reached its 
peak in 2000, but some member states, such as the UK, have seen further increases in 
asylum seekers since then. Recently, many countries have reported a decline in the 
number of asylum seekers, owing not only to the end of the Balkan war, but also to 
changes in the legal framework. Family reunification also plays an important role in 
the case of intra-EU migration. A recent study based on data provided by PIONEUR, a 
new research project on migration, shows that 30% move because of their partner or 
family, 24% because they are searching for a better quality of life and 25% for 
employment.50 The pull factors differ among the EU member states, however: in France 
and Spain, it is quality of life; in Italy, it is a partner or family; and in Germany and the 
UK, it is work and study.  
The relatively high share of migration unrelated to employment tends to be 
reflected in the employment rates of migrants. Table 7.2 distinguishes among natives, 
migrants from the EU-15, those from the EU-10 and non-EU migrants. Comparing 
employment rates between EU nationals and non-nationals gives some insights into 
the relative position of migrants on the labour market. First, intra-EU-15 migrants have 
much the same employment rate as natives. Second, focusing on the EU-25, the lowest 
employment rate is reported for the group of non-EU migrants, whose employment 
rate is 10 percentage points lower than that of EU nationals. But a closer look at this 
figure reveals that this aggregate number results from the fact that, in the EU-15, the 
employment rate of non-EU nationals is much lower than that of natives. A 
comparable effect is not reported for the EU-10, where the employment rate of non-EU 
nationals is even higher than that of nationals. This outcome might be explained by 
different types of migration, variations in the design of the selection processes or in the 
legal frameworks. Still, it is a common feature of migration that the employment rate 
for migrants is lower than it is for nationals. 
About 45% of all migrants entering the EU-15 are women. While most of the 
member states reported a share of nearly 50% of women, in Germany the immigration 
of men significantly exceeded that of women (Eurostat, 2003). Women’s employment 
rates are usually lower than employment rates for men. This tendency also holds true 
for immigrants (Table 7.3). Even so, there exists a gap in women’s labour participation 
between natives and migrants in many European countries. In Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Finland, France, the Netherlands and Sweden the participation rate of 
migrant women is lower than that of native women by about 10 percentage points or 
more (OECD, 2006b, p. 71). Integrating foreign women into the labour market seems to 
be a special problem. A gender analysis of unemployment rates shows that migrant 
women are more likely to be confronted with unemployment than migrant men are. 
The unemployment rate among migrant women is extraordinarily high in Finland 
                                                      
50 See the European Commission’s website (http://europa.eu/rapid/searchResultAction.do? 
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(31%), France (22%) and Belgium (18%). The comparable figures for migrant men are 
21% in Finland, 14% in France and 15% in Belgium.  
Table 7.2 Employment rates by nationality, 2005  
Country of destination  National  EU-15  EU-10  Non-EU 
Belgium 62  60  55  35 
Germany 67  68  51  48 
Greece 60  53  47  71 
Spain 62  64  78  71 
France 64  69  62  44 
Ireland 67  69  85  57 
Netherlands 74  76  64  41 
Austria 69  72  66  60 
Finland 69  67  55  45 
Sweden 74  73  62  45 
UK 72  69  75  58 
      
EU-15 67  68  62  55 
EU-10 57  59  68  63 
EU-25 65  67  62  55 
Notes: Italy is excluded, since it does not disaggregate by nationality. Denmark, Luxembourg and Portugal 
are excluded owing to small sample size. 
Source: Eurostat, LFS, European Commission. 
Table 7.3 Employment rates of migrants by gender, 2004  
Country of destination  Migrants  Migrant women  Migrant men 
Belgium 60  49  71 
Germany 64  51  78 
Greece 73  57  87 
Spain 78  66  89 
France 65  52  77 
Ireland 65  53  80 
Netherlands 60  50  76 
Austria 69  57  79 
Finland 69  57  83 
Sweden 68  65  75 
UK 68  60  79 
Source: OECD (2006b). 
Figure 7.1 presents some insights into the relative skill and education level of 
immigrants in the EU-15. The question is whether the skill structure of migrants is 
complementary to that of the EU-15 nationals. Migrants are divided into three 
subgroups: those from the EU-15, those from the EU-10 and non-EU migrants. The skill 
composition of the natives can be considered a benchmark. According to the data, 31% 
are low-skilled workers, and 23% are highly skilled. Important findings are first that 
the educational and skill profile differs significantly among the subgroups. Second, IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 107 
 
migration from non-EU countries as well as migration from the EU-10 has – to a certain 
degree – a complementary character. Third, the proportion of low-skilled workers is 
the highest among non-EU nationals (48%) and the lowest among EU-10 nationals 
(21%).51 Within this latter subgroup, the proportion of low-skilled workers is much 
lower than in the subgroup of EU-15 migrants (36%). Therefore, migration induced by 
the EU enlargement of 2004 seems to be principally migration of persons with a 
medium educational level (57%).  
Figure 7.1 Education levels of migrants and nationals in the EU-15 (among the working-age 
population), 2005 
0
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Note: Education level – low (lower secondary), medium (upper secondary), high (tertiary) 
Source: Eurostat, LFS, 2005 Q1, France and Austria, 2005 Q2, European Commission. 
In addition, the educational profile of EU-15 migrants and EU-15 nationals is 
similar; hence, intra-EU-15 migration is not necessarily complementary in character. 
Nonetheless, the proportion of the highly skilled is highest among EU-15 migrants; 
here, the share of highly skilled persons is even slightly higher than that of nationals in 
the EU. Thus, with regard to skills, internal migration and migration from non-EU 
countries are not direct substitutes. Furthermore, the differences in skill profiles of EU-
                                                      
51 Most of the EU-10 migrants work in the retail sector (hotels and restaurants). Their share of 
28% is not significantly higher than the 25% share of nationals. This point also holds true for 
agriculture (in which 4% of nationals work compared with 3% of EU-10 migrants), industry 
(18%) and financial services (13% and 14%, respectively). By contrast, the share of migrants 
working in construction is about 15% compared with 8% of the national workforce. The share 
also differs in public administration, where 32% of residents work compared with 23% of 
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10 and non-EU migrants on the one hand, and natives on the other, could be a sound 
base for future economic growth, since these profiles are broadly complementary. In 
addition, the age structure of migrants and natives differs in the EU-25: immigrants are 
on average younger than natives are, with 41% of all immigrants in the age cohort of 
20-39, compared with 28% of natives. Only 9% of migrants are 65 or older compared 
with 17% of natives (Eurostat database, 2006). 
All these types of migration are based on legal migration. Yet, illegal migration is 
also very substantial in Europe. According to rough estimates, about 500,000 illegal 
migrants enter the EU each year. Illegal migration from North African countries has 
become a progressively more important issue for Spain and Italy, and it is a very 
specific problem for Malta. Calculations based on regularisation data show that in 
2004, about 1.4 million illegal immigrants were living in Spain and Italy, representing a 
1.2-1.6% share of the total population.52 But the highest share of illegal or unofficial 
immigrants in Europe was found in Greece (3.4% of the total population).53 There, 
migrants from Albania constitute the large majority of illegal migrants. Usually illegal, 
unauthorised, undocumented or unofficial immigrants live under hard conditions, and 
they are forced to participate in informal networks and in the shadow economy.  
In summing up the socio-economic characteristics of legal migrants in the EU, it 
can be said that they are often men, younger than the natives are and show different 
educational patterns from the natives. In addition, they are much more often 
confronted with unemployment than the natives are and many of them came for 
reasons other than work (such as family reunification). 
In the case of the EU, the country of origin of a migrant is crucial for formal 
access to the national social welfare schemes: at the end of the period of transition (in 
some countries), migrants from other EU member states will be treated on the same 
terms as natives. Non-EU migrants generally have only limited access to national 
welfare programmes. The lowest form of protection is given to the illegal and 
undocumented migrant, while permanent residents as well as conventional refugees 
have broad access to social welfare. Since social standards differ widely among the EU 
member states, incentives for ‘welfare shopping’ could exist. Nevertheless, little 
support for a ‘welfare magnet’ hypothesis can be found. Moreover, there seems to be 
evidence that in many European countries migrants generate at least transitory 
positive effects on pay-as-you-go pension systems. Net contributions tend to increase 
with the skills of the foreign workers. Thus, against the background of existing tensions 
in the welfare schemes, the question of how to select successful migrants is 
increasingly prominent in public debate. 
As noted earlier, the member states of the EU have agreed to develop a legal 
framework for a common immigration policy at the EU level in the future. 
Coordination and harmonisation of the legal framework should not be a goal in itself. 
Rather, it should be used to create an EU-wide legal framework that matches the goals 
of the Lisbon agenda and reduces transaction costs for migrants. These processes 
                                                      
52 Many of those making up this share were legalised in 2005. 
53 It is difficult to estimate the number of illegal immigrants; however, various estimate 
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should not necessarily lead to a tightening of migration policies. Indeed, it is well 
known that with the tightening of immigration rules the number of illegal migrants 
increases. All in all, the new legal framework should leave enough room for flexibility 
at the national level.  
Stable linkages between the EU as a supranational organisation and the host 
country on the one side, and the traditional labour-exporting countries on the other 
could create advantages if they allow clear rules for migration (and for return 
migration) to be formulated. In the case of developing countries, the implementation of 
technical and social aid programmes for the labour-exporting countries could be part 
of the overall agreement. This approach could lead to a reduction of poverty in the 
home countries of the migrants as well as a decrease of illegal immigration. Box 7.1 
provides a case study for Greece. 
Box 7.1 A case study: The socio-economic impact of immigration to Greece 
Greece witnessed a large inflow of immigrants during the 1990s as a result of social, 
economic and political changes in communist countries right after the fall of the Soviet 
Union. The first immigrants came from Poland, but many others followed them; for the most 
part, they were illegal and they were looking for a job. Yet the key figure in Greece’s 
experience and what made Greece different from other southern European countries such as 
Italy, Spain and Portugal, was the predominance of immigrants from a single country, 
namely Albania.  
The increasing number of immigrants soon started to attract attention and forced the 
government to attempt to shape a migration policy, which initially sought to prevent 
immigrants from entering the country. Owing to the geographical location of Greece and the 
fact that most immigrants were coming from neighbouring Balkan countries, these efforts 
quickly proved inadequate. Therefore, the next step was to try to legalise them. Three 
legalisation schemes were put into practice, but bureaucracy and public sector rigidities have 
led to unsatisfactory results. Some go as far as accusing Greece of deliberately creating 
obstacles in order to limit the number of immigrants obtaining a legal work and stay permit, 
and thus allowing employers to exploit them. Consequently, illegal immigrants have now 
become undocumented immigrants. 
Although many studies attempt to investigate the impact of immigrants on the Greek 
economy, the lack of statistical data seriously constrains their results. Most of the studies, 
however, agree that immigrants have positive and negative economic effects. Among the 
positive effects mentioned are the increase in GDP and its growth rate, support for the 
agricultural sector and many small to medium-sized firms (at least in the short run), the 
dampening of inflationary pressures and the increase in foreign direct investment towards 
mostly Balkan countries. Among the negative effects, immigrants are also thought to have 
helped the expansion of the informal economy, which was already noticeable, and to have – 
in some cases – substituted Greek unskilled and semi-skilled workers (according to others, 
they have freed up the labour force). It is argued that this has led to increased income 
inequality, unemployment and slow-growing wages, and may have contributed to the 
slowing down of technological developments (firms find it easier to hire cheap labour than to 
invest in capital-intensive production techniques) as well as to have drained aggregate 
demand from Greece by remitting large amounts of money abroad.  
With respect to some other issues, such as the impact of immigrants on employment 
and unemployment overall, a definite answer is yet to be given. Demands on public services 
(health services included) are not considered to have increased much because of immigrants, 
except for expenses directed towards public order, which have grown considerably.  110 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
Box 7.1 Continued 
Still, because of their low income, immigrants do not pay direct taxes, and only 
contribute to government revenues through indirect taxes. Finally, the impact of immigrants 
on the social security system is considered positive in the short term, but is expected to 
become negative in the long term.  
The presence of immigrants does not seem to have caused significant demographic 
changes. Nevertheless, it has given rise to isolated phenomena of xenophobia and racism, 
which have been fuelled by media and police practices. The increase in criminal activity 
during the 1990s that was attributed to undocumented immigrants has contributed to such 
phenomena. The integration of immigrants into Greek society is advancing, but it is doing so 
at a slow rate since state initiatives are limited and immigrants are left alone to find ways of 
fitting in.  
Greece needs to introduce a more straightforward and clear-cut immigration policy, 
which will simplify and rationalise the process of legalisation for the different groups of 
immigrants, attend to their needs and protect their social, political, religious and human 
rights. In addition, efforts are needed to integrate immigrants into Greek society and to help 
the indigenous population realise that immigrants are here to stay, in order to create a truly 
multicultural, multi-ethnic and above all functional society. It is also both necessary and 
important to collect statistical data that will help researchers form a clearer picture of the 
situation and to enable better and more efficient actions to be planned and implemented by 
the government and non-governmental organisations. Finally yet importantly, attention 
should be given to assisting the integration of second-generation immigrants – an issue not 
yet fully comprehended by the majority of researchers and politicians. 
 
Migration not only has important consequences for the host nation, but also for 
the labour-exporting country. One important feature of migration is that the labour 
migrant might have higher earnings in the host country than in the country of origin. 
These earnings might at least partially be sent home.54 Worldwide official remittances 
amounted to more than $232 billion in 2005 – an amount that is more than double that 
of international aid programmes (Schiff & Özden, 2005). In addition, large amounts of 
money are sent through informal channels and are not reported in official statistics.  
In the case of a weak official financial sector, intra-family arrangements for 
remittances offer not only investment possibilities, but also insurance against social 
risks and income uncertainty, and often contain social as well as intergenerational 
elements. As a result, remittances are assumed to increase with the educational level of 
the migrant. A natural interpretation of the linkages between migration, education and 
remittances is that the prospect of migration makes education a profitable investment. 
The linkages between migration, education and remittances are often discussed under 
the heading of ‘brain drain–brain gain’.55  
                                                      
54 For a long time, workers’ remittances were widely neglected in economic analysis. Recent 
studies clearly show that migrants’ remittances are an important source of external finance for 
many low-income countries and can be considered a specific form of development assistance 
and policy. Nevertheless, the figures on the amount of remittances differ widely. One important 
data source is the World Development Indicators offered by the World Bank.  
55 Recently, it has become apparent that Europe is also affected by a certain degree of brain 
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In general, there are at least two linkages between remittances and education: on 
the one hand, the education of the migrant might affect the size of remittances; on the 
other, remittances might be spent on the education of the children left at home. 
Therefore, the impact of remittances on growth in the labour-exporting country 
depends on migration costs, the availability of education in the home country and the 
use of remittances for intergenerational transfers for education. Any increase in the 
access to education, which might also be financed by remittances, can be considered to 
have a positive impact on economic development. In this context, remittances can be 
interpreted as compensation for the labour-exporting country’s investment in the 
human capital of the migrant.  
7.2  Perceptions of migrants and trends in policy reforms 
An overview of the changing perceptions of Europeans about migration and the 
welfare state is provided by the results from Eurobarometer surveys (Table 7.4 and 
Figure 7.2). Table 7.4 displays the (unconditional) probability of a respondent agreeing 
with the statement, “Minority groups exploit the system of social welfare.” 
Table 7.4 Do minority groups exploit the system of social welfare? (% of respondents answering 
in the affirmative) 
   1994  1997  2000 
Spain 20.2  30  36.7 
Northern Ireland  40.98  39.87  40.67 
Italy 40.39  32.2  41.5 
Luxembourg 28.29  36.85  43.83 
Austria –  48.3  45.87 
Greece 44.11  29.21  46.02 
Sweden –  42.64  46.4 
Netherlands 42.29  38.33  48.62 
Portugal 22.2  37.7  49.5 
Denmark 59.1  58.24  51.9 
West Germany  60.35  54.11  54.14 
Finland –  50.05  54.95 
Ireland 25.6  33.5  56.5 
UK 66.05  53.53  57.56 
East Germany  64.16  50.29  59.59 
France   70.2  63.42  65.17 
Belgium 73.68  68.95  65.76 
EU-12 46.97  44.73  51.25 
EU-15 –    45.13  50.86 
St. dev. EU-12  18.57  13.10  9.03 
Sources: Eurobarometer 1994, 1997 and 2000. 
                                                                                                                                                             
drain, and is competing with the US for young scientists. While the brain-drain discussion and 
therefore the linkage between migration and education also affects the EU-15, the linkage 
between education and remittances is usually only discussed in the context of the catching-up 
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Figure 7.2 Unconditional correlation between perceptions of welfare abuse and the generosity of 
welfare systems 
 
Sources: Eurobarometer 1994, 1997 and 2000. 
These results are in line with a restrictive orientation in immigration policy. The 
database of social reforms compiled by the fRDB shows increasingly restrictive policies 
being adopted by national governments to contain immigration flows. In Table 7.5, we 
describe the evolution of the orientation of reforms during the last 15 years. 
Corresponding with the ‘–‘ sign, we find reforms reducing the generosity of the 
migration policy, while corresponding with the ‘+’ sign, we find reforms increasing the 
generosity of the system. 
Table 7.5 Orientation of reforms 
  AT DK FI FR DE GR IE IT NL PT SP UK 
1990                      
1991          –        –   
1992             +       
1993  –    –               
1994             –       
1995                      
1996                   +   –  
1997      –               
1998  –     +          +     
1999           –  +       – 
2000         +   –       +  
2001    –          –    –   
2002   –      +    –       
2003     +  –    –     –  –  
2004     –      –         – 
2005         +   –         
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Other results are presented in Tables 7.6 and 7.7. They report the qualitative 
results of regressions (using European Community Household Panel (ECHP) data 
covering the period 1994–2001) evaluating the presence of residual dependency from 
social transfers among non-EU citizens. In other words, we try to isolate whether being 
a migrant helps to explain the fact of receiving a social transfer in addition to the 
personal characteristics of the individual (such as the number of dependent children) 
affecting the probability of receiving the transfer. This approximation is the closest 
possible to the notion of abuse, capturing individuals who ceteris paribus receive a 
social transfer because they are not a citizen of the EU. Put another way, the following 
question is posed: Would a non-EU citizen be more or less likely to be dependent on 
social transfers than an EU citizen with similar characteristics? 
Table 7.6 Probability of receiving transfers from the social insurance (contributory) parts of the 
welfare system (pensions and unemployment benefits) 
 DE DK NL BE  FR UK  IR  IT GR  SP  PT AT  FI 
Age  --- --- --- ---  --- ---   ---  +++  ---   --- --- 
1  Child  ---  +++     -     --- ---  ---  --- ---  - 
2  Children   +++  ---  - ---  ---  -    --- --- ---  ---  --- 
Medium  education   ---   --- -  +++ --- --- ---  ---  --- ---   
High  education  - ---   ---  ---  +++ --- --- ---  ---  ---  +++  +++ 
HH  high  income  --- ---   ---  --- --- ---   ---  ---  --- --- --- 
HH  low  income  +++    ++  ---    ++ +++  -- +++   --- +++ +++ 
Partner  employed  ---  --- +++  --- ---  -  - +++ +++ ---  --  ---  --- 
Migrant,  non-EU ---  +++   +++  +  ---   --  --    +   
Note: HH = household 
Source: ECHP (1994–2001). 
Table 7.7 Probability of receiving transfers from the social assistance (non-contributory) parts 
of the welfare system (housing benefits, social assistance and family allowances) 
  DE DK NL  BE  FR UK  IR  IT GR  SP  PT AT  FI 
Age  +++ +++ +++ +++   +++ +++    --  --- +++ +++  +++ 
1  Child  +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++  +++ 
2  Children  +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++  ++ 
Medium education    --  +++  ++   +   -  ---  --  +++    
High  education  +++   +++  +++   +++   ---  ---  ---  ++  ++  ++ 
HH  high  income  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---  + --- ---  --- 
HH  low  income  +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++  +  ---  ++ +++  ---    +++ 
Partner  employed ++  -  +++ --- ---  --      --  --  +++  +++   
M i g r a n t ,   n o n - E U         - - -    +   - -      +  
Note: HH = household 
Source: ECHP (1994–2001). 
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The answer provided by Table 7.6 is that this is not usually the case. Migrants 
receive proportionally more transfers than natives do (Boeri, Börsch-Supan & Tabellini, 
2001) mainly insofar as they have characteristics associated with entitlement to these 
schemes. There is generally no additional effect of the migrant dummy on the 
probability of receiving social transfers. Importantly, the exceptions – the cases in 
which some residual dependency of migrants is observed – mostly relate to the 
contributory component of social welfare systems, that is, social insurance schemes 
whereby the individual is entitled to the transfers only to the extent that s/he has 
contributed to the system in the past (unemployment benefits, sickness benefits and 
pensions). There is much less evidence of residual welfare dependency (or this is 
negative, as in the case of the UK and Greece) when the focus is on the non-
contributory component, including social assistance, family allowances and housing, 
which is usually funded through general government revenues.  
Overall, there is no evidence that migrants are abusing the welfare state, notably 
the non-contributory parts of the welfare system. Their over-representation in the stock 
of benefit recipients can be explained by characteristics such as the presence of many 
dependent family members and higher exposure to labour market risks, or in any 
event by past contributions. In effect, migrants are ceteris paribus over-represented only 
among contributory social insurance schemes. We do not observe residual dependency 
on welfare by migrants. 
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8.  DEEPER ANALYSIS OF INEQUALITIES 
IN THE EU 
s indicated in chapter 6, a trend towards increased inequality has been evident 
in most EU member states since the 1980s. This trend has many roots and, 
although it may have been affected by globalisation or the various drivers 
behind increased internationalisation, this tendency has been influenced by other 
sources of change. This chapter considers the determinants of inequality in greater 
detail. 
8.1  Accounting for inequalities within the EU 
The most recent rounds of enlargement of the EU introduced a further and marked 
heterogeneity into the EU as a whole. The range of GDP levels in the EU-27 as a result 
of the entrance of the new member states is much more diverse than in the EU-15. In 
addition, the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe have undergone 
large-scale social, economic and political transformations in the last 15-20 years. This 
process is normally called ‘transition’, but to a certain extent, it could also be 
understood as a form of globalisation (because integration into the European Union 
effectively means lifting trade barriers, the freer flow of economic resources, and so 
forth).  
Income inequalities within countries in the EU-25  
An overview of recent trends is provided in Table 8.1 (taken from a recent OECD-wide 
overview of income distribution trends by Förster & d’Ercole, 2005).  
The country coverage includes most current EU member states (shown in bold), 
but excludes those countries not in the OECD. As benchmarks, several other OECD 
countries are also presented. What can be inferred from these data? 
•  There have been all sorts of divergent trends in inequality developments in the 
period between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. Moderate and strong declines 
were observed in Greece, Finland and Sweden, while a strong increase was 
registered in the UK.  
•  The general trend in the period between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s was 
characterised by an increase in inequality. Yet this period was the most important 
one in terms of the economic and social transition of the prospective new 
member states. 
•  The period between the mid-1990s and 2000 shows a mixed picture as well. 
While in Finland and Sweden there was a large increase in the Gini coefficient, 
indicating growing inequality, for the rest of the countries there was either no 
change or a very minor change. 
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Table 8.1 Overall trends in income inequality (mid-1970s to 2000): Summary results for the entire population (based on the Gini coefficient for 
individuals, equivalised household incomes) 
  
Strong 
 decline 
Moderate 
decline 
Small  
decline 
No  
change 
Small  
increase 
Moderate 
 increase 
Strong 
 increase 
Mid-1970s to mid-1980s  Greece  Finland, 
Sweden 
Canada –  Netherlands  US  UK 
Mid-1980s to mid 1990s  –  Spain  Australia, 
Denmark 
Austria, Canada, 
France, Greece, Ireland 
Belgium, 
Germany, 
Luxembourg, 
Japan, Sweden 
Czech Rep., 
Finland, Hungary, 
Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, 
UK, US 
Italy, Mexico, 
New Zealand, 
Turkey 
Mid-1990s to 2000  –  Mexico, Turkey 
France, Ireland, 
Poland 
Australia, Czech Rep., 
Germany, Hungary, 
Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Portugal, US 
Austria, Canada, 
Denmark, Greece, 
Japan, Norway, 
UK 
–  Finland, Sweden 
Notes: Strong decline/increase denotes a change in income inequality above +/-12%; moderate decline/increase refers to a change between 7 and 12%; small 
decline/increase specifies a change between 2 and 7%; and no change means changes between +/- 2%. The results are based on the values of the Gini coefficient in four 
reference years, which may vary among countries. The variations are presented below. 
–  Data for 2000 refers to the year 2000 except for Australia, Austria and Greece (1999), Germany, Luxembourg, New Zealand and Switzerland (2001), and the Czech 
Republic, Mexico and Turkey (2002).  
–  Mid-1990s data refers to the year 1995 in all countries except for Austria (1993), Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Japan, Mexico and Turkey (all 
1994), and the Czech Republic and New Zealand (1996).  
–  Mid-1980s data refers to the year 1983 for Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden; to 1984 for Australia, France, Italy and Mexico; to 1985 for Canada, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Spain and the UK; to 1986 for Finland, Luxembourg, New Zealand and Norway; to 1987 for Ireland and Turkey; to 1988 for Greece; and to 1989 for the 
US.  
–  For the Czech Republic, Hungary and Portugal, the period mid-1980s to mid-1990s refers to the early to mid-1990s. 
Source: Förster & d’Ercole (2005). IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 117 
 
For the first few years of the new decade, more harmonised data are available for 
the entire EU-27. As a result of efforts to develop indicators (known as the ‘Laeken 
process’, see Atkinson et al., 2002 and 2005), new data on income inequalities have 
become available that are presented in Table 8.2. The conclusions, again, are not very 
straightforward: 
•  There are slightly more countries where inequality seems to be increasing than 
countries experiencing a decline in inequality. The overall picture, however, is 
not very clear. 
•  No signs of ‘path dependencies’ can be observed (in which inequality increased 
in countries that initially had low inequality and in those that initially had high 
inequality). Nor can a convergence of inequality measures be discerned: there are 
no fewer variances in the levels of inequality among the countries at the end of 
the period than those observed at the beginning.  
•  Within this period, large differences cannot be traced, even between the EU-15 
and EU-10 countries. Furthermore, during this period the transition countries no 
longer make up the group that produces the most significant changes over a 
certain period. 
Table 8.2 Overall trends in income inequality in the EU-27 countries, 2000 to 2004 (end-period 
Gini coefficients in brackets)* 
--- --  -  0  +  ++  +++ 
x>12% 12%<x>7% 7%<x>2%  0%  7%<x>2%  12%<x>7%  x>12% 
Strong 
decline 
Moderate 
decline 
Small 
decline 
No change  Small 
increase 
Moderate 
increase 
Strong 
increase 
Belgium 
(26) 
– 
Estonia (34) 
Spain (31) 
Lithuania 
(29) 
Netherland
s (26) 
Greece (33) 
France(28) 
Luxembourg 
(26) 
Czech Rep. 
(25) 
Slovenia (22) 
Portugal (38) 
Latvia (36) 
UK (34) 
Ireland (32) 
Poland (31) 
Romania (30) 
Hungary (27) 
Finland (25) 
Bulgaria (26) 
Sweden (23) 
Germany 
(28) 
Austria (26) 
Italy (33) 
Denmark(24) 
* Begin-period data refers to 2000, except for the Czech Rep. (2001) Denmark and Sweden (1999). End-
period data refers to 2004, except for the Czech Rep., Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia and the UK (2003). Income concepts and equivalence scales differ from the OECD 
study quoted in Table 8.1. The most important difference is the use of Laeken definitions and concepts in 
Table 8.2. Cross-country differences in trends over time are not suspected to be large in this respect, 
however. Alternative estimates (by TÁRKI) for Hungary shows higher Gini values (29 for 2000 and 2005 
as well). This result would move Hungary into the ‘no-change’ cell. 
Sources: Tóth (2006b) and data from Eurostat NewCronos database.  118 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
Cross-country differences  
Recent research on cross-country differences in inequalities (based on the Laeken 
indicators and produced within the frame of the open method of coordination)56 
presents six different country clusters based on a simultaneous evaluation of economic 
development and of inequality levels.57 Splitting the EU-25 into the EU-15 and the EU-
10 (since there is so much difference in the mean levels of GDP of the two groups) also 
implies a classification by the level of development (in this respect, even the two non-
transition countries of Cyprus and Malta fit the EU-10 reasonably well), as shown in 
Table 8.3.  
Table 8.3 Country clusters based on inequality and GDP levels in the EU-25 by country group, 
2001 (group averages) 
 
 
Category 
 
 
Countries 
GDP per 
capita PPS, 
% EU avg. 
 
Gini 
coefficient 
 
 
S80/S20 
Poverty rate 
(60% median 
threshold) 
Unequal EU-10  LV, EE, SK  42  33  5.7  18 
Moderately 
unequal EU-10 
CY, MT, HU, PL, 
LT 
60 29  4.5  15 
Equal EU-10  CZ, SI  68  24  3.3  10 
Unequal EU-15  GR, PT, ES, UK  89  35  5.8  20 
Moderately 
unequal EU-15 
IT, DE, BE,  
NL, IE 
117 28  4.3  16 
Equal EU-15 
FR, FI, SE, DK, 
AT, LU 
136 25  3.6  11 
Note: The inequality level is defined by S80/S20, whereby unequal = 5.0 or higher, moderately equal = 
between 4.0 and 4.9, and equal = below 3.9. 
Source: Tóth & Gábos (2005). 
The six country groupings are described below. 
•  The EU-15 countries with relatively equal income distributions are Austria, 
Denmark, France, Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden. 
•  The EU-15 countries with a moderate degree of income inequality are Belgium, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. 
•  The EU-15 countries with a relatively high degree of inequality are Greece, 
Portugal, Spain and the UK. 
                                                      
56 For a description and references, see Atkinson et al. (2005) and European Commission (2004a, 
2005a and 2006h).  
57 The report has been produced through the frame of the European Observatory on the Social 
Situation LOT 2, Network on Social Inclusion and Income Distribution. The study was 
commissioned by the DG for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunity, and was 
carried out by the consortium of Applica (Belgium), Essex University (UK), the European 
Centre for Social Welfare Research (Austria) and TÁRKI (Hungary).  IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 119 
 
•  The EU-10 countries with relatively equal income distributions are the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia. 
•  The EU-10 countries with a moderate degree of income inequality are Cyprus, 
Hungary, Malta, Poland and Lithuania. 
•  The EU-10 countries with a relatively high degree of inequality are Latvia, 
Estonia and Slovakia. 
There is a considerable degree of heterogeneity, both in the level of GDP and in 
the inequalities. Nevertheless, and despite the fact that the EU-10 have much lower 
GDP per head even in terms of purchasing power standards (PPS), there are generally 
no significant differences between the old and new member states with respect to the 
variance of overall income inequalities and relative (not absolute!) poverty (Figures 8.1 
and 8.2). 
In terms of poverty, however, it seems that four groups of countries can be 
clearly distinguished. Continental European EU-15 countries and the Scandinavian 
countries belong to the group characterised by high GDP levels and relatively low 
poverty rates. Anglo-Saxon EU-15 countries and the EU-15 countries of the 
Mediterranean tier represent a group with lower levels of GDP and higher poverty 
rates. Those EU-10 countries that are relatively better off constitute the third group, 
with comparatively low poverty rates, while the other EU-10 member states have the 
lowest GDP levels and the highest poverty rates. This pattern will obviously 
correspond to welfare arrangements in the various countries as well as economic 
factors and historical traditions.  
Figure 8.1 GDP per capita and income inequality in European countries 
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Figure 8.2 GDP per capita and relative income poverty in European countries 
Countries
 
 
8.2  Interregional differences within the EU: Macro data 
When analysing the evolution of interregional inequalities in Europe, the main 
question is whether there is regional convergence, with the poorer regions developing 
faster than the richer ones or whether, on the contrary, regional development is 
characterised by divergence (interregional differences, of course, might persist over 
time without significant convergence or divergence taking place). The results of studies 
using various methodologies may differ according to the methodology used and the 
regional and time coverage of the data.  
Studies on the evolution of regional GDP per capita reveal that during the period 
of general economic growth in the 1960s and the early 1970s, regional income 
differences, measured by such indices as the Theil, Gini or Atkinson, narrowed in the 
EU (see e.g. De la Fuente & Vives, 1995; Duro, 2004). Regarding evolutions in the 1980s 
and 1990s, the European Commission’s cohesion reports and several other studies trace 
the evolution of interregional inequalities in Europe. During the 1983–93 period, there 
was little change in the dispersion of interregional GDP per capita (measured by the 
standard deviation), but there was a growing dispersion of unemployment among the 
NUTS II regions.58 During the 1988–2001 period, GDP per capita59 dispersion between 
regions decreased and employment and labour productivity also converged across 
                                                      
58 See the European Commission’s first report on Economic and Social Cohesion (1996). 
59 There has been a change in the definition of the GDP measure in the European Commission’s 
cohesion reports. The first and second reports use GDP in PPS terms. In the third report, it is 
argued that using PPS is misleading when considering changes over time and they switch to 
GDP in real terms. IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 121 
 
regions.60 Regions in which GDP per head was less than 75% of the EU average 
experienced a higher rate of growth than did other parts of the EU. This was especially 
true in the case of low-income regions in the ‘cohesion’ countries (Greece, Ireland, 
Spain and Portugal), while low-income regions in richer countries seemed to stagnate. 
Using different inequality measures (Gini, Atkinson and Theil measures)61 Duro 
(2004) finds that regional inequalities in GDP per capita among NUTS II regions62 
generally declined over the period 1982–95. This process was not uniform across the 
whole period, however. The beginning of the period under study (from the start of the 
1980s to the middle of the same decade) was characterised by an increase of 
interregional inequalities; at the end of the period, a levelling-off or a slight increase in 
inequalities was detected. Duro presents a Theil decomposition analysis of 
interregional inequality into within-country and between-country effects.63 During this 
period, between-country inequalities fell while inequalities between regions and within 
countries rose. The between-country component of inequalities showed a cyclical 
pattern, decreasing in periods of general growth and increasing in periods of recession 
(in the period 1973 to 1984). Four countries can be characterised by convergent 
behaviour: initially poor countries (Ireland, Portugal and Spain) grew more rapidly 
than the EU as a whole, while initially richer-than-average France grew more slowly. 
Inequality between regions increased most in large countries, with Spain and the UK 
showing the greatest rises, but with Italy, Germany and France also experiencing 
significant growth in regional inequalities. 
A classic result on regional convergence using regression methods and which 
also includes data on five European nations during the period 1950–90 is that by Sala-i-
Martin (1996), who concludes that regions tend to converge at a speed of 2% per year. 
Boldrin & Canova (2001) also use regression methods (as well as nonparametric 
comparisons of regional distributions of income and unemployment) to discover 
patterns of convergence or divergence among 185 NUTS II regions of the EU during 
the 1980–96 period. According to their results, no rapid convergence or divergence in 
income per capita took place in this period. Other researchers use spatial econometric 
methods to account for similarities among neighbouring regions, which could bias 
results on convergence in ordinary regression estimations. Arbia & Piras (2005), using 
data on 125 regions in 10 EU countries, show that allowing for spatial dependence 
among regions reduces the speed of convergence, but convergence is still detectable. 
                                                      
60 See the European Commission’s Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion (2004d). 
61 For the definition of these inequality indices, see Cowell (2000). 
62 There are 143 regions in Duro’s database, which is based on the REGIO 1999 database. 
63 The Theil index might be decomposed into two parts: one measures that aspect of overall 
inequality owing to income dispersion within regions; the second measures inequality 
stemming from inequality between regions. Within-group inequality is a weighted sum of 
Theil(1) indices of the regions, where weights are income shares of the regions. Between-group 
inequality is the value of the Theil index of a hypothetical income distribution, where every 
household has the average income of the region to which it belongs. On the methodology of this 
decomposition, see Deutsch & Silber (1999). 122 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
Using transition matrices, Overman & Puga (2002) show that when changes in 
regions’ relative income situation is considered, there appears to be a high degree of 
persistence of the positions held between 1986 and 1996. In Table 8.4, transition 
matrices of relative regional income levels and unemployment rates are displayed. It 
can be seen that a great majority of the regions (with the exception of the second 
group) had retained their 1987 relative position in 1996. This stagnation of regions’ 
relative income positions does not mean that regional economies behaved in a similar 
way. The study also demonstrates that in the same period there was a polarisation of 
regional unemployment levels. There is a persistence of relative positions among 
regions with the lowest and the highest unemployment rates, while among regions 
with intermediate unemployment levels mobility proved much greater.  
Table 8.4 Transition probability matrices for GDP per capita and unemployment rates relative 
to the EU average (150 NUTS II regions) 
  1995 GDP per capita relative to the EU average (%) 
1987 relative GDP 
per capita (%) 
0-60 60-75  75-100  100-130  130- 
0-60  0.83 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 
60-75  0.21 0.47 0.32 0.00 0.00 
75-100  0.00 0.18 0.68 0.14 0.00 
100-130  0.00 0.00 0.13 0.72 0.15 
130-  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.83 
  1996 unemployment rates relative to the EU average (%) 
1986 unemployment rates/ 
EU avg. (%) 
0-60 60-75  75-100  100-130  130- 
0-60  0.81 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 
60-75  0.52 0.26 0.09 0.09 0.04 
75-100  0.24 0.29 0.26 0.21 0.00 
100-130  0.06 0.22 0.34 0.19 0.19 
130-  0.00 0.00 0.16 0.22 0.62 
Source: Overman & Puga (2002). 
8.3  Regional income inequalities and poverty in Europe: Microdata  
Although aggregate data as used in the studies reviewed in the preceding section are 
useful for describing broad regional trends, they are not a very good measure of the 
average well-being of individuals. One major reason for this is that they do not take 
into account taxes and transfers, which considerably modify the distribution of wages 
and capital incomes. In order to study regional inequalities in individual well-being, 
microdata on incomes, household attributes and possibly other sources of well-being 
are more suitable. The sources of data on inequality of household incomes and regional 
patterns of poverty in EU countries include such internationally comparable datasets 
as the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and the Luxembourg Income 
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While individual or household well-being might be better evaluated using 
microdata on income, these data are not without deficiencies. In some cases, regional 
sample sizes are small, which results in imprecise estimates, while the temporal 
coverage is shorter than for GDP data. Patterns of regional (at the NUTS I level) 
differences in household incomes are described in Stewart (2002) for the beginning and 
the middle of the 1990s using the LIS data and in Förster (2004) for the years 1993 and 
1998 using the ECHP database. The most recent results show two typical pictures of 
regional disparities (ibid.). The pattern of regional income inequality in a first group of 
countries is characterised by relatively small differences between the average incomes 
of regions except that there is one region that has a significantly higher average income 
than all other regions, which is generally the region with the given country’s capital. 
The London region and the Paris region (Ile de France) are striking examples, while in 
Greece the region of Attiki, containing the capital Athens, has an average income well 
above the country’s other regions. Yet these differences are exaggerated because of the 
data problem caused by commuters into the region counting towards its output, but 
not its population. 
In a second group of countries, there is a different pattern with regions clustering 
in clearly discernible groups. In Italy there seems to be a three-way divide along the 
north–south dimension. Southern regions (such as Sardegna, Sicilia, Campania and 
Sud) have the lowest average household incomes; the central regions (including Lazio 
and Centro) have an intermediate position, while the northern regions, especially 
Lombardia and Emilia-Romagna, do even better. A similar picture can be detected in 
Spain. The southern and north-west regions have the lowest average incomes, while 
the region with the capital Madrid has the highest. But there is evidently a third, 
intermediate group of regions composed of the eastern and north-eastern regions (for 
example, Aragon). In Germany, differences in average incomes between the regions are 
not as large as in Italy or Spain, but there is still an obvious east–west divide. The 
eastern regions of the former German Democratic Republic have the lowest average 
incomes, while most of the western regions are noticeably better off. The exceptions are 
the region composed of Rheinland-Pfalz and Saarland, and the region of 
Niedersachsen – although here again commuting comes into play. In Sweden and 
Austria, the regions containing the capital cities have higher average incomes than the 
other regions, but the overall level of regional inequality is relatively low. 
Förster (2004) provides a decomposition of household income inequality into 
between-region and within-region inequality in European countries, using the 
decomposability of inequality indices of the Theil index (Figure 8.3). When comparing 
the extent of interregional inequality between countries, we have to bear in mind that 
the number of regions differs among countries. A greater number of regions obviously 
allows for more interregional dispersion. According to the results, five countries have 
higher interregional income differences than the others: France, Italy, Greece, Spain 
and Portugal. Italy shows the greatest value of between-region income inequality, 
during both the middle and the end of the 1990s, with a slight increase during this 
period (ibid.). Spain shows the largest rise in interregional inequality during the 
second half of the last decade, almost catching up to the Italian figure from a much 
lower level. France, Greece and Portugal show somewhat less interregional inequality 
and only minor changes between 1993 and 1998. In the rest of the countries, income 
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Figure 8.3 Part of the between-region Theil index in overall Theil 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Förster (2004). 
The two countries with the highest between-region inequalities (Italy and Spain) 
also have the highest degree of overall inequality explained by differences between the 
regions. In this respect, Italy is clearly the leader, with interregional differences 
accounting for 15% of total inequality as measured by the Theil index. Moreover, this 
share increased between the first and sixth wave of the ECHP by 4 percentage points. 
Spain has a somewhat lower proportion of inequality explained by between-region 
dispersion, but there has been an increase of the same magnitude. The share of 
interregional inequality in total inequality grew from 8% in 1993 to 12% in 1998. In the 
cases of Portugal, Greece and France, regional inequalities accounted for 7% of total 
inequality in 1998. Changes were minor in France and Portugal, but somewhat more 
considerable in Greece. Inequality between regions in Belgium and Austria accounted 
for a negligible part of overall dispersion, and it was only slightly higher in Finland, 
Sweden and Germany. 
With regard to regional poverty rates, Stewart (2002) asserts that if a national 
poverty line is used, the pattern of relative poverty closely mirrors intra-country 
differences in regional average incomes. In contrast, if a regional poverty line is used 
the results are different: in most of the cases regions with high average incomes show 
high poverty rates. This is true of London and the south-east in the UK, Ile de France 
(the region of Paris), the Vienna region in Austria and the western Netherlands, 
showing that regions with the highest average incomes can sometimes also be those 
with the highest levels of inequality. 
Stewart (2002) also compared regional differences in average household income 
to differences in GDP per capita for the middle of the 1990s. The rankings of regions 
proved to be quite similar for the two indicators but regional differences were much 
higher in the case of GDP per capita than for household income. This result of course 
reflects the effect of the tax and transfer system. 
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8.4  Changes in openness and changes in inequalities in EU countries 
A cross-sectional charting of patterns of openness and inequality levels is presented in 
Tóth & Gabos (2005). This paper gives an overview of poverty and inequality trends in 
Europe around the year 2001. The paper concludes that at first glance, little 
correspondence can be shown between inequality levels and the openness of the 
economy (Figures 8.4 and 8.5). 
There was no relationship found between the openness of a country’s economy 
and the actual level of inequalities as measured by Gini levels or poverty rates. As can 
be seen from the figures, points representing various countries scatter evenly, with no 
relation to EU membership status, the size of the economy or other characteristics. This 
outcome may be misleading, however, as globalisation is a process of opening up. To 
analyse the effects of this process, we need to analyse changes in the observed 
variables, rather than compare actual levels alone. 
To compare the relationship between a change in openness on the one hand, and 
a change in inequality on the other hand, we identified spells for the various countries, 
defined by the magnitude of changes in openness and inequalities.64 For the openness-
to-trade indicator65 (taken from chapter 3), a 10% threshold was defined as significant 
for rises and falls. That is, if there was a change of more than 10 percentage points in 
the value of this indicator (as in the case of the UK, taking the ratio of the 1981–85 
average value to the 1976–80 average value), it was deemed a significant change in 
openness. Similarly (using the same thresholds as Förster & d’Ercole, 2005), when a 
change in the Gini coefficient in roughly the same period exceeded 7%, it was 
considered a significant change.  
The openness-to-trade indicator was calculated for the five-year intervals of 
1976–80, 1981–85, 1996–2000 and a shorter period at the end of 2001–03. A difference 
between these values represents a change in openness for a given country in the given 
period. We can distinguish three distinct periods with this method: 1976–85, 1986–95 
and 1996–2003, with two sub-periods for each spell. A change in a spell should be 
understood as the difference between the values of the openness indicator representing 
the first sub-period and the values of the openness indicator representing the second 
sub-period. A similar method is followed for the Gini coefficients, with the difference 
that the values for the start of the period and the end of the period are compared.66  
                                                      
64 The analysis is similar to those carried out by Cornia & Court (2001) and Ravallion (2004b). 
Rather than concentrating on cross-sectional relationships, longitudinal spells of particular 
countries are put in the central focus.  
65 The indicator for openness to trade reflects the ratio of the average value of merchandise 
exports and merchandise imports as a percentage of the GDP at purchasing power parity. The 
choice of this indicator is quite obvious, since it reflects trade openness and can be interpreted 
as a matter of degree, it certainly enjoys priority over measures indicating only yes–no 
relationships (such as the measure offered by Sachs & Warner, 1995, for example).  
66 The source for the Gini coefficient changes for the first two periods is income data from 
Förster & d’Ercole (2005), who present changes from the mid-1970s to mid-1980s, the mid-1980s 
to mid-1990s and the mid-1990s to around 2000 (as shown in Table 8.1 above). Data for 2004 are 
taken from an analysis of different spells by Tóth et al. (2006),  also presented in Table 8.2 above. 126 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
Figure 8.4 Globalisation index and inequality in Europe, around 2001 
 
Figure 8.5 Globalisation index and relative poverty in Europe, around 2001 
 
 
 
Combinations of these values for the various spells in different countries are 
shown in Table 8.5. We can conclude from these values that there is no clear tendency 
in the relationships between a change in openness and a change in inequality. Further 
points to note are as follows: IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 127 
 
•  For the period with a general decline in openness (that is, from the mid-1970s to 
the mid-1980s), there is a serious lack of comparable data on inequalities. Still, 
periods in which openness declined might be associated with a lower Gini 
coefficient, implying greater equality (for example in Sweden and Finland in the 
first periods) or with an increase in the Gini coefficient (as in the UK in the first 
period and Sweden in the third period), as well as with no change (in the 
Netherlands in the first and Ireland and Greece in the third periods). 
•  Most of the spells with inequality increases occurred in periods of no change in 
openness, mainly in the last periods of observation as in Denmark, Finland, Italy, 
Austria and Germany. It therefore seems that inequalities may rise in periods 
with no significant changes in openness. 
•  A significant increase in openness did not always lead to a change in inequalities 
as measured by the change in Gini coefficients (out of the 18 such spells in which 
openness increased only four showed a significant surge in inequality). In fact, 
when openness grew significantly, Gini coefficients remained stagnant in most of 
the observed countries (in each of the three periods). 
•  There were some spells when increases in openness were accompanied by rises 
in inequality (for instance in the Netherlands, Hungary, Italy and Portugal in the 
second period), but these were a small proportion of the total number of spells. 
•  An increase in inequalities might have been preceded by an opening-up period 
(as in the Netherlands, Italy, Hungary and Portugal in the period 1986–95) and a 
fall in openness (as in the UK during 1976–85 and Sweden in 1996–2003). 
While these are all important messages, two qualifications should be made here. 
First, all the measures we take into account reflect macro-level aggregated 
characteristics of the various countries. It may be that certain sectors or population 
subgroups are affected more than others and this may be masked by the aggregate 
figures (the problem of ‘horizontal inequalities’). Second, it might easily happen that 
levels of or changes to openness and inequalities are correlated and will only be shown 
to be so when controlling for a number of background variables.  
In a recent study, when attempting to identify the relative strengths of various 
background factors in explaining inequalities and poverty, Tóth & Gábos (2006) 
i d e n t i f i e d n o  s i g n i f i ca n t  e f f e c t  o f o p e n n e s s  i n  a n  O L S  r e g r e s s i o n  c o n t r o l l e d  f o r  p e r  
capita GDP, public social expenditures and EU member status (Table 8.6). All other 
things being equal, larger GDP showed a negative impact on inequality, while being an 
EU-10 member state also lowered inequality and poverty levels. Social expenditure has 
a significant negative effect on income inequality and poverty: the higher its level, the 
lower the latter tend to be. The overall employment level and the openness of the 
economy did not show any significant effects. Increased globalisation, therefore, seems 
to have no effect on inequality or the risk of poverty.67 
                                                      
67 Yet this is not proof either: level-to-level regressions should be replaced by change-to-change 
regressions at a later stage to study the effects of globalisation as a process, through increments. 128 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
Table 8.5 Classification of spells in various countries by the magnitude of changes in openness 
and inequality indicators  
 Gini  decline 
(δx>7%)  
Gini no change 
(7%<δx>7%) 
Gini increase 
(δx>7%) 
Not known 
Openness 
decline 
δx>10%  
 
Sweden 1976-85 
Finland 1976-85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Netherlands 1976-85 
Ireland 1996-2003 
Greece 1996-2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UK 1976-85 
Sweden 1996-2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Belgium 1976-85 
Malta 1976-85 
Austria 1976-85 
Denmark 1976-85 
Hungary 1976-85 
Germany 1976-85 
France 1976-85 
Cyprus 1976-85 
Ireland 1976-85 
Italy 1976-85 
Greece 1976-85 
Cyprus 1996-2003 
        
Openness 
no change 
(δx <10% 
change)  
Spain 1976-85 
Belgium 1996-2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Germany 1986-95 
Netherlands 1996-2003 
Slovenia 1996-2003 
France 1996-2003 
UK 1996-2003 
Portugal 1996-2003 
Estonia 1996-2003 
Spain 1996-2003 
Latvia 1996-2003 
Finland 1986-95 
UK 1986-95 
Denmark 1996-2003 
Finland 1996-2003 
Italy 1996-2003 
Austria 1996-2003 
Germany 1996-2003 
 
 
Portugal 1976-85 
Sweden 1986-95 
Cyprus 1986-95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
Openness 
increase 
(δx >10%)  
 
Spain 1986-95 
 
Ireland 1976-85 
Austria 1986-95 
France 1986-95 
Denmark 1986-95 
Greece 1986-95 
Lithuania 1996-2003 
Poland 1996-2003 
Hungary 1996-2003 
Czech Rep. 1996-2003 
Bulgaria 1996-2003 
Romania 1996-2003 
Netherlands 1986-95 
Italy 1986-95 
Hungary 1986-95 
Portugal 1986-95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Belgium 1986-95 
Malta 1986-95 
Poland 1986-95 
Slovakia 1996-2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
Not known  Turkey 1996–2003  Luxembourg 1986-95 
Luxembourg 1996-2003 
Czech Rep. 1986-95 
Turkey 1986-95 
– 
Notes: The definition of the change-in-openness indicator within a period is the average of the yearly values in 
the second half of the period as a percentage of the average of the yearly values in the first half. Data for 
the openness-to-trade indicator comes from chapter 3 in this report. The definition of the Gini change is 
the percentage change of the Gini of the period end-year to the period start-year (or the closest to it). 
Sources: Förster & d’Ercole (2005) and Tóth et al. (2006)  based on the Eurostat NewCronos database.  
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Table 8.6 Linear regression models for cross-country differences in income inequality and poverty, EU-24* 
Gini index  S80/S20  Income poverty 
  
Regr. coeff.  
(st. error)  Standardised coeff. 
Regr. coeff.  
(st. error)  Standardised coeff. 
Regr. coeff.  
(st. error)  Standardised coeff. 
GDP per capita, PPS 
-0.071 
(0.026)  -0.722 
-0.019 
(0.006)  -0.795 
-0.058 
(0.024)  -0.600 
Globalisation index 
-0.067 
(0.114)  -0.135 
-0.016 
(0.026)  -0.132 
-0.074 
(0.107)  -0.152 
Social expenditures (% of GDP) 
-0.595  
(0.169)  -0.731 
-0.132 
(0.038)  -0.683 
-0.556 
(0.154)  -0.698 
Employment rate 
-0.039 
(0.132) -0.063 
-0.016 
(0.029) -0.110 
-0.154 
(0.123) -0.254 
EU member status (0-OMS, 1-NMS)
-8.135 
(2.114)  -0.983 
-1.999 
(0.473)  -1.016 
-8.737 
(1.971)  -1.077 
Constant 
64.560 
(8.603)  – 
13.397 
(1.925)  – 
56.568 
(8.021)  – 
Number of observations  24  24  24 
R-square 0.63  0.67  0.66 
* Lack of data for Cyprus 
Note: Regression coefficients are significant at the 1% or 5% levels. 
Source: Tóth & Gábos (2006). 
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One should not forget one of the most important influences on the inequality 
increase that occurred in one out of three current EU countries: transition. Bearing this 
point in mind makes those attempts to sort out the inequality effects of globalisation 
even more complicated. As noted above, the transition from a planned to a market 
economy constitutes in itself a sort of globalisation. Liberalisation in the direction of 
other European states (that is, economic integration within the EU) and liberalisation 
towards other parts of the world (less or more developed countries as well) has meant 
a two-stage globalisation for the transition countries. It is true, however, that while 
integration into the EU has entailed technology imports from a more developed part of 
the world, the current globalisation challenges that transition countries are facing test 
the competitiveness of their low-cost, low-skill industries.  
The implications of the analysis of inequality for social policy are thus mixed. 
Boeri (2002) suggests that it would be better to “let social policy models compete and 
Europe will win”. Yet, as Sapir (2005) puts it, the combined GDP of countries with 
inefficient models accounts for some two-thirds of Europe.68 The key policy message is 
that the solution lies not so much in trying to slow down or reverse globalisation – 
even if that were an option – but rather to change the policy approaches of European 
countries. The next part of the study extends and develops the policy analysis. 
                                                      
68 This point applies to the EU-15, but this share would be even higher if the EU-10 were taken 
into account. As for the need for reform, see also European Commission (2005j and 2004b).  
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POLICY ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS 
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he empirical analysis and other material presented in part I provides compelling 
evidence of the steady increase in most of the indicators usually considered to 
constitute globalisation. On the whole, the trends are gentle, rather than 
dramatic, implying that there is neither the likelihood of major shifts in the patterns of 
international exchanges, nor an imminent risk of a crisis affecting the EU. Equally, the 
landscape has clearly changed, probably irreversibly. Whereas in the past, the US was 
seen as the leading economy and the principal benchmark against which Europe ought 
to judge its progress in ‘catching up’, internationalisation has become much broader in 
scope and the geographical reach of globalisation has grown much greater.  
In particular, China and India are much more than poorly understood 
competitors that threaten narrow segments of traditional manufacturing, having 
become major players in the world economy. Their competitive position is evolving 
rapidly and they represent a huge increase not only in the global labour force, but also 
in the number of actual and potential global consumers. Both countries, while facing 
huge unresolved problems of poverty and inequality, as well as environmental 
degradation, are making determined efforts to develop their presence in the high-
technology, knowledge-intensive activities of the future. Moreover, other emerging 
economies are making substantial strides that offer the prospect of a new international 
division of economic activity and the extension of international competition into areas 
hitherto shielded from such forces. 
In this multipolar world, Europe can afford neither to stand still nor to delude 
itself into believing that it can stand apart from these trends. Europe has a social model 
that, even allowing for all the variants that can be observed across the continent, is the 
envy of much of the rest of the world, but the model(s) is (are) under pressure from 
underlying drivers of change, not least demography. Consequently, change is required 
not just to equip Europe for the evolving competitive challenges of globalisation, but 
also to modernise the social policy responses to transformations already underway in 
society. In essence, these are the challenges that the Lisbon strategy (and within it the 
elaboration of ‘flexicurity’) seeks to address. While globalisation offers great 
opportunities for improved economic welfare and job creation, its benefits cannot be 
taken for granted. It will require adaptation of the European social model, but not its 
dismantling. 
In considering directions for policy responses, misapprehensions about what is 
and is not happening need to be dispelled, and false dichotomies have to be exposed 
and contradicted, so as to focus on the sorts of reforms that should be given priority. 
While some are obvious and reasonably well understood, even if confronted by 
resistance, others are less so. Migration, for instance, is shown in part II not to be a 
source of pressure on social protection budgets, despite public perceptions. The fact 
remains, as noted in the introductory chapter, that Europeans are apprehensive about 
globalisation and perceive it as a growing threat, yet overall they benefit from it. Nor is 
there much sign that globalisation per se is behind social policy developments. Indeed, 
one of the most striking aspects of the much-feared ‘race to the bottom’ is its complete 
lack of empirical support: as the analysis in part II shows, there have been plenty of 
changes and more are in the pipeline, but these cannot be ascribed to globalisation 
easily (and certainly not solely). 
TIS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 133 
 
Alesina & Giavazzi (2006) are among those who argue that the differences 
between Europeans and Americans are growing more substantial and becoming more 
deeply rooted. They cite the fact that “Europeans take longer vacations and retire 
early” and value job security, while Americans “work long hours” and are prepared to 
go through bankruptcy and frequent ups and downs in the labour market. Although it 
can be pointed out that their crude generalisations mask a wide range of behaviours in 
both continents, a key policy question is whether the European model, especially, is 
incompatible with retaining competitiveness in increasingly open international 
markets. Alesina & Giavazzi acknowledge that there are features of the European 
model that are unambiguously better than its American counterpart, but they also 
emphatically reject as fuzzy thinking the idea that there is a middle or ‘third’ way that 
will allow the best of both worlds. More specifically, they are scathing about the idea 
that there are ‘degrees’ of market economy or that concepts such as the social market 
economy are tenable, stating bluntly that “a market economy is a market economy: 
qualifications are misleading”.  
Yet it is far from obvious that a largely market-led vision is the only way 
forward, not least because of the perceptions in so many EU member states that so-
called ‘neo-liberal’ policies are undermining the fabric of European society. The views 
of Giddens (2007) and his collaborators in the Policy Network suggest an altogether 
different response to globalisation, which puts social justice at the forefront of the 
analysis. While recognising that not all welfare states in Europe are achieving 
satisfactory outcomes, Giddens is at pains to point out that among the most 
competitive economies in the EU are the Nordic countries, which retain extensive 
welfare states. He therefore argues that social justice must be at the heart of the Lisbon 
strategy, and is critical of “airy statements about reducing social exclusion, as so much 
of the EU official literature does”. 
In this part of the report, we concentrate on the policy dimensions of 
globalisation. Chapter 9 considers, first, how to interpret globalisation from a policy 
perspective, distinguishing between its advantages and its threats. We then present 
and assess the main policy-related findings of the study and go on to consider how 
policy priorities might be affected under different assumptions about the future 
trajectory of globalisation. A discussion of policy options and methodologies follows, 
and the report concludes with a series of policy-related recommendations.  
134 | 
9.  UNDERSTANDING THE POLICY ISSUES 
or the EU, the overarching social dimension of globalisation is what it implies for 
the future of the European social model in its different guises. Where other global 
regions may regard income generation and market share as the primary goals, 
Europe has a more complex objective function that is encapsulated in its sustainable 
development strategy. This strategy gives considerable weight to competitiveness, but 
also accords substantial importance to social cohesion and a sustainable environment, 
which are goals of equal standing in the strategy. Consequently, the EU can be 
characterised as open and welcoming to globalisation, but concerned to shape it in a 
manner that is consistent with its wider socio-economic aims. This does not mean 
retrenchment into outdated policies and practices, despite calls for opposition to 
globalisation, so much as engaging in modernisations and reforms that reflect the 
underlying values. The EU has faced mockery for its Lisbon aim to become “the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world”, but the second 
half of this statement is often (unfairly) overlooked, namely, “capable of sustainable 
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”.69 
Alesina & Giavazzi (2006) succinctly articulate one way forward for Europe:  
Europe does not need more public money in a myriad of programs. Europe needs 
reforms that create incentives and make its people willing to work hard and 
longer, take risks, and innovate. Europe needs more competition, not more public 
infrastructures. European universities need more ‘market incentives’, not more 
public money. European firms need lower taxes, less heavily regulated labour 
markets, and better functioning product markets, not more subsidies and 
protection. This does not mean that Europe simply needs to adopt the entire US 
model. Indeed, there are aspects of the European welfare state that are efficient and 
should be preserved. But too often the benefits to overprotected insiders get 
precedence over the needs of the general public and, in particular, at a cost to the 
younger generation.  
But theirs is not the only way… 
One of the most committed opponents of globalisation is the movement known 
as ATTAC (Association pour la Taxation des Transactions financières pour l’Aide aux 
Citoyennes et citoyens). ATTAC argues that globalisation has been dominated by 
powerful economic interests, big banks, investment funds, transnational groups and 
other owners of big capital, in what is described as a neo-liberal agenda. ATTAC claims 
t h a t  i n  t h i s  i d e o l o g y ,  s o c i a l  p r o b l e m s  a r e  m o s t  r e a d i l y  s o l v e d  b y  b e i n g  l e f t  t o  t h e  
market. Not surprisingly, ATTAC portrays globalisation as a failure in its mission of 
bringing prosperity to all and calls for a reassertion of social values to counter what it 
sees as the negative social impact of globalisation in the developed countries as well as 
the rest of the world. The social effects cited include employment that is more 
precarious, the use of underpaid or unpaid women’s labour to cut costs and cutbacks 
in social protection, all of which increase inequality and the risk of poverty. At the 
                                                      
69 See Council of the European Union (2000). 
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heart of the ATTAC case is the proposition that globalisation in its neo-liberal form 
results in many losers and only a few winners.  
Clearly, these visions of globalisation, and thus of what the policy directions and 
prescriptions ought to be, are incompatible. It is therefore useful to preface a policy 
discussion by reviewing the main sources of costs and benefits, which is the subject of 
the next section. We then develop an inventory of the central policy issues that have to 
be confronted in responding to globalisation. 
9.1  The costs and benefits 
Processes often referred to as ‘globalisation’, especially the deepening international 
division of labour affected through growing trade and investment flows, can overall be 
adjudged to have undeniable benefits. The exchange of products makes trading parties 
better off. Flows of products and investment increase productive capacity by 
facilitating the transfer of knowledge and technology. International investment flows 
often help create capital dramatically faster than used to be the case with relatively 
closed economies, while improving returns for savers. Openness to trade usually helps 
heterogeneous economies to improve their governance patterns. But even in more 
mono-sectoral economies, where rent-seeking and monopoly practices may 
temporarily be sustained by intensified trade, openness tends subsequently to 
accentuate political pressures for change. Equally, analysts and ultimately policy-
makers need to be aware that the impact of globalisation depends very much on the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  e n d o w m e n t s  i n  t h e  e c o n o m y  a n d  i n  s o c i e t y .  A p p r o p r i a t e  p o l i c y  
decisions based on the knowledge of linkages between globalisation-related effects and 
the impact on welfare will help create public or market-based mechanisms that should 
aid the management of risks emanating from globalisation, and contribute to robust 
economic performance. Hence, the ‘creative destruction’ resulting from globalisation 
will not only affect the economy, but will almost unavoidably introduce new and 
possibly unanticipated changes in the distribution of income. Globalisation may thus 
disturb and disrupt the mechanisms of social ‘justice’ in the sense of John Rawls (1973). 
A common concern of European policy-makers is the mediocre growth 
performance of the European countries over the last three decades, which is apt to be 
seen as empirical evidence that globalisation is not working for Europe. Despite the 
positive impact of European economic integration on economic growth, Europe’s 
performance has deteriorated, both absolutely in comparison with earlier decades and 
relatively in comparison with the US, let alone the dynamic emerging economies such 
as China. In the post-war period, Europe enjoyed a combination of high growth rates 
and a high level of social protection. This successful economic performance lasting 
from 1945 to 1975 was based on factor accumulation, imitation of technologies and 
large-scale production. This process led Europe closer to the technology frontier, 
however. At the same time, the new technological revolutions in communications and 
information made leading European industries susceptible to offshore production in 
middle-income, newly industrialised countries with educated workforces and lower 
labour costs. In this new environment, imitation has lost its power in creating 
production structures capable of coping with international competition, and 
innovation at the frontier has become the main engine of growth. It is easy in these 
circumstances to blame globalisation for the malaise of the EU economies and to decry 136 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
délocalisations, but it is very often misleading to do so. In practice, as many authors 
have shown, globalisation brings a variety of threats and opportunities. 
9.1.1  The advantages of globalisation 
The rapid changes in the world economy owing to the acceleration of the globalisation 
process are expected to yield significant gains to EU countries, as well as to other 
global regions, through more efficient allocation of world resources. This more efficient 
allocation of resources will boost growth with potentially positive effects on social 
welfare by offering the prospect, and very often the reality, of greater aggregate 
prosperity. The economic benefits of globalisation partly reflect the large body of 
theory and empirical evidence on the gains from increased specialisation. They also 
flow from the access to knowledge and the reorganisation taking place in value chains. 
The principal benefits of globalisation can be summarised under a number of key 
headings: 
•  The diffusion of technology combined with larger markets should stimulate 
economic growth by facilitating productivity growth.  
•  A spur to innovation as a competitive factor can also lead to higher productivity 
and improved living standards. 
•  A better configuration of the value chain, in which comparative advantage and 
specialisation gain according to economic geography characteristics, translates 
into a higher aggregate output. 
•  More responsive capital markets can allocate resources to where they can attain 
the highest return, with knock-on benefits for the EU’s savers. 
•  Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows can achieve a better matching of savings 
and investment flows across the world, including the fact that such flows 
continue to provide capital and opportunities for richer countries such as the EU 
member states. 
•  Demand from emerging markets is the flip side of the rapid expansion of new 
competitors. Fears expressed in the EU-15 about competition from the recently 
acceded member states have proved to be unfounded, as these dynamic 
economies have greatly increased their imports from the former. Similar 
increases in demand can be expected from the new global competitors, including 
China and India. The upshot is that new sources of demand tend to offset losses 
in selected markets, including the domestic one. 
•  Consumers gain from obtaining access to cheaper sources of goods and services. 
Yet the fall in prices relies on the level of competition in the product markets. If 
markets are characterised by an oligopolistic structure, the positive price effect of 
globalisation may be more limited. Here, many authors point to the rising 
saliency of the multinational enterprise as a feature of globalisation, but also as 
the driver of trade, investment and technological changes.  
•  With all the world population growth in the coming decades forecasted to be in 
developing countries, there is a potential labour supply for ‘ageing’ Europe. IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 137 
 
The macroeconomic position 
What is important to note is that many of the gains are pervasive, but often not very 
visible or readily calculable, with the result that there is no easily quantifiable figure 
for the overall benefits. Jaumotte & Tytell (2007) estimate, for example, that falling 
prices for traded goods have increased output and real labour incomes in the 
‘advanced’ economies by about 6% over the last quarter of a century. This gain has 
been accompanied by substantial increases in real terms in the labour incomes of 
emerging market economies, yet it is also probable that the competitive pressures have 
been one factor behind the general decline in inflation. There has nonetheless been a 
tendency for the labour share of income to fall, a trend that has appeared in most 
advanced economies in recent years (although the supposedly Anglo-Saxon economy 
of the UK is a notable exception). ‘Labour globalisation’ may be a factor in this shift, 
but Jaumotte & Tytell (2007) argue that technological change has had a bigger impact, 
above all on the levels of unskilled wages, and also notes that despite the fall in share, 
real labour incomes have “grown robustly in advanced economies”, especially in the 
Anglo-Saxon ones.  
The degree to which real wages in the most dynamic emerging markets converge 
with richer countries is striking. According to Jaumotte & Tytell (2007), real 
manufacturing wages in China (adjusted for purchasing power) caught up from 7.4% 
of the US level in 1992 to 16.1% 10 years later in 2002. Over the same period, Korean 
wages went from 48.8% to 70.2%. By and large, such relative changes reflect growth 
rates, and it is noteworthy that economically less successful emerging economies have 
not seen similar rates of catching-up. The policy implication, however, is that the 
economies that do expand significantly will follow a well-trodden path of seeing rising 
wages and growing consumer demand. 
9.1.2  Presumed threats and challenges 
Critics of globalisation identify a broad range of actual or potential threats from 
unfettered globalisation. These encompass distributive impacts, such as adverse 
consequences for specific groups in society, issues of cultural hegemony, concerns 
about environmental damage and geopolitical disruption, nowadays especially from 
terrorism. 
The main threats identified from globalisation arise from the intensification of 
competition, pressures on public finances and the repercussions of migration. The 
existence of a number of restrictions on trade and on labour flows provides the EU 
member states with relatively more insulation from the more pernicious effects of 
globalisation than other countries around the world. Nevertheless, they still face a 
number of potentially serious social costs that are associated with the process of 
globalisation. Torres (2001, p. 1) makes the point that the sheer complexity of 
globalisation and its many dimensions means that “identifying a simple relationship 
between globalisation and social progress is impossible”. The range of effects can be 
grouped under five main headings. 
Social dumping and tax competition 
Social dumping results from the rising competition of countries for the attraction of 
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This competitive deregulation is complemented by the impact of tax competition on 
the welfare state (Bretschger & Hettich, 2002; Winner, 2005). The free mobility of 
factors of production stemming from globalisation can tempt countries to embark on 
tax competition aimed at attracting the tax bases of relatively more mobile factors of 
production (e.g. capital). In equilibrium, this process lowers tax rates to suboptimal 
levels, leaving tax bases unaltered with a negative impact on government revenue, at 
least in the short run. This process restricts the ability of countries to preserve a strong 
welfare state and increases the relative tax burden of less mobile production factors 
(e.g. labour). In contrast to this process, the need for a strong welfare state may increase 
with globalisation for at least three reasons. First, many of the arguments supporting 
the existence of the welfare state (the presence of uncertainty that could otherwise 
reduce innovation and investment) become more significant in a globalised 
environment. Second, gains from globalisation may spread unevenly across 
individuals. Third, exploiting the efficiency gains from globalisation depends crucially 
on the existence of the welfare state and its role in preserving a suitable economic and 
regulatory environment. 
A rise in unemployment  
For developed countries in general and EU countries in particular, globalisation can 
have a negative effect on employment, at least in the short term. Yet, this effect is not 
uniformly distributed across the population, but has hitherto had a disproportionate 
effect on low-skilled workers. Skill-biased technological change reduces the demand 
for unskilled labour, leading to higher long-term unemployment among unskilled 
workers in Europe. The magnitude of this effect depends on the ability of workers to 
be successfully retrained. At the same time, international outsourcing leads to a shift in 
relative demand for labour and increases the employment share of highly skilled 
versus low-skilled labour. As shown in chapter 4 of this report, firms outsource the 
low-skilled, intensive parts of production and hence increase the relative demand for 
skilled labour. Empirical work examining the effects of outward FDI on home 
employment provides mixed evidence, however, while at the same time showing that 
at least some of the short-term costs are reversed in the longer term (Brainard & Riker, 
1997; Blomstrom et al., 1997; Mariotti et al., 2003).  
A rise in income inequality and poverty 
Trade increases the efficiency of production and affects the income of factor prices in a 
way that is rarely beneficial for all individuals. If economies are endowed with 
different capital/labour ratios, in theory free factor mobility will induce capital 
(labour) to move from the economies with a high (low) capital/labour ratio to those in 
which capital (labour) is relatively scarce. This process in turn affects the distribution 
of income since it increases the relative income of capital (labour) in the countries 
endowed with a high (low) capital/labour ratio. Moreover, trade arising from 
differences in technologies can have a positive impact on all workers only in the 
unrealistic scenario that all workers are identical and fully mobile across industries. 
Otherwise, technological innovation will tend to raise the relative demand for skilled 
labour. As a result, the relative income of skilled versus unskilled labour will tend to 
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are likely to lead to increased levels of inequality and (relative) poverty. Yet as chapter 
8 showed, the empirical picture is decidedly mixed and inconclusive. 
A rise in international migration 
Increased international migration entails both costs and benefits for all countries 
involved. From the perspective of economic benefits, migration has two important 
effects. First, it can facilitate economic growth by raising labour supply or by affecting 
the skill composition of the workforce. Second, it may partly tackle the financial 
burden imposed on the social welfare systems of industrialised countries by the ageing 
of their populations. The evidence presented in chapter 7 suggests that in many 
European countries migrants generate at least transitory positive effects on existing 
pay-as-you-go pension systems. On the cost side, migration may reduce wages and 
increase unemployment in the host country, especially if migrants’ skills are similar to 
those of workers in the host country.  
The European Commission’s Second Annual Report on Migration and Integration 
(European Commission, 2006b) notes that net migration, which has grown significantly 
i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  c o n t i n u e s  t o  b e  t h e  m a i n  s o u r c e  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  g r o w t h ,  w i t h  s o m e  
member states such as Spain and Cyprus experiencing exceptional increases. Yet the 
report also notes that national policies are becoming more diverse, although a general 
trend is towards policies that are more restrictive. Moreover, it is clear that the 
integration of migrants remains problematic, even in those countries that appear to 
have adapted social policies well in relation to the complexities of globalisation (see 
Begg & Marlier, 2007). For example, the employment rate of migrants in Denmark – the 
country that tops the table for employment rates in several segments of the working 
population – is significantly below that of the indigenous population. In several 
member states, the extent of participation of immigrants in civic society is low and 
there are specific problems among target groups, notably women and dependent 
migrants. 
A rise in regional inequality 
In theory, in a frictionless world the process of globalisation should gradually 
eliminate regional inequality. The free mobility of goods and factors of production 
should enforce a more efficient allocation of resources internationally through the 
equation of marginal productivity and income across different regions. Low-income 
regions should grow faster than high-income regions as they will attract more capital 
and be able to exploit their comparative advantage. In the real world, however, 
production often concentrates in relatively advanced regions in order to exploit 
agglomeration effects and increasing returns to scale, such that the catch-up process of 
backward regions becomes very difficult. EU countries are partly protected from the 
effects of globalisation because of the existing restrictions to trade with the rest of the 
world (especially trade in agricultural products) – although these restrictions have 
declined substantially in recent decades. Still, the EU countries remain exposed to free 
capital mobility. Furthermore, European economic integration is a form of 
globalisation on a smaller scale. According to the Sapir et al. (2004) report, in the 1980–
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across the EU member states, while within most countries one can observe a 
divergence of GDP levels across regions. 
Plainly, there will always be localised impacts of structural change and these 
impacts may be long-lasting ones. Many regions and localities largely dependent on 
traditional industries in decline – such as coal mining, steel-making, ship-building and 
textiles – faced severe economic problems during the latter half of the 20th century. 
Among the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe, the decline of state-
owned enterprises had a similar, although often even more pronounced effect during 
the 1990s. It is moreover safe to predict that further localities will be affected in this 
way from new forms of restructuring that themselves cannot readily be predicted. Two 
observations are nonetheless germane. First, in the contemporary economy, dominated 
as it is by relatively smaller and more diversified companies or branches of larger 
companies, the sheer number of large production units at risk has declined. Second, the 
understanding of economic development needs and of the contribution of different 
policies in this arena has improved considerably over the years.  
Other distributive effects 
It has to be recognised, however, that adjustment can be slow and that the 
consequences can be acute for affected groups. Adjustments to job losses and job gains, 
whether at the level of localities or among different occupational groups, take various 
forms and create a variety of social pressures. In boom areas, the social infrastructure 
can be become overrun and congested, while migrants drawn to the area often face 
poor housing conditions and varied forms of discrimination.  
The typical social repercussions of changing patterns of activity that result in 
economic decline include 
•  immediate job losses that raise the unemployment rate, with knock-on effects on 
other jobs in the local economy through depression of local demand; 
•  a decline in the employment rate and a rise in inactivity as displaced workers fall 
victim to invalidity or become detached from the labour market (Alcock et al., 
2003), sometimes also associated with an increase in social exclusion or mental 
health problems; 
•  migration away from the area, which can diminish local communities by leaving 
a more dependent population; and  
•  a loss of social capital for communities as a whole and the undermining of the 
human capital of the individual. 
All of these effects pose challenges for the European social model and social 
protection systems, which have simultaneously to meet expectations that they will 
contribute to adjustment trajectories, while offering solidarity. The next section 
considers what is at stake. 
9.2  Policy questions: What is at stake? 
Three issues are most central regarding the benefits from globalisation. First, 
globalisation gains are not uniformly distributed across individuals, regions or 
countries. Second, although the costs of globalisation are likely to be concentrated in 
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globalisation will depend on whether EU countries can succeed in combining high 
growth with a reformed model of social protection. 
Many of the prospective social advantages of globalisation flow from the 
anticipated increases in output afforded by the division of labour and the dynamism 
imparted by economic integration. It is also important to recognise that some of the 
un de r l y in g  p r o ce s se s  ca n  a l so  be  b e ne f ic ia l  a n d  n o t t o  t a k e  a  p u rely  s t a ti c vi ew  o f 
current trends. Thus, in the medium to long term, benefits such as the diffusion of 
technology and the competitive stimulus that may initially destroy jobs should 
translate into improved productivity gains for the EU. In short, it is misleading to 
portray international competition as a zero-sum game. 
Critics continue to claim that the EU model has to change. Thus, Alesina & 
Giavazzi (2006) hold that the growing welfare state in Europe was paid for by inflation 
in the 1970s and growing public debt in the 1980s, prompting them to assert that “the 
very institutions that had been responsible for the success of the 1960s became an 
obstacle for growth after the 1970s”. The thrust of their critique is encapsulated in their 
statement that “you can’t grow very fast if you work fewer and fewer hours per week, 
unless your productivity grows at extraordinary rates”. Yet the evidence is that 
countries that have implemented appropriate reforms have been able to promote 
equality and maintain social provision while prospering in international markets. Part 
of the answer is to adopt strict criteria for assessing the quality of social spending – 
moving away from the idea that aggregate social spending is the measure of social 
provision. Rather, the focus should be on whether social justice is being advanced and 
whether there is a ‘productive’ orientation to the system.  
Globalisation as a process calls for a variety of means of adjustment. It entails 
assisting workers to adapt to the new economic environment and offering sufficient 
protections to those in transition. The diverse welfare states in the EU have differing 
performances in this regard, suggesting that there is considerable room for learning 
and experimentation in facilitating adjustment. It is in addition relevant that all EU 
countries face similar core issues for the future, but have to respond on the back of past 
structures and approaches that reflect preferences that have been forged over decades. 
Solutions therefore have to be customised. 
A commonly held view, despite the lack of hard evidence that it is happening, is 
that globalisation is bound to threaten established welfare states because of 
competitive pressures. The argument runs as follows: 
•  offshored or outsourced work leads to unemployment; 
•  payments of social charges fall; 
•  demands for social protection rise; 
•  generosity therefore has to diminish; or  
•  taxes have to increase, which raises costs and which in turn accelerates 
offshoring, and so forth. 
Yet it is also important to stress offsetting effects. First, there is a boost to real 
incomes from the lower prices of imports. Second, the job losses resulting from 
international competitive effects are small in scale compared with normal ‘creative 
destruction’ in the labour market. In the same vein, the pressures on social protection 
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value jobs may be less damaging than it sounds: if offshoring means retaining only 
high-value jobs, it could be seen as a logical answer to a declining labour force.  
Additionally, if ‘social protection as a productive factor’ is to be realised as an 
objective, there manifestly have to be changes in the nature of regimes, implying a 
need to reconcile the protective, productive and solidarity elements of social 
protection. Incentives are critical. The tension in social safety nets, according to an 
OECD study by van den Noord et al. (2006), is that their presence may help overcome 
resistance to globalisation, “but they can also weaken the incentives to work and save”. 
The authors show that safety nets, in certain circumstances, prolong adverse shocks 
and have a negative impact on employment. Insofar as safety nets favour insiders, they 
can offset resistance to globalisation, yet may also harden the opposition of outsiders. 
Their research is ambivalent, however, about the effect on business investment. 
The trend towards increased inequality is partly attributable to lower taxation on 
high incomes. Still, it is not evident whether the latter is a consequence of tax 
competition induced by globalisation or is instead a microeconomic shift – which first 
emerged as ‘Reaganomics’ – aimed at increasing incentives in the interests of 
enterprise. The policy question is whether inequality is damaging to social cohesion, 
and here it has to be emphasised that inequality and poverty are not (necessarily) two 
faces of the same phenomenon.70 
It would be disingenuous to dismiss claims that globalisation has costs. As report 
after report stresses, the benefits of globalisation do not accrue automatically to all. 
Workers do lose jobs and they are not redeployed instantly. Some categories of 
workers will face systematic downgrading of their earning capacity. By contrast, the 
gains may be very substantial for other groups. What this adds up to is that 
globalisation may have aggregate gains, but has distributive consequences, and it is 
predictable that those who lose will shout louder than those who gain. 
Much of the discourse around globalisation, however, is still centred on a 
‘manufacturist’ view of the world. In this regard, it is an open question how different 
the ‘knowledge’ economy is from the economic structures that preceded it, wherein 
mass manufacturing was perceived as the driving force of prosperity, notwithstanding 
the progressive decline of the manufacturing share. Today, private services of various 
kinds and publicly-funded services account for the bulk of jobs. Many of these jobs are 
low-skilled, poorly paid and often subject to greater precarity, albeit not directly in 
competition with the rest of the world: a care assistant employed in Lyon at the 
minimum wage does not compete with a hospital cleaner in Bangalore. But in 
manufacturing, low-skilled jobs are increasingly disappearing because of new 
technologies and it is in this domain that the threat of outsourcing or imports from 
China and India may be contributing to the insecurity of the worst-off. Even so, it is in 
business services that some of the main contemporary challenges of globalisation may 
become most acute, as the discussion in part I demonstrates. 
 
                                                      
70 Giddens (2007) does make the telling point that if poverty is defined as only relative to a 
median income line, then poverty and inequality become synonymous.  
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10. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU SOCIAL AGENDA 
AND THE SOCIAL POLICY STRATEGIES OF 
MEMBER STATES 
his chapter explores the main policy implications of globalisation for the EU and 
its member states. It should be noted that several aspects of globalisation are 
closely linked with features of European integration, making it difficult to 
identify which one is the principal cause or at what level the policy response should be 
envisaged. Nevertheless, some attempt is made to disentangle the corresponding 
effects and to focus on policies dealing with the socio-economic consequences of 
globalisation that are not directly related to the process of European integration.  
As EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson put it recently, “there are real 
challenges. Rapid change means opportunity for many, threats for some and 
uncertainty for most” (Mandelson, 2007, p. 12). Yet he also makes clear that “the 
politics of globalisation are the politics of change”, and it can be argued that the real 
focus of attention should be around the adaptation of social protection systems. Tony 
Atkinson (2004) has drawn attention to the role that social protection systems play in 
responding to globalisation, pointing out that in the early 20th century, when the 
previous wave of globalisation reached its peak, social protection systems were already 
well established even if their outlays were small. Atkinson disagrees with others (he 
cites Tanzi, 2004) who date modern welfare states to the inter-war (and thus 
protectionist) period. He asserts instead that they arose as a direct complement to the 
prosperity that was being generated by increased international exchanges, precisely 
because it afforded the means of countering trends towards unacceptable levels of 
inequality: “[S]ocial insurance was a response to the perceived shortcomings of the 
industrialised market economy.”  
The differences among EU member states debunk the idea that it is only lightly 
taxed economies that rein back their welfare states that can prosper in an increasingly 
competitive, globalised world. Rodrik (1997) has shown that economies that are more 
open tend to have larger governments, demonstrating that the reason is to cushion 
segments of the economy from shocks and to facilitate efficient labour-market 
adjustment. The Nordic economies illustrate this conjunction and the Nordic 
experience shows it is possible to have a flexible labour market, high trade intensity, 
balanced budgets, high growth and a strong welfare state with low levels of poverty 
and few structural social problems such as long-term unemployment. Still, this does 
not mean that social policy in general and social protection in particular can avoid 
scrutiny and eventual reform, not just to contend with globalisation, but also the many 
other dilemmas facing the welfare state, such as those associated with population 
ageing. In essence, this is the backdrop to much of the debate around the concept of 
flexicurity.  
Today, social policy aims at being both more extensive and complex, embracing 
the many different EU social priorities (as articulated by the European Commission in 
its 2005 relaunch of the social agenda). The headline goals are, first, employment, and 
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second, fighting poverty and promoting equal opportunities. Compared with the early 
20th century responses to globalisation, the agenda now embraces gender, equality and 
social inclusion, as well as the protection of those at risk and countering poverty. 
Demography (identified as one of the underlying drivers of globalisation) is also 
recognised in the social agenda as one of the issues that policy has to confront. The 
press release accompanying the European Commission’s (2005d) Communication 
states that by “modernising labour markets and social protection systems, it will help 
people seize the opportunities created by international competition, technological 
advances and changing population patterns while protecting the most vulnerable in 
society”. 
10.1   Strategic social choices 
There are several directions that policy can take in responding to globalisation. At one 
extreme is opting out, following the prescription of non-governmental organisations 
such as ATTAC71 and the associated protest movements that now tend to congregate 
around meetings of the G8 and similar events. At the other extreme would be full 
market liberalisation, in all its dimensions, as sometimes advocated by the most radical 
economists. Somewhere in the middle is the mainstream European view captured in 
the Lisbon strategy (vintage 2000), which calls for extensive supply-side reforms, 
tempered by policies to assure social cohesion. It is a middle way that lies between 
what Mandelson (2007) has called the standpoint of the hyper-globalists and that of the 
protectionists. He identifies – and rejects – “hyper-globalism”, which portrays 
globalisation as an irresistible economic force in which global capital imposes neo-
liberal economic policies on all governments, with the implication that the EU cannot 
muster the political capability to shape this change. But the mainstream European view 
is not one that espouses protectionism either. 
The core policy package, reiterated in many a communication or policy 
statement, comprises fiscal consolidation, labour market reforms aimed at raising 
employment rates (especially for target groups), much-increased effort on research and 
innovation, an intensification of competition and better regulation. This mix has been 
referred to as the Brussels–Frankfurt consensus, in parallel with (but not slavishly 
following) the well-known Washington equivalent long advocated by the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Adjusting to globalisation implies a number of 
adaptations, many of which will have social ramifications that need to be managed. As 
the European Policy Committee (EPC) notes in a recent report (EPC, 2005), it is 
imperative that Europe’s economies are able to move labour and capital swiftly and 
with ease “to take advantage of new opportunities and potential income gains, and 
minimise adjustment costs”. Particular concerns are to avoid concentrations of 
displaced workers. Much of the analysis in this report is consistent with the middle 
way. Even so, it is also important to stress that there are many areas in which choices 
still need to be made, some difficult, others harsh. What is meant by structural reform 
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is not always agreed, although the main elements tend to be variations on the same 
lists; for example, Trichet (2006) has suggested four priorities: 
•  moving more people into work, 
•  increasing competition, 
•  unlocking business potential, and 
•  supporting an innovative environment. 
A three-pronged policy approach is advocated by Jaumotte & Tytell (2007), 
which calls for adverse distributive impacts to be addressed by the following 
orientations: 
–  Improve the functioning of labor markets. Policies that reduce labor costs 
and increase the ease with which workers move from declining to expanding 
areas of the economy would help the adjustment. In some countries, making 
health care less dependent on continued employment and increasing the 
portability of pension benefits would also contribute.  
–  Increase access to education and training. Workers in skilled sectors have 
been better able to adapt to changing conditions caused by the ICT revolution 
than workers in unskilled sectors. Improved education and training will help 
workers compete with the growing pool of skilled workers in emerging 
market countries, especially in Asia. 
–  Ensure adequate safety nets during the adjustment period. Adequate 
income support should be available to cushion, but not obstruct, the process 
of change. 
Other topics might be included, but the underlying messages are now sufficiently 
familiar that they do not require repetition. At the same time, there is an open question 
about where social policy fits into the structural reform agenda. The crude view that 
social protection is a drag on competitiveness has given way to a more nuanced 
discussion of how different approaches to social protection can feed into reform. The 
High-Level Group report on the future of social policy in the enlarged EU (European 
Commission, 2004b) is particularly emphatic in this regard, noting the need for lifelong 
learning, the modernisation of work organisation and reform of social protection 
systems. The High-Level Group also calls for a new intergenerational pact “focused on 
the young and based on confidence” and, in its discussion of opportunities, stresses 
that societal change creates new job opportunities in a range of areas for which 
knowledge is key. ‘New’ jobs call especially for competences in areas such as 
information technology and interpersonal communications.  
The High-Level Group points to the requirement for specific adaptations induced 
by globalisation, noting that three “compromises can be detected within the social 
model: between the state and the market; between labour and capital, requiring 
concerted action and a role for nationwide agreements; and between the welfare state 
and individual responsibility”. Key areas for action are 
•  the method of financing social protection, and especially the link to 
competitiveness; 
•  social dialogue, not least as a means of mediating change; 
•  efforts to counter the tendency towards the social exclusion of marginalised 
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•  new forms of security that go beyond income, notably lifelong learning and 
‘capital ownership’, especially through the activities of pension funds. 
In a similar vein, the ‘social stock-taking’ exercise currently being conducted by 
the European Commission (see the discussion paper by Liddle & Lerais, 2007), while 
arguing that it is internal social dynamics rather than globalisation that are having the 
greatest effects on social trends, identifies fairness between the generations as a major 
social issue. The balance between protection of the vulnerable and solidarity on the one 
hand, and dependency and weakened incentives to seize opportunities on the other, is 
stressed. The paper also draws attention to the balance between rights and 
responsibilities, noting a trend towards greater ‘individualisation’ as a phenomenon of 
recent years. At the same time, the paper notes the multiple social challenges of 
increased migration, with the many cultural and economic benefits attributable to 
immigrants being offset by problems of inadequate integration and the perception, if 
not necessarily the reality, that immigrants are a competitive threat to the indigenous 
population in diverse ways. 
A Communication from the Commission (2007b) builds on ideas in the Joint 
Employment Report (Council of the European Union, 2007a) to spell out what is meant 
by flexicurity. The Communication makes the link to globalisation very explicit. It 
stresses that flexicurity is about transitions between the different stages of working life 
and also that in combining the flexibility and security elements, a balance is being 
struck between competitive imperatives and the need to offer adequate social 
protection and income security. A further element is that the Communication 
recognises that those most at risk may be relatively more detached from the labour 
market and that there will be a need to offer more than conventional active labour 
market policies in a more comprehensive inclusion strategy. The latter can be defined 
to mean not only inclusion in the labour market, but also social empowerment, access 
to social services and adequate minimum incomes. 
The four components of flexicurity set out in the Communication are as follows: 
•  flexible contractual arrangements (from the perspective of both the employer 
and the employee) through modern labour laws allowing for sufficiently flexible 
work arrangements and reducing labour market segmentation and undeclared 
work. The link between productivity and wages is part of such arrangements; 
•  reliable and responsive lifelong learning  systems to ensure the continual 
adaptability and employability of workers. Financial and other incentives should 
be reviewed to achieve a breakthrough. EU funding should strongly support 
these enhanced efforts;  
•  active labour market policies, which effectively help people to cope with rapid 
change, unemployment spells and transitions to new jobs; and 
•  modern social security systems, which combine the provision of adequate 
income support with the need to facilitate labour market mobility. The removal 
of restrictions and obstacles for the mobility of workers within the EU, and 
measures to support work–life balance (including enhanced childcare) are part of 
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There is also an important strand within social inclusion policy that seeks to 
promote active inclusion, defined to mean not only inclusion in the labour market, but 
also social empowerment, access to social services and adequate minimum incomes.  
It is worth examining whether and how these orientations accord with the likely 
demands on policy emanating from globalisation and perhaps more importantly, 
where rhetoric stops and real policy momentum can be found. Immigration is a good 
example, since it can be anticipated that the integration of immigrants will require 
much more than just labour market policies. The 2007 Joint Report on Social Protection 
and Social Inclusion (European Commission,  2007a) notes that most member states have 
active labour market policies that reach out to disadvantaged workers, but there are 
shortcomings in minimum income provision and access to quality social services. The 
report calls specific attention to flexible working arrangements for older workers. 
A clear policy conclusion from reviewing the socio-economic costs and benefits 
of globalisation is that there is an urgent need for policy reforms aimed at mitigating 
costs and increasing gains to the greatest possible extent. Several policies seeking to 
maximise the advantages of globalisation will at the same time reduce its costs (for 
instance, policies promoting education), while enabling EU economies to achieve 
optimal positions in the new, emerging international division of labour. Yet reforms 
may differ significantly in their distributional impact and in the time needed for the 
full realisation of their effects. In general, reforms that will improve the benefits/costs 
ratio of globalisation in the long term while they are accompanied by a strong short-
term impact on social cohesion are more difficult to implement. Several policies 
belonging to this category, such as those aimed at reforming the welfare state and the 
labour market, are vital to enable the benefits from globalisation to be attained at the 
lowest possible cost. The next sections describe the principal policy actors and areas 
involved.  
10.2  The dimensions of a policy response 
Prospective responses to globalisation can come from all levels of government and they 
can be expected to engage a wide range of actors. Which aspects of the social 
dimension of globalisation are most relevant in the EU context? On the one hand, these 
include the different effects on target groups and on indicators of well-being and its 
distribution, all of which shape societal change. On the other hand, responses to what 
is perceived as globalisation embrace both economic and social policies, the social 
models that countries try to develop and the policy strategies, designs and 
instruments. The scope is considerable, covering inter alia labour market trends 
(employment, unemployment and remuneration); labour standards and rights to 
protection; the quality of work; and more overtly social objectives such as gender, 
social inclusion or cohesion, family policy and solidarity. Globalisation also entails 
looking at complementary policy areas that affect capacities to adjust, encompassing 
education, innovation and many other facets of the supply side.  
Consequently, the challenges that globalisation imposes on policy are grouped 
under three main headings. The first is that of equipping the economy to compete in 
the globalised age. The second involves the many demands on policy-makers to 
smooth adjustment. The third concerns the issues of governance. In all of these 
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adopted by member states, while the approach of other actors (such as the social 
partners) will also be influential. 
10.2.1 EU policies 
EU policies that bear extensively on globalisation have evolved in the areas of 
competitiveness, external relations and the social agenda. In responding to 
globalisation, several EU policies are relevant. Most obviously, the relaunched Lisbon 
strategy – the partnership for growth and jobs (PGJ) – is central, but it has to dovetail 
with other policy measures and instruments in providing both effective governance 
and real policy momentum. The social fund, for instance, has a role to play. 
A recent paper by two UK government ministers (Blunkett & Johnson, 2005) puts 
forward a (surprisingly?) persuasive case for EU policy: 
The European Union has a key role as a catalyst for change – identifying the 
challenges and promoting solutions. We have much to learn from each other and 
Europe should provide more opportunities to share experience and identify and 
share good practice, agreeing strategic targets and reviewing progress. It can also 
provide a forum for bringing together key actors, not only government but 
business, trade unions and other stakeholders. Ultimately, what happens in one 
nation state affects the potential for success in others. 
The areas in which the EU level can make the most impact – in the absence of 
more extensive funding (assuming no significant growth in the EU budget overall or in 
the ‘envelope’ for growth-related policies) – are partly regulatory and partly to do with 
the coordination of national policies. It is in the latter context that the evolution of the 
open method of coordination (OMC) will be critical. 
The partnership for growth and jobs 
The PGJ is in many ways a response to globalisation insofar as its primary aim is to 
reposition the EU in the global economy, while respecting social cohesion. In essence, it 
is a broad reform agenda, although in focusing especially on innovation and 
employment rates, it addresses two of the perceived weaknesses of the EU identified in 
many recent studies. The PGJ is both a policy framework, characterised by the 
integrated guidelines that map out the agenda for reform, and a policy methodology in 
which the emphasis is on policy coherence, learning from others and using good 
practices such as setting targets – in other words, the aims usually ascribed to the 
OMC. 
In social policy terms, perhaps the key issue is how employment evolves. Raising 
the employment rates is clearly identified as a core target of the PGJ. Yet while it is 
necessary, it can be argued that it is not sufficient to address fully the question of how 
to deal with the social dimension of the Lisbon strategy. Active inclusion, as a policy 
approach, is critical since it confronts employability, but social protection systems also 
have to be able to offer assistance to those who lose their connections with the labour 
market. Therefore, there is a need to enhance the links between the social protection 
and social inclusion strategies at the EU level and the PGJ. 
An important feature of the relaunch of the Lisbon agenda is that it is intended to 
offer a framework within which other policies both contribute and benefit. Trade is a 
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strategy (European Commission, 2006g), various internal policies, including “social 
and cohesion policy exert a strong influence on the capacity of EU companies to 
compete internationally”. The paper notes the importance of economic openness, but 
also highlights that while “the costs of change are limited at an aggregate level they are 
strongly felt in the specific areas they occur”. It also notes that benefits are “more 
diffuse and longer-term”. The implication is that a political economy problem exists 
and has to be managed. Along with a redefinition of the EU’s approach to external 
policy, the global Europe action plan stresses the need for complementary policies to 
support adaptation and education. 
Following the application, in 2006, of the OMC to social protection and social 
inclusion, member states have prepared national strategies in these policy areas. They 
are intended to complement and feed into the Lisbon strategy as part of the overall 
response to globalisation. In these domains, the importance of active inclusion policies 
has been emphasised (for an independent overview, see Begg, Berghman & Marlier, 
2006). Active inclusion has three overlapping elements: promoting inclusion in the 
labour market, assuring minimum incomes and empowering excluded individuals, 
notably by guaranteeing their access to public services. It is a policy approach that tries 
to reach out not just to unemployed individuals who are already economically active, 
but also to those more distant from the labour market. 
Cohesion 
Cohesion policy is another domain in which EU-level interventions can influence social 
impacts. Since EU economies differ in several aspects, such as their level of innovation 
or their capacity to engage in R&D, globalisation may widen income disparities across 
countries. Although EU cohesion policy is based on principles (the multi-annual 
programming of the expenditure, national co-financing of the EU transfers and the 
additionality of EU financing to national funds) that address such dilemmas, it is 
largely focused on regions (through structural funds) rather than on countries (through 
cohesion funds). While the 2007–13 programming period has seen an increased 
prominence accorded to Lisbon objectives, there are still doubts about whether enough 
attention is paid to the challenges of globalisation. Influential studies, such as the Sapir 
report, argue that EU convergence policy should concentrate on low-income countries 
rather than on low-income regions, and eligibility should be reviewed at the end of 
each programming period, even if such a move were to face political obstacles. 
Moreover, there is a need to revisit some of the policy instruments and to tailor them 
more closely to the circumstances of individual regions: for example, institution-
building may be more salient in some cases than investment in human and physical 
capital.  
Education 
Since the turn of the century, there have also been several initiatives at the EU level in 
the area of education policy.72 The principle is to advance policy in this area through 
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the OMC, emphasising policy learning and the exchange of experience. It is noted in 
the most recent Joint Interim Report of the Council and the Commission73 that the 
objectives of the approach in the context of the Lisbon strategy are both social and 
economic: the social aims include not only employment, but also a means of countering 
social exclusion, while the economic rationale is to boost “excellence, innovation and 
competitiveness”. This dual role of education is central in offering a constructive 
response to globalisation and is also regarded by the EU institutions as highly relevant 
to the future of the European social model. The report welcomes the higher priority 
given by most member states to education and training, but also notes that there are 
still large differences among them in the extent of commitments to lifelong learning 
and other elements of policy in the Lisbon agenda. 
In higher education, the Bologna process, through which the comparability of 
degrees and quality standards are meant to be assured, is a key measure. Yet the report 
notes that the EU as a whole lags well behind in its spending (private as well as public) 
on higher education, spending 1.2% of GDP in 2001. EU spending is below half that of 
notable competitors such as the US (3.2%) and Canada (2.5%), although the Nordic 
member states are well ahead of the EU average in this regard, with Sweden at 2.3% 
and Denmark at 2.8%. The report notes that to attain the US ratio, the EU member 
states in aggregate would need to spend an additional €180 billion per annum, a sum 
achievable only by mobilising more private funding. The funding of higher education 
is thus an area in which the EU needs to think afresh in responding to globalisation. 
Sustainable development 
A revised EU sustainable development strategy (SDS) was agreed in 2006, although its 
relationship with the PGJ is subject to some ambiguity. The overall aim of the SDS is to 
achieve continuous improvements in the quality of life for both current and future 
generations and to this end, the strategy sets out seven key challenges and 
corresponding overall objectives and targets. While the SDS tends to be associated 
most with environmental aims (being seen by some as ‘only’ the ‘environmental pillar’ 
of Lisbon), it has broader ambitions. In particular, the sixth of its seven objectives 
concerns social inclusion, demography and migration. A politically sensitive issue 
around the SDS is how potential clashes of objectives are resolved. 
Other policy areas 
The ability of countries to use exchange rate policies to stabilise their economies in the 
light of adverse economic events is limited by the openness of their economies. As 
emphasised by De Grauwe (2003), the higher the degree of an economy’s openness, the 
more rapidly the real effects of a currency’s realignment will disappear. Devaluation 
will increase inflation directly through a rise in import prices. The rise in inflation will 
boost wage demands, putting an upward pressure on production costs. Furthermore, 
                                                      
73 For further details, see Council of European Union, Modernising Education and Training: A 
Vital Contribution to Prosperity, and Social Cohesion in Europe, 2006 Joint Interim Report of 
the Council and of the Commission on Progress under the ‘Education & Training 2010’ Work 
Programme, OJ C79/01, 01.04.2006. IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 151 
 
the rise in the price of imported intermediate products and inputs will also stimulate a 
rise in the price of domestic products. As domestic products become more expensive, 
the impact of exchange rate devaluation on the competitiveness of the economy will 
disappear, leaving countries with an unaffected level of output but at the cost of a 
higher level of prices. Hence, the globalisation process implies the steady weakening of 
exchange rate policy as an effective instrument for economic stabilisation.  
The resulting implication is that in order to stabilise the EU after a symmetric 
shock and to avoid an EU-wide recession, alternative aggregate stabilisation policies 
(for example, monetary policy) should be used. On the other hand, at the national level 
the openness of the member states’ economies owing to globalisation reduces the cost 
of adopting the euro. Plainly, the cost of abandoning independent exchange rate policy 
in order to join a common currency area decreases as exchange-rate policy becomes 
less effective in a more open, globalised economic environment. 
In an increasingly open international economy, it becomes more likely that direct 
tax bases (personal and corporate incomes) will react elastically to tax rates. In the 
context of this new reality, achieving the desired level of redistribution becomes 
progressively more difficult. Moreover, since capital is significantly more mobile than 
labour, tax competition may shift the tax burden from capital to labour, adding some 
extra burden to the already high level of European unemployment. Indeed, with 
capital liberalisation, some member states have experienced an erosion of tax revenues 
coming from direct taxation of personal savings and of companies. Although proposals 
to harmonise several aspects of tax policy have been discussed for decades in the EU, 
only some very limited measures have been adopted because most proposals have 
been blocked by the requirement of unanimity in the Council. As recognised by the 
Sapir et al. report (2004), national decision-making, desired redistribution and 
integrated markets for goods and products form an inconsistent trinity.  
Furthermore, despite the steps taken at the EU level for deeper economic 
integration, the rapid pace of globalisation may gradually remove the option of 
imperfect economic integration. Thus, retaining a level of redistribution that would 
allow both the offsetting of the social costs of redistribution and the creation of 
conditions facilitating the growth process would require at least some form of 
coordinated decision-making.  
10.2.2 Member state policies 
Given that the EU level has scarcely any budgetary capacity in relation to social policy, 
with the corollary that its actions must necessarily be in the regulatory domain or in 
coordinating member state policies, it is at the member state level that the principal 
responses have to be funded and implemented. Joseph Stiglitz (2004), a member of the 
International Labour Organisation’s World Commission on Globalisation that 
produced that organisation’s study of the social impact of globalisation, explained that 
in the thinking of the World Commission and contrary to those who worry that 
globalisation has become a reason to criticise “excessive government intervention in 
the economy” the opposite is true. He asserts, “[T]the state has a role to play in 
cushioning individuals and society from the impact of rapid economic change. The 
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to play its proper role.” The question that then arises is where the member states 
should concentrate their efforts.  
Disparities in long-term unemployment rates reveal the differences among 
member states, but according to the EPC (2005) they do not provide firm evidence of 
the ‘best’ social model. Rather, the onus should be on member states to find solutions 
that reflect good practice (and hence draw on EU-level comparisons) in five areas, all of 
which concern the labour market: 
•  tax and benefit reforms that make work pay; 
•  improvements in the skills and employability of workers; 
•  active labour market policies that reach disadvantaged groups in the labour 
market; 
•  better-designed employment protection legislation; and 
•  flexibility at the regional and sectoral levels, not least in wages. 
Nevertheless, the labour market cannot be seen as the only arena in which 
member-state policy choices are critical in relation to social policy. Other key areas also 
merit focus by the member states: 
•  education systems; 
•  the reform of social protection, rather than its attrition, together with a more 
inclusive approach to immigrants; 
•  attention to labour standards; and 
•  a better appreciation of transitions to and from the world of work. 
Taking into account the heterogeneity of EU member states, not all policies are 
equally suitable or urgent. At the same time, enhancement of the capacity of 
government, public administration and legislatures to implement reforms and to 
ensure a high degree of efficiency in the delivery of social protection is fundamental to 
success. It is in many of these domains that the OMC is supposed to offer ways of 
achieving advances through policy transfer and learning. The success or failure of the 
OMC crucially depends on the efforts of national governments (especially in the 
implementation phase), the extent and quality of public scrutiny, and the ability to 
identify best practices. Hence, benchmarking along with the definition of indicators 
plays an important role. Benchmarks are the basis for well-founded evaluation, public 
scrutiny and peer review. Consequently, the definition and use of credible and 
accurate indicators is a sine qua non for a successful benchmarking exercise. 
Yet, in the absence of adequate and firm data and sufficient proof of a clear 
causal relationship between OMC processes/initiatives and social policy 
modifications, the successes and failures of the OMC are still debatable. On the one 
hand, it is reported that the OMC has generated noticeable change over the last few 
years (Pochet & Zeitlin, 2005). The main contributions of the OMC include the 
increased awareness being given to enhancing social inclusion by national 
governments, a better understanding of the main features and causes of poverty and 
social exclusion, and greater ambitions and enriched aspirations in social policy-
making. The OMC has allowed progress in social policy areas where the traditional 
regulation methods have confronted a lack of any consensus over priorities and an 
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On the other hand, hard-law proponents claim that opportunities for the 
necessary hard legislation may be crowded out unless the soft option is radically 
restricted. Soft coordination through the vague guidance of the European authorities 
may have occurred at the expense of top-down harmonisation of minimum legal 
standards, a fact that jeopardises the European social policy influence on national legal 
systems and turns any impact into something that is ‘illusory rather than actual’. In 
fact, for all its rhetoric, the ability of the OMC to coordinate national social policies 
towards convergence on best practice models has yet to prove its worth in the presence 
of a dominant European market law. The OMC is also evidently insufficient in areas of 
social and employment policy characterised by strong negative externalities. 
Against this backdrop, it is worth exploring how different policy areas can be 
expected to evolve at the national level. Prospective reforms can be explored under a 
number of headings. 
10.2.3 Welfare state reforms – Fleshing out flexicurity 
Global competition is related to higher uncertainty, and thus presents new difficulties 
for the management of social risks. One of the main justifications for government 
intervention in economic life, as well as for the establishment of the welfare state, is the 
presence of uncertainty and uninsurable risk. Globalisation tends to intensify this 
uncertainty, in turn strengthening the role of the welfare state. In fact, the existence of a 
safety net will encourage entrepreneurial risk-taking with a positive effect on growth. 
Nevertheless, social policy should aim at helping individuals to manage the steadily 
mounting risks by endowing them with the capabilities to do so rather than relying on 
mechanisms of insurance, redistribution and consumption smoothing. Enhancing these 
capabilities implies shifting social insurance from passive measures to those promoting 
education, lifelong learning and labour market participation (for example, through the 
provision of childcare facilities, maternity and paternity allowances, etc.). Such policies 
are likely to combat poverty and social exclusion among younger cohorts of the 
population (Muffels et al., 2002). At the same time, social protection systems in EU 
countries have to find innovative ways to cope with rising health care and retirement 
costs while avoiding the resurgence of elderly poverty. 
The goal of any welfare state reform should be to combine greater economic 
flexibility with better social protection in order to create an environment capable of 
making the best use of the opportunities offered by globalisation. This is the basic idea 
behind the concept of ‘flexicurity’ discussed above. Many member states currently face 
a potentially unfavourable conjunction of a heavily burdened welfare state and low 
economic growth. Insufficiently high growth rates and rising unemployment combined 
with a rapidly ageing population have increased the costs of the European social model 
since the mid-1970s. But improving the growth rates and cutting unemployment 
requires adapting the welfare state to the new socio-economic environment.  
Prior to the last two stages of expansion, the EU welfare state was characterised 
by the presence of four distinct social models (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ferrera, 1996): 
the Nordic (Denmark, Finland, Sweden and, to a large extent, the Netherlands), the 
Continental (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxemburg), the Anglo-Saxon 
(Ireland and the UK) and the Mediterranean (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). 
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each of them. By comparing the four models in terms of i) the reduction of income 
inequality and poverty, and ii) the rewards for labour market participation, Boeri 
(2002) concludes that the Nordic model performs better on both criteria whereas the 
Anglo-Saxon model does almost equally well according to the second criterion. Similar 
conclusions are also reached by Sapir (2006). The addition of the 12 new member states 
has increased cross-country heterogeneity and introduced at least one more type of 
social model. Giddens (2007) is critical, however, of the continuing portrayal of four 
distinct types of social models in the EU-15, arguing that even if they are seen as ideal 
types rather than accurate descriptions, they no longer reflect the many changes that 
h a v e  r e s u l t e d  i n  ‘ h y b r i d s ’ .  H e  a l s o  e x p r e s s e s  d o u b t s  a b o u t  “ a c c o r d i n g  t o o  m u c h  
primacy to jobs”, noting that there are wider social problems to confront than 
unemployment.  
Insofar as the Lisbon strategy is at the heart of the EU response to globalisation, 
the insistence by Giddens on social justice and on the fact that “reform promotes social 
justice” rather than undermining it is central to new thinking, which he labels “positive 
welfare”. Giddens associates social injustice above all with poverty and stresses its 
dynamic character. He notes that flexicurity is about transitions between jobs and 
recognises that a job is still the best way out of poverty. But he holds that a 
preventative approach is needed as well to counter episodes of poverty that may be 
unrelated to the labour market. He reserves the term ‘social exclusion’ for multiple 
deprivations.  
These trends, together with the fact that diverse welfare states face common 
dilemmas, are critical to developing a new understanding of social justice and of the 
policy interventions that will be needed to promote it. In a recent statement, the Policy 
Network (2006) observes that  
while the defence of the welfare status quo may seem electorally attractive in the 
short term, it is a political dead end. Failure to advocate progressive reforms leads 
to blockages in our societies: certain versions of the European social model can 
confer competitive advantages, but a poorly functioning social model can, on the 
contrary, become an economic handicap.  
This statement highlights a critical “paradox that defence of an existing social 
model may in crucial respects not serve the cause of social justice, while reform that 
superficially tests traditional conceptions of social justice may actually fulfil the long-
term demands of social justice more effectively” (ibid.). 
If the benefits of globalisation are to be reconciled with social justice, new 
strategies are plainly needed, as the adverse effects of misguided policies are becoming 
more evident in the disparate performances of EU economies.  
10.2.4 Labour market reforms 
As noted earlier, both the costs and benefits of globalisation depend crucially on the 
flexibility of the labour market. The existing evidence suggests that most European 
labour markets were substantially more rigid by the turn of the century than they had 
been in the mid-1960s (Nickell, 2003), indicating that labour market inflexibility is 
partly to blame for inadequate growth in Europe. The process of globalisation has 
increased the cost of labour market rigidities by making producers more sensitive to 
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labour turnover. With the rising importance of innovation and the quickening speed of 
restructuring, labour market flexibility has become an important factor for economic 
growth. This implies that globalisation has grown costly for countries that impose 
significant costs on turnover. Modern European welfare states nonetheless often 
protect the status quo at an increasing opportunity cost (Heckman, 2003). 
Labour market reforms frequently meet strong political opposition. 
Consequently, when such reforms are actually implemented they are so heavily 
shaped by political constraints that they can often be counterproductive. According to 
Saint-Paul (2000), the following conditions may ease the political constraints faced by 
reformers: 
•  the existence of an unfavourable economic climate in which incumbent workers 
face a higher risk of lob losses; 
•  the design of reforms in a two-tier fashion so that they apply to new labour 
contracts without affecting employed workers; and 
•  the existence of a lag between the decision date and the implementation date.  
Given that the impact of globalisation on the EU labour markets satisfies the first 
condition, political constraints to labour market reforms are likely to loosen. As noted 
by EEAG (2004), this is rather unfortunate and paradoxical since the adverse effects of 
these reforms are more bearable in economic booms when economic conditions are 
favourable. 
Employment protection 
Strict employment-protection provisions are a form of labour market inflexibility that, 
although the significance is disputed, is widely seen as a constraint to economic 
growth, insofar as it inhibits an effective matching of skills and abilities with specific 
tasks, as well as a better adjustment of employment to output levels. That being said, 
diminished employment protection comes at a significant cost in terms of less stable 
employment paths and lower human capital investment, and the costs of change to an 
alternative model are not always appreciated. More specifically, the uncertainty 
regarding the workers’ future employment prospects may discourage investment in 
both general skills by the employer and in firm-specific human capital by the worker.  
The overall picture of developments in the EU labour markets suggests that 
countries that have managed to decrease unemployment have all liberalised their 
labour markets along at least some lines, whereas none of those who did not liberalise 
have managed to reduce unemployment (EEAG, 2004). It should be noted, however, 
that this may come at a social cost, since the experience of at least the US and the UK 
shows that labour market liberalisation has led to greater wage inequality both 
between and within groups of workers (Gosling & Lemieux, 2004; Tsakloglou & 
Cholezas, 2006). That being said, recent OECD research by Bassanini & Duval (2006) 
shows that there are systematic differences between countries in labour market 
performances. They hold that “high and long-lasting unemployment benefits, high tax 
wedges and stringent anti-competitive product market regulation are found to increase 
aggregate unemployment”, while coordinated or centralised wage-bargaining systems 
have a positive effect. In addition, employment rates are higher where the tax wedge is 
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Regarding protection against uninsurable labour-market risks, the four European 
social models mentioned earlier behave very differently in the sense that they offer a 
different combination of employment protection legislation (EPL) and unemployment 
benefits. The Mediterranean model offers very strict EPL with a rather low coverage of 
unemployment benefits. On the opposite side lies the Nordic model. Both the Anglo-
Saxon and the Continental models offer generous unemployment benefits, but they 
differ in their level of EPL, since the Anglo-Saxon model provides comparatively less 
protection than all other systems. Furthermore, Sapir (2006) finds a strong connection 
between the employment rate generated by a social system and the instrument the 
system uses for protecting workers against uninsurable labour market risks. He reports 
that the stricter the EPL is, the lower the employment rate. The generosity of 
unemployment benefits plays only a secondary role. This view implies that changing 
the instruments for workers’ protection from stricter EPL to higher unemployment 
insurance is potentially useful for raising the rate of employment. 
Moreover, a large proportion of the dismissal costs in most countries (especially 
in southern Europe) takes the form of highly uncertain legal procedures. Therefore, 
there is a need for reducing uncertainty by simplifying the EPL. EEAG (2004) advocate 
“the elimination of the current system of legal procedures in many countries, especially 
the Southern European ones and its replacement by a simple ‘firing tax’ which would 
be paid to [the] worker as [a] severance payment”. 
Active labour market policies 
The consensus view among both policy-makers and economists is that a push towards 
training and redeployment is a more productive way of using public revenue and the 
unemployed workers’ time than passive policies of compensation. Yet, active labour 
market policies can prove costly and inefficient if they fail to create the appropriate 
incentives. In order to decrease the equilibrium rate of unemployment, these policies 
should improve the competitiveness of the unemployed workers and their search 
intensity. This approach, however, may not be politically desirable or easy if it puts 
competitive pressures on incumbent employees. For example, the French emploi jeunes 
programme in 1997 directed young unemployed workers towards exclusively low-
skilled public sector jobs despite the fact that many programme participants had a rich 
educational background. Restricting the programme to the public sector removed 
competition for private sector jobs but its medium-term effect on employability has 
been questionable (EEAG, 2004). 
Reforms that affect the incentives of unemployed and employed workers  
Cutting the benefits on offer to the unemployed if job search activity proves 
insufficient may have a positive employment effect, as shown by the Swedish and 
Dutch experiences. This type of reform increases labour market efficiency without 
reducing the level of social insurance. In addition, it is likely that work incentives will 
increase if means-tested welfare payments are replaced by in-work benefits like tax 
credits for earned income. Such a reform may have a strong positive impact on 
employment while being politically more acceptable than alternative reforms (such as a 
reduction in employment protection). Finally, profit sharing or the promotion of stock 
ownership may decrease the rate of equilibrium unemployment and stimulate growth. IS SOCIAL EUROPE FIT FOR GLOBALISATION? | 157 
 
Under such schemes, incumbent workers may be more willing to accept policies that 
improve firms’ profitability (e.g. wage moderation) even though they would strongly 
oppose such policies outside these schemes. 
Labour mobility and migration policies 
Labour mobility is an important aspect of labour market flexibility since it allows 
European economies to adjust to the changing market conditions brought about by the 
globalisation process. The role of labour mobility in the EU countries is twofold: first, 
labour mobility contributes to the flexible environment required by economic growth 
while, second, in a monetary union the role of mobility becomes more significant as an 
important adjustment mechanism in the presence of asymmetric shocks. One can 
distinguish between regional mobility within individual countries, intra-EU mobility 
and that between the EU and non-EU countries.  
The degree of cross-border labour mobility within the EU and indeed within 
many member states is manifestly limited (Vandamme, 2000), especially compared 
with federal countries such as the US or Germany. As a result, the social impact of the 
creative destruction process implied by globalisation increases and individual EU 
countries rely on national budgets to stabilise adverse regional shocks (Obstfeld et al., 
1998). It should be noted that intra-EU mobility is an important component of the 
single market and existing obstacles in terms of the non-transferability or 
incompatibility of acquired rights for health, pensions and unemployment benefits 
should be removed. Improving labour mobility across eurozone countries will 
significantly reduce the cost of a single currency, since labour mobility is an important 
characteristic of an optimal currency area. This is especially so given that other 
characteristics of an optimal currency area, such as wage flexibility or the existence of a 
central fiscal budget, are very limited in the euro area. 
Migration from non-EU countries could contribute to additional economic 
activities that otherwise would not take place. The positive impact of migration on 
growth accentuates when the skill structure of migrants and natives is complementary. 
As noted earlier, although the skill structure of intra-EU migrants is comparable to that 
of natives, non-EU labour migration seems to be complementary to the skill structure 
of natives. Migration is also often considered a tool to counteract the demographic 
problems arising from the ageing of society and to support the very survival of the 
existing social welfare systems. The policy implications are explored in greater depth 
in section 10.3 
10.2.5 Product market liberalisation and competition policy 
Deregulating product markets as well as labour markets may boost employment and 
improve the growth prospects of an economy in a progressively globalised 
environment. Especially where growth is innovation-driven, the importance of 
contestable markets with the entry and exit of firms has grown. New entrants may 
make innovations at the frontier more easily since established firms face the cost of 
losing their current markets. Market liberalisation can prove beneficial for both 
consumption and growth, since on the one hand, it leads to lower prices owing to 
intensified competition, and on the other hand, it stimulates innovations. A successful 
example of this type of market liberalisation has been observed in telecommunications. 158 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
At the same time, active competition policy is important for successful market 
liberalisation. It is essential that market liberalisation be supported by an appropriate 
regulatory framework that protects new entrants from anti-competitive behaviour by 
existing firms. Thus, better coordination between competition and regulatory policies 
is important for encouraging new entrants. It should be noted that harmonising the 
present regulations may often protect incumbent firms instead of stimulating entry and 
exit. Moreover, complex regulatory environments that increase the time and 
administrative costs of establishing a firm may reduce the returns from innovation and 
limit the entry of new firms. 
Research and development are clearly a prerequisite for technological progress 
and innovation. The European Council has set the target for R&D expenditure at 3% of 
GDP. The EU is investing substantially less in R&D than the US is, but this average 
picture mainly reflects the low levels of R&D expenditure by the Mediterranean EU 
countries and on the part of business. Paradoxically, technological progress based on 
the development of new technologies requires the imposition of limits in the diffusion 
of these new technologies, which in turn may delay such progress. In other words, 
innovation is possible as long as mechanisms such as patents are in place, thus 
ensuring the returns from innovations to the innovator. Still, in 2000 the EU produced 
only a quarter of the number of patents produced in the US. Tax credits are also 
important for encouraging private research investments. Tax credits have the 
advantage of lowering administration costs. In addition, they reward success since 
only profitable firms can use the credit and they avoid all the problems related to the 
ability of bureaucrats to pick winners or their possible sensitivity to special interests. 
Regional policies 
At the member state level, the interplay between spatially targeted economic-
development policies and competition engenders some tensions. Regional income 
inequality may refer to income disparities across EU countries or within EU countries. 
In theory, only the first type of regional inequality should be tackled by EU policies, 
whereas the latter type should be a concern of national policies. Several political and 
economic arguments support this allocation of responsibilities: subsidiarity, coherence 
with fiscal policy, equal treatment of equally prosperous countries, etc. As 
globalisation accelerates, economic change and the need for dealing with significant 
regional inequalities within individual EU countries may emerge, at least in the short 
run. This phenomenon may be mitigated by national regional policies, complemented 
by a combination of policies mentioned in previous sections (labour market and 
migration policies). Still, it is essential that these policies are compatible with EU rules 
(for instance, state aid to industries may violate EU competition policy). 
10.3  Migration, welfare and globalisation 
In many respects, migration is the policy area that has been the least coherently 
approached in adapting to globalisation. Migration is, in any case, a particularly 
daunting dilemma for the welfare state. This view is extensively held by Europeans 
and, significantly, it tends to be stronger in countries with the most developed welfare 
states. Indeed, even within the EU, labour mobility has long been a problematic issue, 
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enlargement. Although the 2005 social agenda is explicit about the need for policy 
innovation in relation to immigrants, a recent assessment of member state policies in 
this domain points to a range of shortcomings (Begg & Marlier, 2007). The differences 
among member states and among immigrants of different origins have to be stressed, 
but immigrants typically have worse housing conditions, lower educational attainment 
and inferior access to social services. Ethnic minorities such as the Roma often face 
equivalent marginalisation, although the reasons differ. Regarding the appropriate 
design of migration policies, the following factors should be taken into account.  
Migration is not a temporary development 
It is important that EU countries perceive that, in a globalised environment, migration 
is likely to be a permanent development and thus migration policies should be 
designed to reflect a long-term perspective. This was not the case with early national 
migration policies, which tended to have a much shorter perspective. For example, in 
Italy, migration only began to be considered a stable phenomenon in the 1990s with the 
Martelli Law, aimed at regulating the entry and residence of non-EU citizens (Kosic & 
Tryandafyllidou, 2005). 
The social benefits of migration depend on migrants’ integration  
For migration to be a successful long-term process, the integration of migrants is a 
necessary condition. The effective integration of different types of migrants into the 
economy and society of the host country is important for maximising the social benefits 
of migration. In this respect, facilitating the access of migrants and especially that of 
their children to education would be a promising approach. Allowing migrants to 
participate in the decision-making process regarding migration policies is another. 
Moreover, providing political rights to long-term migrants may be an effective way of 
promoting their integration.  
In addition, migrants (at least those who anticipate long-term residence in the 
host country) should be actively encouraged to learn the language of the host country 
and thus to take part more fully in social and economic life. A good example of a 
migration reform that follows this direction is the new Nationality Law that came into 
force in Germany in 2000. A child born in Germany to non-German parents 
automatically acquires German citizenship at birth, but then has to choose between the 
citizenship of his/her parents or German citizenship by the age of 23. Along the same 
lines but in a less generous way, in 1998 France reintroduced (with Law 98/170 – loi 
Guigou) the automatic right to French citizenship for children born in France of foreign 
parents. They become French at the age of 18, unless they decide to renounce French 
nationality, while the parents may ask for French nationality for their children at the 
age of 13. It should be noted that the mass media also have an important role to play in 
the successful integration of immigrants in the social life of the host country by 
discouraging the promotion of xenophobic stereotypes and thinly veiled racist 
behaviour. 
Combining a general EU policy framework that allows national flexibility 
In an integrated Europe, national migration policies are bound to have externalities for 
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common immigration policy at the EU level in the future. Yet, different types of 
migration (e.g. permanent or temporary) can match different demand structures in the 
labour market of the host country of the potential migrant. For example, Greece is a 
country in which labour demand exhibits strong seasonal patterns because of the 
importance of summer tourism and agriculture in the economy. For this reason, in 2001 
Greece allowed seasonal workers to work in the country even without a settlement 
permit. The needs of the local labour market are known best at the local level, and 
hence future EU rules on migration should allow enough scope for flexibility at the 
national and local levels. 
Encouraging migration to benefit growth 
The migration decision is greatly influenced by economic considerations. Therefore, 
creating favourable economic conditions will work as a pull factor. Many of the non-
EU immigrants are low-skilled workers. Given the shift of demand towards skilled 
labour brought about in the EU by globalisation, to make migration an effective a long-
term strategy it is necessary for these migrants and their families to be integrated into 
programmes for lifelong learning. Moreover, countries can provide incentives for 
migration in areas where there is a shortage of domestic labour supply. Since higher 
education is a long-term investment, in the short term the supply of highly educated 
workers is inflexible and migration can fill some of the excess demand.  
Several countries have implemented migration policies aimed at attracting highly 
skilled labour. In 2000, Germany introduced a residence permit for highly qualified 
foreign workers in the information and communication technology industries (a green 
card system). Similarly, in 2002 Denmark introduced a job card scheme to ease the 
entry of highly skilled foreign workers into areas experiencing a shortage of Danish 
labour. More recently, in 2005 the German Immigration Act provided more incentives 
for the migration of highly skilled workers by granting an immediate permanent 
residence permit to highly qualified persons as well as the possibility for non-EU 
students to remain in Germany for one year after their studies to seek employment. 
The same Act includes some further growth-stimulating measures such as the 
settlement of self-employed persons, who receive a residence permit if they invest at 
least €1 million and create a minimum of 10 jobs.  
Contributions of migration to funding the welfare system 
Migration can partially contribute to the sustainability of existing welfare systems or at 
least provide them with the breathing space to reform. Labour market shortages and 
financial distress in the social security systems caused by the shrinking number of 
contributors can be counteracted by a higher supply in the official labour market. In 
this respect, the imposition of measures that weaken the incentives for illegal migration 
is essential. Applying measures to limit the black market for migrants ex post (with 
respect to their transportation, employment, accommodation, trafficking, etc.), such as 
those taken in Greece and Spain in the early 2000s, is only a second-best policy. One 
policy broadly implemented in the EU that tends to provoke illegal migration with 
negative consequences for pension systems is the requirement of a job contract in order 
to be allowed entry into the country. Tackling this issue was partly the aim of the 
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sponsor mechanism): foreign citizens are allowed to enter Italy even without an 
employment contract in order to establish themselves in the work environment. The 
precondition is that an Italian citizen or a foreign citizen legally resident in Italy 
guarantees the support of the foreigner for one year.  
In 2002, a similar measure was introduced in the UK for highly skilled labour in 
the framework of the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme, which seeks to attract 
individuals with a high stock of human capital in terms of the qualifications and skills 
required by UK businesses to compete in the global marketplace. This scheme provides 
migrants leave to enter the UK to seek work instead of requiring them to demonstrate a 
pre-existing offer of employment.  
There is only weak evidence that the specific design of a given welfare system 
operates as a welfare magnet. At any rate, there is no doubt that introducing basic 
common features to the social protection systems of the member states would cut the 
transaction and information costs of potential migrants. In this framework, the cross-
border portability of claims against pension systems is desirable and it should be 
facilitated. 
Cooperating with labour-exporting countries 
Migration also has important consequences for the labour-exporting countries. Stable 
linkages between the EU and individual host member states on the one hand, and the 
traditional labour-exporting countries on the other, could have benefits. In this context, 
clear rules for migration, outbound as well as return, should be formulated. In the case 
of developing countries, the implementation of technical and social aid programmes 
for the labour-exporting countries could be part of the overall agreement. This 
approach could lead not only to a reduction of poverty in the home country of the 
migrant, but also to a decline in illegal migration.  
Policy options on migration 
Although the actual impact of migration on public finances is probably very limited, 
the issue of migrant demands on the welfare state is nevertheless perceived as a salient 
one by citizens and their governments. Against this background, there is a high risk of 
setting in motion a vicious circle in which unskilled migration inflames public opinion, 
resulting in calls for unrealistic (or needless) restrictions on migration. These 
restrictions in turn lead to more illegal and unskilled migration, further inflaming 
public opinion against migrants and forcing governments to adopt even stricter (and 
unenforceable) migration policies. Three strategies for addressing this potential vicious 
circle are 
1)  closing the welfare door to migrants, 
2)  introducing a ‘points system’ rewarding skilled migration, and 
3)  harmonising safety nets at the EU level. 
Closing the welfare door? A number of scholars, including Hans-Werner Sinn (2004b 
and 2004c) advocate the temporary closing of the welfare door to migrants. Closing the 
welfare door would reduce migration flows, while mildly increasing the proportion 
(although not necessarily the absolute number) of skilled workers in migration inflows. 
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in the country or who would come in any event. Thus, it may – paradoxically – 
increase the negative externalities on the native population from immigration to rigid 
labour markets, by pushing many migrants into illegal activities. 
Adopting a points system? A points system is a method for ranking applications for 
residence and work permits. It has been adopted by Australia, Canada, New Zealand 
and, in Europe, by Switzerland. Each applicant is allocated a score based on explicit 
criteria that typically reward educational attainment, experience and language abilities. 
‘Bonus’ points can also be given for employment in occupations and regions where 
there is a shortage of workers. A points system adopted by Europe vis-à-vis non-EU 
nationals would encourage more skilled migration not only in relative, but also in 
absolute terms, enhancing the growth potential of migration and reducing negative 
externalities through unemployment. An additional advantage of a points system is 
that it could simplify migration regulations, notably by removing the need for ad hoc 
policies for highly skilled migrants and by integrating asylum policies into a broader 
framework through, for example, granting ‘humanitarian’ points.  
Harmonising minimum welfare across jurisdictions. The above policy options have 
to do with migration policy or the treatment provided to migrants rather than the 
design of social policies. Another option involves the harmonisation of minimum 
welfare standards (Bean et al., 1998; Bertola et al., 2000) or an EU-wide minimum 
welfare floor (see Atkinson, 2002). The rationale for this policy is that it would prevent 
welfare shopping and a potential race to the bottom in social welfare provision fostered 
by concerns of fiscal spillovers across jurisdictions. Although, as explained in the last 
part of chapter 6, there is no evidence that social assistance provisions are being 
dismantled, many countries have some safety net in place, and hence it seems 
reasonable to coordinate these schemes for a minimum guaranteed income.   
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11. SCENARIOS 
n view of the many influences on globalisation, it is evident that it is not a static 
concept and that changes can be expected. As globalisation itself evolves, it is 
useful to develop a plausible scenario for what can be expected over the next 15 to 
20 years and to examine the factors that might result in deviations from the more likely 
trends. Useful background material that focuses extensively on globalisation is 
provided in weighty scenario-building exercises by the CIA (National Intelligence 
Council, 2004), with a 2020 perspective, and by the pioneers of scenario-building, Shell, 
in an exercise that looks out to 2025 (Shell, 2006). The futurology industry is, in 
addition, very extensive and ideas and analyses from a wide variety of sources have 
been incorporated in what is presented in this chapter. 
Globalisation, as Richard Baldwin rather pointedly puts it, “is a new and 
important phenomenon – and has been since the introduction of steamships, railroads 
and the telegraph” (Baldwin, 2006, p. 1). A first era of globalisation extended from the 
mid-19th century (and could be dated from considerably earlier) until World War I. It 
saw not only a great opening of trade and investment flows, but also large-scale 
population movements (Atkinson, 2004). In the last 40 years and more especially in the 
last quarter of a century, it is the expansion of trade and investment that has been the 
main visible manifestation of globalisation, while international labour flows have been 
much less extensive, certainly compared with the phase from the mid-19th century to 
World War I. Figure 11.1 shows the degree to which international trade has outpaced 
output over the last quarter of a century, underlining what is a key trend. 
Figure 11.1 Growth of world output and trade 
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11.1  Influences on future developments 
The CIA’s 2020 project suggests several ways in which major global developments 
could take shape and be buffeted or bolstered by the forces of change over the next 15 
years. In a sense, the most likely evolution is a continuation – in some cases an 
intensification – of many of the trends discussed in earlier chapters. Indices that try to 
measure the extent of globalisation typically combine information on flows of trade 
and investment, along with measures of social interactions and political convergence. 
They are inevitably somewhat arbitrary, both in the choice of indicators and in how 
they are weighted together, but nonetheless provide some measure of the long-run 
trend. For example, the ‘KOF’ index, compiled by the Swiss Institute for Business Cycle 
Research, demonstrates that globalisation has been on an interrupted upward trend 
since 1970 (Figure 11.2) and shows no sign of abating.  
Figure 11.2 The unrelenting rise of globalisation 
 
Source: Swiss Institute for Business Cycle Research website (2007) (retrieved from 
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/). 
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conflict, including between states. In addition, according to the CIA, anti-Americanism 
is presently at a peak and is likely to abate, especially if globalisation takes on new, 
more nuanced characteristics.  
11.2  Sources of variation 
Various currents of political and social change can be expected to interact with the 
economic variables that have until now shaped globalisation in determining likely 
trends. Some will continue to be underlying drivers, while others may exert an 
inhibiting effect on current trends, possibly leading to reversal. It is also important to 
recognise uncertainties. 
Drivers 
Bearing in mind the ideas set out in part I, it is worth speculating on how some of the 
key drivers identified will evolve. 
•  Multilateral trade negotiations may have run out of steam, but internal 
liberalisation in emerging markets can be expected to continue and, moreover, to 
have marked effects on the trends in markets. There will be both risks and 
opportunities for the EU from these developments. 
•  Further advances in information and communications technology (ICT) and 
perhaps more importantly, in the interplay between technology and regulation, 
will be a critical driver, especially in enabling individual functions to be 
outsourced and in opening up markets for services. 
•  Market opportunities are shifting to reflect the new global distribution of 
prosperity. 
•  An internationalisation of savings and investment decisions is underway, such 
that countries will come under more intensive scrutiny from investors and 
savers. 
•  Societal changes are prompting further reassessments of welfare states in ways 
that can be expected to bear on the capacity to respond to globalisation. 
Inhibitors 
Frieden (2007) argues that the first era of globalisation collapsed above all because 
“there was no effective political and policy response to changing economic and social 
conditions”, with social orders facing new demands that were not satisfied. Possible 
triggers for a similar reaction today include 
•  reform fatigue; 
•  anti-immigrant sentiment, including resentment of highly skilled professionals 
competing for what have hitherto been jobs reserved for indigenous workers; 
•  even a potential backlash from Euro-scepticism; this could be described as the 
‘José Bové’ phenomenon or could be characterised by the emergence of a 
polarised ideological choice between radical right solutions and populism on the 
left (witness the 2007 French presidential election?); and 
•  at the political level, an additional source of opposition to globalisation is 
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All of these factors point to the challenge of dealing with the concern of those 
who lose or perceive themselves as losing. 
Switching points 
Any base scenario relies on there being stability and predictability in underlying 
relationships, but there can plainly be developments that alter such relationships, 
causing reassessments. Possible interruptions could come from 
•  a pandemic of some sort (today’s candidate being avian flu, while yesterday’s 
was SARS and the previous day’s was AIDS – the key message being that there is 
always a risk); 
•  much-increased terrorist activity or an upsurge of tensions that could deteriorate 
into armed conflicts; 
•  concerns about economic or physical security, whether from threats to ICT 
security or from terrorism, that lead governments to close the doors and re-
impose harsher restrictions on movement; 
•  a backlash against outsourcing, especially if it reaches deeper into white-collar 
jobs; 
•  financial instability as a source of extensive disruption; 
•  a rapid acceleration of climate change that undermines established productive 
structures; 
•  effects of growing energy demand as the world’s two most populous nations 
continue to expand, restoring the link between energy demand and global GDP 
growth that had arguably been broken after the oil crises of the 1970s; and 
•  access to water, which can be viewed similarly. 
Even within the base scenario, factors with the potential to cause change include 
•  terrorism proving to have a disruptive impact on global connections; 
•  the way in which the next stages of China’s and India’s integration into the world 
economy proceed. Interdependencies will be created, but there may also be 
attempts by these new competitors to enter previously protected markets in the 
EU and the US; 
•  oil price changes and the success of efforts to diversify to new sources of supply 
on the one hand, and to reduce demand on the other; and 
•  the potential impact of new entrants to the EU, notably the most populous 
(Turkey and Ukraine). 
Possible positive ‘surprises’ could come from 
•  breakthroughs in relevant technologies, such as energy; 
•  price mechanisms ensuring better use of scarce primary materials; 
•  a more far-reaching and consensual multilateral trade deal; 
•  an acceleration in incremental improvements in energy saving; 
•  health advances that lead to more productive older workers; and 
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11.3  The most likely evolution 
At the heart of any scenario is the question of inevitability. Shell has long espoused a 
contrast between a ‘TINA’ (there is no alternative) approach and what might be 
labelled the ‘ATTAC’74 approach of curbing market power in favour of community, 
environmental and social objectives. In its latest scenario exercise, however, Shell notes 
that today populations expect more of their states in providing security, as a result of 
which there is now a three-way interaction, and not just a form of efficiency–equity 
trade-off. Moreover, none will be optimal. The CIA similarly puts forward a ‘Davos 
world’ scenario along with various security-related ones in which non-economic 
imperatives become more important. In this exercise, the favourable Davos world 
scenario is one of robust economic growth and a continuation of many of the 
globalisation trends. Although the sudden reversal of 1914 serves as a warning that a 
continuation of globalisation cannot be taken for granted, it is hard not to make an 
extension of these trends a central projection of a scenario up to 2020. Such a scenario 
would have a number of elements to it: 
•  trade volumes continuing to grow as a share of GDP (as in Figure 11.1 above); 
•  further increases in the flows of FDI, again relative to income; 
•  more jobs being associated in some way with international exchanges; and 
•  deeper embedding through the various social interactions, increasing Internet 
access and further developments in ICT that allow greater volumes of digital 
flows at falling costs. 
What can be drawn from this is that for a base scenario, a continuation of the 
trends is probable, but with a possible new twist. In a recent contribution, Baldwin 
(2006) offers some important and original insights into the evolving economics of 
globalisation and the implications of emerging trends for EU policy. He argues that 
there have been two economic processes behind globalisation, which he labels 
“unbundlings”. The first enabled separation between the location in which goods 
(initially) and services (subsequently) were produced and their place of consumption, 
giving rise to vastly increased international trade. He notes, however, that the finest 
level of competition was firms and that, because firms tended to cluster in particular 
locations, the skilled labour that those firms used most intensively tended to prosper or 
not, along with the sectors to which the firms belonged.  
A second unbundling has arisen much more recently, driven by rapidly falling 
communication and coordination costs. According to Baldwin, this results in 
competition among workers to carry out particular tasks, enabling factories and offices 
to be “unpacked” and implying that certain conventional assumptions about the 
consequences of globalisation have to be revisited. In particular, the widely accepted 
notion that it is skilled workers in the richer countries who benefit while the unskilled 
lose may cease to be valid. If correct, this would have profound implications for a 
policy approach that emphasises skills and knowledge intensity as the way forward for 
the EU.  
                                                      
74 ATTAC refers to the non-governmental organisation, Association pour la Taxation des 
Transactions financières pour l’Aide aux Citoyennes et citoyens. 168 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
Nevertheless, there is no certainty that globalisation will either continue apace or 
remain – at least in some eyes – a predominantly American-led and neo-liberal 
phenomenon. For the CIA, one of the likely changes is that globalisation will acquire 
more of an ‘Asian face’, as the countries currently expanding at high rates evolve from 
low-cost competitors in mass markets to become major consumer markets, while also 
enhancing their contributions to innovation and the development of new technologies. 
These trends would be expected to translate into a reconfiguration of economic roles, 
but also to lead to shifts in the balance of political power, including the shaping of 
rules. China, India and other emerging countries can be expected to increase their 
influence not only in economic terms, but also in global governance. The potential for a 
backlash cannot be ignored. 
Using Baldwin’s notion of unbundling, it is evident that globalisation is entering 
a phase wherein there is a difference in the manner in which markets are opening. This 
can be characterised as a fragmentation of the production process, involving 
opportunities driven by ICT to ‘outsource’ and ‘offshore’. An OECD (2006a) Issues 
Paper has described this trend as follows: “[T]he globalisation of value chains has 
resulted in a greater use of intermediates by companies, with a decline in the 
‘production depth’.” Still, certain aspects of globalisation are likely to prove 
irreversible and thus become axiomatic in any scenario. In particular, the 
interconnectedness that has arisen because of communication advances of different 
sorts will be a core feature of globalisation that will have not just economic impacts, 
but also (as the CIA puts it) shake up the status quo and lead to political and cultural 
convulsions. It is also salient that even with some moderation of growth rates in the 
most dynamic economies, global per-capita GDP could be some 50% higher in 2020 
than it was in 2000. 
Table 11.1 provides a summary of the CIA’s exploration of factors that will bear 
on the future direction of global relations. The table offers a useful contrast between 
those developments that can be regarded as reasonably probable and those for which 
much greater uncertainty can be identified. For example, there are bound to be 
reservations about the ability of European countries to recast their welfare states, 
especially as they are faced with the problems of population ageing.  
Drawing on these and other interpretations, a number of points arise.  
•  Contrary to the expectations of some business gurus, according to Shell the state 
will not wither away, but will shift from a nation-state conception to a market-
state one with more emphasis on enabling than on providing (see also 
Mandelson, 2007). 
•  Technological progress will depend on cooperation and on regulation of 
intellectual property rights, while migration is expected to accelerate but will be 
increasingly subject to political backlashes. Nationalism could impose a brake on 
both. 
•  Energy is widely seen as both a constraint and a challenge. Three decades of de-
linking between GDP growth and energy consumption, with the latter no longer 
directly correlated with the former as in the past, have been overtaken by the 
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Table 11.1 The 2020 global landscape, according to the CIA 
Relative certainties  Key uncertainties 
Globalisation largely irreversible and 
likely to become less Westernised 
Whether globalisation will pull in lagging 
economies; the degree to which Asian countries 
set new rules of the game 
World economy substantially larger  Extent of gaps between the ‘haves’ and ‘have 
nots’; backsliding by fragile democracies; 
managing or containing financial crises 
Increasing number of global firms 
facilitate the spread of new technologies 
Extent to which connectivity challenges 
governments 
Rise of Asia and the advent of possible 
new economic middle-weights 
Whether the rise of China/India occurs smoothly 
Ageing populations in established 
powers 
Ability of the EU and Japan to adapt workforces, 
welfare systems and integrate migrant 
populations; whether the EU becomes a 
superpower 
Energy supplies ‘in the ground’ 
sufficient to meet global demand 
Political instability in producer countries; supply 
disruptions 
Growing power of non-state actors  Willingness and ability of states and international 
institutions to accommodate these actors 
Political Islam remains a potent force  Impact of religiosity on the unity of states and the 
potential for conflict; the growth of jihadist 
ideology 
Improved weapons-of-mass- destruction 
capabilities of some states 
More or fewer nuclear powers; the ability of 
terrorists to acquire biological, chemical, 
radiological or nuclear weapons 
Arc of instability spanning the Middle 
East, Asia and Africa 
Precipitating events leading to the overthrow of 
regimes 
Unlikelihood of great-power conflict 
escalating into total war  
Ability to manage flashpoints and competition 
for resources 
Environmental and ethical issues even 
more to the fore 
Extent to which new technologies create or 
resolve ethical dilemmas 
US will remain the single most powerful 
actor economically, technologically and 
militarily 
Whether other countries will more openly 
challenge Washington; whether the US loses its 
science & technology edge 
Source: National Intelligence Council (2004). 
A key point is that some tasks lend themselves to unbundling to a much greater 
degree than others, because they do not all respond similarly to lower costs. This 
tendency has a number of immediate ramifications: 
•  It makes it much less predictable who will win or lose from globalisation. 
•  Change may grow more sudden. For example, the solution to a computer 
security problem may overnight facilitate, say, the offshoring of an invoicing 
function. What Baldwin (2006) calls the “tipping point” may occur when a 170 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
number of technological advances come together to alter relative costs so 
substantially that companies have to adapt swiftly. 
•  The effects will often be at the level of the individual, so that responses also need 
to be at that level. By the same token, a response at the level of the sector may 
prove to be seriously misconceived: as Baldwin puts it, “policies designed to help 
sectors may miss globalisation’s losers entirely”. Central to his line of argument 
is the element of coordination costs. 
•  Routine, but not necessarily low-technology jobs have become more mobile. The 
sorts of tasks that can most easily be offshored are (van Welsum & Reif, 2006a 
and 2006b) those that are 
–  IT intensive, 
–  readily transmittable through IT, 
–  codifiable, and 
–  do not require face-to-face interaction. 
11.4  The risks and opportunities 
Looking forward, the influences on the evolution of globalisation will lead to a range of 
risks and opportunities. Globally, it is to be anticipated that there will be significant 
power shifts (sectorally as well as geographically) that in turn will affect the range of 
risks and opportunities emanating from globalisation. Many of the opportunities 
follow from the well-established analysis of the effects of enhanced international 
specialisation, while risks arise from failures to anticipate or adjust. At the same time, 
new vulnerabilities have to be foreseen and accommodated. 
One of the most likely developments over the coming years is that a higher 
proportion of workers will be affected positively or negatively by globalisation, instead 
of the old distinction between the traded and non-traded sectors. Labour turnover will 
tend to be higher with the corollary that income and employment security cannot be as 
high as in the past. Overall, this is perceived as a threat (especially in the EU), but can 
just as readily be viewed as an opportunity. In the ‘second unbundling’ approach, a 
different profile of worker is on the front line and the risks are intensified for workers 
with poorly transferable skills. Additional features are that  
•  the balance between security and openness is critical, 
•  shifts in governance are essential, and 
•  ‘Asianisation’ implies faster adjustment in the EU. 
What facilitates adaptation? 
Globalisation is, as has been stressed in many parts of this report, essentially always 
about adjustment. As Baldwin (2006) puts it, “gains from trade almost always come 
with pains-from-trade”, which make it incumbent on governments to facilitate 
adjustment through a combination of labour market and supply-side policies on the 
one hand, and social protection on the other. Unpredictability may be the most 
awkward facet of ‘new’ globalisation to deal with. Analytical skills that are not 
currently traded may become subject to new competition. The premium may be on 
knowing how to learn (which is one step back from lifelong learning) rather than 
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Adjustment will also be shaped by the degree to which governments are 
prepared to cooperate, both within the EU and in wider fora. Here, Shell sees a number 
of options. If there is little trust, institutional discontinuities will make further 
integration more difficult and could lead to regulatory competition, including giving 
oxygen to the famous race to the bottom. Equally, nationalist sentiment could be 
expected to lead to regulatory fragmentation and the dominance of national regulatory 
regimes in what could become a zero- or negative-sum game. It can therefore be 
anticipated that the costs of adjustment will depend on the following factors: 
•  political and administrative structures that are geared towards success and 
reward it; 
•  high levels of educational attainment; 
•  open economies reinforced by competition; 
•  a capacity to ‘work smart rather than work hard’; 
•  an emphasis on taking individual responsibility as well as having access; 
•  but also some coercion from the state to make sure things happen; and 
•  the revisiting of mechanisms of governance for the contemporary challenges. 
As an example of the dilemmas, Artus, Cohen & Pisani-Ferry (2006) have voiced 
their concerns about the trends visible in France, noting the ‘mainstreaming’ of 
protectionist rhetoric (admittedly in the context of the 2007 election campaign). While 
their analysis is confined to France, many of the points they raise may have resonance 
for other member states:  
•  First, they stress that the underlying trends cannot be reversed, notably the desire 
for greater well-being in China, India and other emerging economies. 
•  Second, they assert that “all Maginot lines suffer from the same defect: by 
offering the illusion of safety, they delay an effective response”. 
•  Third, they emphasise that France’s economic woes cannot really be blamed on 
import competition, misguided euro-area economic policies or high labour costs, 
but on “the narrowness of our export supply-base: too few French companies are 
able to compete on quantity or quality, and they have been too timid in reaching 
out to the new areas of growth in the world”. 
•  They also implicitly criticise the French propensity to pander to the short-term 
victims of globalisation, while recognising the importance of helping the 
individual to deal with the consequences through retraining and income support.  
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12. OVERVIEW, POLICY RESPONSES AND POLICY 
PROCESSES 
 key argument in the present report and indeed in the vast majority of studies 
and reports consulted is that globalisation is a major factor influencing 
‘creative destruction’, to use the renowned terminology of Joseph Schumpeter. 
The evidence suggests that over the long term and across the economy as a whole, 
globalisation is favourable to employment. What is evident, however, is that the 
benefits of globalisation cannot just be assumed to happen and, with an increased pace 
of change, it is inevitable that there will be losers as well as winners, with marked 
social consequences. Yet this does not mean that the European social model is doomed 
and that only free market approaches will prosper. Indeed, the success of the smaller 
open economies testifies to the scope for prospering, even where the welfare state is 
extensive and consumes a high proportion of GDP (as is the case in the Nordic 
countries). It also has to be stressed that much of the increase in exposure to 
international competition confronting EU member states is in fact the result of 
European economic integration. 
An important conclusion is therefore that costly welfare states cannot 
convincingly be blamed for slow growth, but that economic problems commonly 
associated with globalisation are more often the result of failures to invest sufficiently 
in growth-promoting policies. In this vein, Aiginger (2005) notes that the four 
European countries that have enjoyed the greatest success (Denmark, Finland, the 
Netherlands and Sweden) have all invested heavily in education, the diffusion of new 
technologies and research. It is also striking that these countries have succeeded in 
attaining progressive social aims, including promoting gender equality, limiting 
poverty and inequality, fostering high rates of (family-friendly) employment and 
investing in children. At the same time, indicators of openness show that all four are 
among the most open economies in the world and can thus be adjudged to have fully 
embraced globalisation. 
A strong conclusion is that many of the fears surrounding globalisation are 
greatly exaggerated and even where justified they tend to rest on an incomplete 
analysis of the process. It follows that to view globalisation as an inexorable and 
threatening force is simply unwarranted. This message has to be repeatedly articulated 
and ‘sold’ to citizens. Nevertheless, it is plain that globalisation will be a bumpy ride 
and that it cannot be ignored as a major determinant of the well-being of Europeans, 
but also that adjustment to it is necessary. It calls for imaginative and well-conceived 
policy responses. The EU’s Economic Policy Committee (2005) identifies a twin 
challenge for EU policy-makers: 
•  to communicate clearly that globalisation has tangible benefits and affords many 
opportunities to Europeans, and 
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•  to formulate and deliver policies that deal with the concerns Europeans have 
about globalisation and equip the economy to adapt to change. 
12.1  What is at issue? 
Globalisation is not – indeed by far – the only factor influencing the socio-economic 
and cultural fabric and is often wrongly credited with or blamed for much that is 
happening in EU member states (and elsewhere). Longevity is increasing and the 
predictability of the life cycle is reducing for a large number of citizens. There are 
increasing returns on intellectual capital, that is, on investment in education and 
knowledge. Still, this emergence of the knowledge society entails an increase in 
apparent income disparities and – at least in some socio-economic contexts – a change 
in the patterns and strength of the inclusive forces in society.  
12.1.1 Opportunities and drawbacks 
The issue of opportunities is too often overlooked and has to be approached from 
differing perspectives. Turnover in the labour market is critical. As noted in part II, 
evidence presented by the EPC (2005) shows that in only four member states 
(Denmark, Greece, Finland and Portugal) could more than 10% of job losses be 
explained by relocation and offshoring over the period 2002–05. Yet these countries 
have also been able to create jobs successfully, thereby keeping unemployment in 
check. Instead, it is in the area of adjustment of employment that some of the main 
policy issues arise. These concern, first, the speed with which workers are redeployed 
and second, the options that are open to such workers in terms of location and quality 
of jobs, retraining and other policy actions to underpin their employability. 
To some extent, the EU economy is stuck with mass production, large firms, 
outdated technologies and rigid employment patterns that inhibit adjustment to the 
new international environment, so that in the absence of any reforms globalisation 
could present more of a threat than an opportunity. But it need not be so. The impact of 
rapid technological change and strong global competition on economic growth will 
depend on various factors such as the flexibility of production structures and the 
labour market. A more flexible economic environment combined with policies 
promoting the formation of high-quality human capital and R&D will allow EU 
economies to adjust quickly to the rapid change in the global economy, thereby reaping 
the benefits of globalisation. At the same time, reforms of the social protection systems 
aiming at supporting and reinserting into the labour market those affected negatively 
from these changes can promote a more equal spreading of the benefits of 
globalisation. 
Many claims about the social impact of globalisation are bandied around, often 
on the flimsiest of evidence. Above all, there is no empirical support for the proposition 
that globalisation is leading to a race to the bottom in social policy. Spending on social 
protection has been remarkably stable as a proportion of GDP and, although many 
member states are engaging in extensive reform of their welfare systems, this is more 
because of a need to react to population ageing than to competition from the rest of the 
world. Similarly, progress on gender issues such as equality of pay has continued – if 
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Manifestly, an important aspect of globalisation is that the world’s two most 
populous countries – China and India – have reintegrated into the world economy after 
decades of comparative isolation. Together with the reintegration of former communist 
countries in Europe, this has meant that the supply of labour available at the global 
level has greatly expanded. Debunking is nonetheless needed on economic threats. For 
example, the idea that India’s production of engineers and China’s emerging R&D 
focus will swamp the EU has, at worst, only limited credibility. While there are 
legitimate fears about the propensity of some emerging economies to adopt 
mercantilist policies that result in growing trade surpluses and an apparent exodus of 
jobs from developed countries, an important lesson from European integration is that 
new member states boost demand. In other words, the huge increase in the global 
l a b o u r  p o o l  i s  a l s o  a  h u g e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  g l o b a l  c o n s u m e r s .  M o r e o v e r ,  
China cannot continue indefinitely to rely on export growth, if only for straightforward 
arithmetic reasons; it must then turn to domestic demand, especially as before long 
China will have to provide for its own ageing population, implying some unwinding 
of its foreign reserves. Already, China is engaged in a profound debate on how to instil 
better labour standards and how to build its own forms of social protection. 
A distinctive feature of the present wave of globalisation is the intensity of 
(mostly two-way) capital flows, including foreign direct investment (FDI). Although, 
for most OECD countries, FDI still accounts for a relatively small proportion of overall 
investment, it is a key source of capital and know-how for a number of developing 
countries, and also has been significant for some EU member states such as Ireland. 
Asian investment in the richer countries also deserves to be highlighted. Nor is 
offshoring certain to be an inexorable or one-way trend. Some companies have brought 
call-centre jobs back from India to the UK. The relationship between wage relativities 
and the benefits of offshoring is complex (de la Dehesa, 2007) and unpredictable as 
technology evolves. 
While the overall impact of globalisation offers the potential for increased 
prosperity and often the reality of it, it would be disingenuous to claim that there are 
not drawbacks. Certainly, there have been changes that run counter to the tenets of 
some social models, especially the overall observation that inequality has tended to 
increase (as discussed below). Still, the trends and the possible causalities involved 
need to be examined with considerable care.  
12.1.2 Growing inequality? 
Over the last few decades, and thus the period associated with globalisation, there has 
been some evidence that inequality has increased in EU member states, although the 
trends have been far from stable. The period between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s 
was characterised by inequality increases. At the same time, this period coincided with 
the most intensive economic and social transformations of the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe that have recently acceded to the EU. The period between the mid-
1990s and 2000 showed a mixed picture again. In some traditionally low inequality 
(Nordic) countries a large increase in the Gini coefficient was observed, signalling 
greater inequality, but for the rest of the countries either no change or a very minor 
change was visible. Analytic work (see chapter 8) suggests that the relationship 
between the trend of openness and inequality is inconclusive. Most of the spells in 
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globalisation is not a necessary precondition for an increase in inequalities. Nor did a 
significant gain in openness always lead to a change in inequalities as measured by the 
change in Gini coefficients (out of the 18 such spells of openness increase only 4 
showed a significant rise in inequality). There were some spells when increased 
openness coincided with increased inequality, but this was not a consistent result.  
There has been no evident overall tendency towards an increase in interregional 
income inequalities in Europe in the past two decades. Overall, inequality between 
regions has stagnated or decreased, with a marked fall of between-country inequalities 
and a rise of within-country regional disparities.  
It is also demonstrable that skill-biased technological development explains more 
of the variance in inequality changes than the rival trade theories. Even so, an 
important part of the observed phenomena remains unexplained by any of these 
theories. Among the alternative explanations, a plausible one is that institutional 
settings (actual patterns of welfare state activities) play an important role in shaping 
inequalities. It is not the welfare state in general, but the type and efficiency of the 
welfare state that matters, and it is conceivable that some welfare states will be more 
vulnerable than others will to the tides of globalisation. Equally, the evidence suggests 
that the most efficient and adaptable social and economic policy regimes can readily 
accommodate globalisation. 
12.2  Effects on public finances and the pressures on social protection systems 
It can be argued that the many forms of globalisation, together with trends in 
demography, have gradually sucked Europe into a spiral of low growth and high 
public expenditure. A driving force behind this spiral is the difficulty of reforming 
social policy in Europe in a way that stimulates growth while preserving social 
cohesion. Low growth rates and high unemployment rates put a heavy burden on 
public finances, curbing the scope for fiscal policy to be used to support the growth 
process. It is evident that implementing policies promoting growth is a necessary 
condition for being able to finance policies aimed at improving social cohesion. As 
globalisation accelerates further, both costs and benefits will tend to rise, with costs 
such as higher unemployment and increased inequality concentrated in the short run 
while benefits in the form of lower prices, higher productivity and income will only 
occur later on. Hence, the main challenge for Europe is to promote policies that 
maximise the benefits while reducing the costs of globalisation and optimising the 
sequencing of policy interventions. The following key messages arise: 
•  Weakening the welfare state and thereby undermining social cohesion is not a 
prerequisite for reaping the benefits of globalisation in terms of economic 
growth. Moreover, the introduction of measures that may threaten social 
cohesion even in the short run, such as reducing employment protection, is only 
one possible way of arriving at a more flexible economic environment. An 
alternative ‘high route’ would include more investment in training and product 
market liberalisation. 
•  In contrast, a strong welfare state is a prerequisite for coping with the social cost 
of globalisation. In addition, a strong welfare state may stimulate growth by 
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•  Nevertheless, the majority of social systems in Europe are under significant strain 
owing to the social impact of globalisation combined with the effects of factors 
unrelated to the globalisation process, such as the low efficiency of welfare 
systems and population ageing. 
•  Therefore, it is conceivable that at some point welfare systems may not be able to 
safeguard social cohesion in Europe. Clearly, this outcome is not politically 
acceptable in Europe. 
•  To avoid a damaging breakdown in social cohesion it is urgent to reform social 
systems in a timely yet well-sequenced way that combines social protection with 
endowing individuals with the necessary abilities to manage steadily increasing 
risks. 
•  Reforming the social system may entail short-run costs in order to achieve 
medium-term benefits. Thus, policy-makers may be reluctant to introduce 
reforms if the horizon for reaping the benefits exceeds the policy-makers’ 
expected terms in office.  
•  Some form of central EU policy or policy coordination at the EU level may hence 
be required for two reasons. First, intensified international competition, desired 
redistribution and local decision-making form an inconsistent trinity. Second, 
applying reforms decided at the EU level can reduce (although not in all 
circumstances) the political cost of these reforms for national policy-makers. 
•  Still, preserving national flexibility is important since the needs and 
characteristics of individual economies and societies are best known at the 
national level. Future EU policies need to be flexible enough to meet needs at the 
national level.  
A sense of perspective moreover has to be maintained in discussing 
globalisation, even if the trend on all the relevant indicators of internationalisation 
tends to be upwards. Not all jobs are subject to international competition, even 
indirectly, and this will remain the case. On the contrary, a substantial share of jobs in 
personal services (both publicly and privately produced), local production of goods, 
construction and public administration are largely immune to external competition. 
Plainly, overall prosperity and thus the demand for non-traded goods is correlated 
with competitiveness, but EU ‘domestic’ demand will always be a significant influence. 
New technologies can be expected to increase the proportion of currently non-traded 
jobs (notably in services) that can be traded, but they will still constitute a low 
p r o p o r t i o n .  S o m e  s u c h  j o b s  w i l l  f a c e  c o mpetition from immigrants, but even this 
phenomenon will be subject to controls imposed on the number and characteristics of 
immigrants. In any case, migrants boost domestic demand in host countries. 
12.3  Policy responses 
Countries can, and do, adjust to globalisation and there is no great mystery about what 
is needed. It can be argued that the core of a social policy response is in the following 
main policy domains: education and training, immigration policy, labour market 
reforms and the reshaping of social protection. These policy domains are inevitably 
interconnected and these connections have to be stressed, while also being linked to 
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a Balkanised one. In this regard, the breadth of the EU’s post-2005 Lisbon and 
sustainable development approaches has to be commended, with the former now 
becoming a much broader economic governance framework. The trouble is that 
delivery has lagged behind. 
Policy needs to be integrated, not least because change is not confined to the 
economic sphere, where the large manufacturing operations based on a relatively 
homogeneous workforce employed in assembly-line work are becoming less and less 
significant. The social sphere is changing too. People no longer live mainly in nuclear 
families, having children at a fairly predictable age and facing only transient problems 
with employment that are easily dealt with through unemployment insurance. In a 
society where a bad mix of skills can lead to lifelong poverty, the premium on good 
education and lifelong learning opportunities is increasing.  
12.3.1 Flexicurity and beyond in the reform of social protection 
A common feature of the European social models is that it is considered a key task for 
public policy to provide a certain degree of collective protection of the citizens against 
the risks that are not ‘insurable’ in the market. These aspects of public policy could 
perhaps be called ‘collective risk management’, but are increasingly analysed in terms 
of ‘social risk management’. This concept of social risk management is closely related 
to the notion of social protection as a productive factor and a key argument is that the 
more effectively a society lets the individual manage his or her risks, the higher the 
welfare gains for all. The implication for policy is that the welfare of individuals is 
enhanced by the right mix of market and state-based risk-management mechanisms 
that go beyond the narrowly defined social protection that dominated policy-making 
for most of the post-war era. In the view of some observers, the era of classical social 
policy has in fact come to an end and is being supplanted by a policy approach aimed 
at providing appropriate tools to enable the citizen to face up to the complexities of a 
life cycle lasting almost a century. The state, in other words, is altering its role from 
that of ‘provider’ to that of ‘enabler’. 
From this perspective, we argue that in the 21st century, we cannot collectively 
protect the individual against all risks nor offer comprehensive social security, but that 
as a minimum we must offer a policy framework within which the individual can plan 
the life cycle and benefit from a collective management of uninsurable risks. We see no 
contradiction between adopting such a basic principle for social policy and pursuing 
the fundamental objectives of the Lisbon agenda. Yet, the principles of empowerment 
and social risk management would seem to us to go far beyond the labour market 
emphasis that is at the heart of today’s conception of flexicurity.  
Reinventing the welfare state requires much more than and indeed something 
beyond just combining flexibility and security. The security element of flexicurity tends 
to be portrayed as an assurance to the worker that his or her income will be protected 
in return for agreeing to more flexibility in the work environment, with the focus on 
protection of the worker rather than the job. This shift appears to work well in some 
settings, but the degree to which the approach is transferable is open to question. It 
also tends to leave out of the equation the protection of those more distant from the 
labour market either because of social exclusion or because of their stage in the life 
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Hence, further thinking about the nature of flexicurity is needed, perhaps 
restoring solidarity more to the equation than is sometimes the case when flexicurity is 
(and is certainly perceived to be) portrayed almost exclusively as a labour-market 
policy concept. At the same time, it is also important to recognise the salience of the 
many transitions in the labour market, as well as to and from work. The relationship 
between work and non-work is becoming more complex (Policy Network, 2006), and 
its features include both passive and active aspects, rights and obligations, and 
incentives alongside benefits. Protection is needed, but of an appropriate kind.  
Reform of social protection also has to exhibit sensitivity to new demands, a good 
example being migration. The empirical studies reported in chapter 7 show that 
migration has had little discernible impact on indigenous labour. Nonetheless, all the 
indications are that the extent of migration will increase and this will require a 
concerted policy response, from the perspectives of both labour supply and human 
capital. Skilled migrants can be a source not just of filling gaps in the labour market, 
but also of a competitiveness-enhancing increase in labour supply. As such, they 
constitute an element in the wider strategy to boost human capital. Social protection 
systems consequently need to evolve to ensure the better integration of immigrants. In 
parallel, there is a political challenge to be confronted to convince indigenous 
populations that immigrants should not be seen as competitors for scarce jobs and 
social benefits (and thus a threat), but as contributors. 
12.3.2 The primary role of enhancing human capital 
In a long-term perspective, investments in human capital should be expected to deliver 
a higher rate of growth as well as a higher degree of income equality and added labour 
market flexibility. This view is in line with notably the recent argumentation of Esping-
Andersen (2006), in favour of shifting the emphasis in social and welfare policy 
towards childcare and education of the younger generations, a standpoint echoed by 
Giddens (2007). Returning to its role as a basic driver of socio-economic developments 
discussed in the introduction, a number of conclusions about human capital can be 
derived. 
•  The frequently discussed employment gap between the EU and the US seems to 
be largely an education gap: for given levels of human capital endowment, the 
rates of employment are not very different in the EU and the US, but the share of 
low-skilled labour in the total labour force is much higher in the EU than in the 
US. 
•  Differences in skill levels also stem from a strong age gradient in the EU 
countries. On average, the human capital endowment of the elderly in the EU is 
significantly lower than that of the younger generations, while in the US there is 
much less of a difference between the different cohorts in this respect. 
•  The strictness of employment regulation appears to be negatively associated with 
the endowment of human capital – high levels of employment regulation are 
mainly found in countries with a relatively low level of human capital. 
•  Income inequalities, even after transfers, also appear to be negatively associated 
with human capital endowment, with high levels of income inequality mostly 
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•  OECD countries appear, nevertheless, to be split into two groups: corporatist and 
liberal, with the latter associated with higher degrees of income inequality and 
higher levels of employment protection than the remaining countries. 
These correlations should not be interpreted as time-invariant causal 
relationships. The explanation may perhaps be found in the functioning of the political 
system and the civil society: a workforce with a low level of educational attainment 
may appear less capable of adjusting to rapid structural changes and of adapting to 
innovation and new technology. Social groups and countries with low levels of 
educational attainment may therefore press more strongly for protection and offer 
m o r e  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  c h a n g e  t h a n  g r o u p s  a n d  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  h i g h e r  l e v e l s  o f  h u m a n  
capital endowment. 
12.4  The policy process 
In the last few years, the EU has progressively put in place a system for economic 
governance that can be seen in part as a response to different facets of globalisation. 
From a governance perspective, one of the most contentious issues was (and remains) 
the ability of the European social model and the policies that lie behind it to provide 
significant ‘added value’ to national policies. The sustainable development strategy 
highlights social and environmental dimensions, while also acknowledging the 
responsibilities of the EU towards developing countries. The Lisbon partnership for 
growth and jobs lays considerable stress on the competitive dimension, and can be 
regarded as setting the agenda for reforms consistent with intensifying competition, 
while the different forms of the open method of coordination applied to social policy 
serve to keep social cohesion as a policy objective prominent in policy thinking.  
Two concepts are central to the political and academic discourse: the 
modernisation of the European social model and the synchronisation of employment, 
social and economic policy coordination processes. In these processes, a key 
orchestrating role is played by the European Council, while the methodological 
paradigm for social policy has become the open method of coordination. To achieve 
policy coherence, an important linkage is that between the economic and the social, 
captured in the expressions ‘feeding-in’ (the reform of social protection and social 
inclusion policies to advance Lisbon objectives) and ‘feeding-out’ (the effects of 
economic reforms in improving employment and other variables that help lead to 
greater social cohesion). Feeding-in can be seen as an extension of the notion of social 
protection as a productive factor that underpins many recent initiatives to modernise 
social protection systems. In parallel, the concept of ‘active inclusion’ that is a central 
component of the EU’s social inclusion strategy can be seen as a means of enhancing 
the EU labour force, and thus as contributing to the competitiveness that the EU 
requires to confront globalisation. In a way, the feeding-in/feeding-out concepts 
amount to a refinement of social justice: contrary to the basic argument of John Rawls, 
the task of public policy is not to ensure social cohesion by paying off the poorest 
member of society but to provide the tools and endowments to teach him/her to fish! 
Is the policy structure adequate? Clearly, one of the main shortcomings has been 
delivery rather than strategic aims, but the aims also have to be looked at afresh in 
constructing a social policy for the future. There is plainly unfinished business, not just 
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example the links between competition policy and the propensity to innovate. Here the 
open method of coordination can help, but it needs to go beyond ritualised reporting 
and more intensive efforts are necessary to exploit the opportunities for policy 
learning, experimentation and innovation. 
In the labour market, a nuanced approach to flexibility is needed so as to be 
capable of assisting those outside the reach of conventional policies. In particular, some 
differentiation of labour market policies according to the level of education of the 
various age groups as well as by gender is desirable. As the discussion in chapter 11 
indicates, there is likely to be a spread of employment effects of globalisation into 
previously unaffected occupations. Consequently, what has to be confronted is the 
fundamental issue of empowering the individual and ensuring collective management 
of the risks that cannot be insured by the single person. It could be argued, perhaps, 
that we are here facing a subject that would be ideal as a governing issue for 
coordination at the level of the EU. But then the question of forms of coordination 
arises. Notably, there is an uncertainty about whether the open method of coordination 
goes far enough or has appropriate incentives (and sanctions). 
More generally, there is an increasing need to consider how childcare, education, 
family policy, labour market policy, unemployment allowances, maternity and 
paternity allowances, lifelong learning, health and long-term care and retirement 
schemes can contribute to enhancing the empowerment of the individual during the 
life cycle while ensuring an efficient management of the uninsurable risks. 
Furthermore, it is not possible to draw strong distinctions between the social impacts 
of globalisation and those caused by other factors, especially the emergence of the 
knowledge society. 
Thus, globalisation is only one argument for reinventing the welfare state and we 
see little or no support for arguments in favour of taking measures only to 
‘compensate’ those who suffer most from globalisation. An underlying thesis about 
globalisation is that it must ultimately lead to the EU becoming more like the US in 
social terms. We argue instead that welfare systems respond to new paradigms and 
associated risks, not by cutting back, but by reconfiguring in ways consistent with 
values. It is these values that continue to be the heart of the European social model and 
not the levels of expenditure or the preservation of specific benefits or rules. 
12.5  Recommendations 
This section recapitulates the foregoing discussion and puts forward policy 
recommendations. As noted earlier, the fears about globalisation tend to be overstated 
and distorted by flawed analysis and political grandstanding. It is therefore important 
to stress the benefits and opportunities as well as being realistic about the risks. At the 
same time, the risks cannot be ignored and need to be soberly assessed if they are to 
result in well-conceived policy choices. 
The process of globalisation, including its drivers and social consequences, is 
summarised and illustrated in Figure 12.1 at the end of the chapter. The main drivers 
(enablers) are on the left-hand side, various aspects of the globalisation process are in 
the middle part and the (potential) social consequences and the policy 
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Globalisation reinforces tendencies to diminish ‘local solidarity’, to pit one 
welfare system against another and to expose the individual to a higher degree of 
unpredictability and risk. Yet these processes are not inexorable, especially if a 
coherent, EU-wide response is put in place. Much can be achieved by using the tools 
and methodology of the open method of coordination to enable member states to learn 
from one another and to improve their own policy performance, but it is also crucial 
for the social dimension of policy to be fully incorporated in wider policy processes, 
such as the partnership for growth and jobs.  
Responding to globalisation is only one rationale for reinventing the welfare state 
and would miss a trick if it meant no more than compensating those who suffer most 
from more intense international competition. Policy mechanisms and institutions have 
to be adapted to the changing economic environment, recognising that ensuing social 
effects are not always directly attributable to globalisation, but result from the reactions 
of employment and wage formation. 
As previously mentioned, the core of a social policy response is in the following 
main policy domains: education and training, immigration policy, labour market 
reforms and the reshaping of social protection. This list implies that policy needs to go 
beyond the largely labour market focus of much of the flexicurity agenda. As the 
discussion in the 2007 Joint Employment Report (Council of the European Union, 2007a) 
shows, flexicurity is seen as being about activating workers by providing pathways 
into employment, lifelong learning and the reform of labour laws. Social protection 
reform is on the list, but still with a bias towards the labour market, such that there is a 
risk of neglecting the social impact on the economically inactive or those segments of 
the population that do not fit into neat labour market categories, including immigrants. 
While many of the transitions induced by globalisation are within the labour market, 
allowance has to be made for transitions to and from the world of work. Although the 
scope of flexicurity as most recently defined extends to all transitions, the key will be 
whether it does so in practice. Social justice, as articulated by Anthony Giddens and his 
colleagues in the Policy Network, implies more than jobs.  
Thus, the combination of flexibility and security should be brought about by a 
rethinking and reshaping of social protection, while having sufficient regard to 
solidarity. New ways should be found to manage social and individual risks so as to 
stimulate adaptation to the new patterns of social change. 
With regard to education, training and skills, these can and should be enhanced 
by due attention to the level of education of vulnerable target groups. It is especially 
important to extend adult training and learning beyond those who already have a high 
level of educational attainment, particularly low-skilled workers and those most 
distant from the labour market.  
Labour market adaptability should be enhanced, but within a context of 
solidarity and a framework addressing the individual endowments of workers. 
In relation to migration, there is an evident need for new, more comprehensive 
policies to promote the social integration of different types of migrants into the 
economy and society of the host country. Hence, an active approach to the inclusion of 
immigrants should be part of solidarity as well as labour market integration. Moreover, 
national migration policies are bound to have externalities for other member states, 
and thus establishing common EU principles and approaches is a pressing matter.  182 | BEGG, DRAXLER & MORTENSEN 
 
Aiginger (2005) presents a table in which he contrasts the attributes of the ‘old’ 
and ‘reformed’ models of the welfare state in Europe. Although his focus is on the 
“ability to create welfare” (his definition of competitiveness), his table can also be 
interpreted to address some of the issues posed by globalisation. In Table 12.1, a 
similar exercise is presented, drawing partly on Aiginger’s insights, but bringing in 
additional elements. Manifestly, no country exhibits all the attributes in the right-hand 
c o l u m n  o r  n o n e  o f  t h o s e  i n  t h e  l e f t - h a n d  o n e ,  b u t  s o m e  E U  m e m b e r  s t a t e s  c a n  b e  
characterised as being more ‘column one’ than ‘column two’ and vice versa. 
Table 12.1 Synthesis of the changing focus of social policies in response to globalisation 
Outdated or increasingly 
less effective approaches 
Approaches consistent with  
benefiting from globalisation 
The different components of flexicurity 
Strong protection of existing jobs  Support for the individual to redeploy 
Passive income support for the 
unemployed 
Active labour market policies 
Easy access to early retirement  Encouragement of older workers 
Rights to a range of social services and 
benefits 
Conditions for eligibility 
Protections linked to employment  New interpretations of social justice 
The economic activity model 
Male, full-time breadwinner  Gender mix with flexible working hours 
Industrial policy that promotes 
‘champions’ 
Small and medium-sized enterprises and new 
sectors 
Manufacturing as a core activity  A knowledge economy 
Regulated labour and product markets  ‘Better’ regulation; flexibility in managing 
companies 
Stability Growth 
Physical capital  Human capital and research 
Marginalisation of migrant workers  Economic and social integration of migrants 
 
The challenge facing welfare reform is not about defending or opposing levels of 
social expenditure or casting doubt on specific benefits or rules. Successful welfare 
states respond to new paradigms and associated risks, not by cutting back, but by 
reconfiguring in ways consistent with values such as those espoused by the European 
social model. Our fond hope is that the discourse on globalisation can be altered to 
reflect this analysis. 
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Figure 12.1 Schematic overview of the process of globalisation 
Drivers 
Aspects of 
globalisation 
Social 
consequences 
Social policy 
recommendations 
 
Positive feedbacks 
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transportation 
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movements 
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